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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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10 May 1991

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### League Reviews Agreements, Seeks Member Cooperation

91P40246A London AL SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
21 Apr 91 p 3

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned from sources in the Arab League's General Secretariat that it is currently conducting a comprehensive review of all Arab agreements signed under the Arab League's constitution, and is trying to contact member countries to implement the clauses of these agreements. The League is asking the countries who did not approve these agreements to approve them and to inform the Secretariat accordingly. The sources noted that Egypt has approved most Arab agreements signed between 1979-1989, and has informed the General Secretariat of this. The latest Arab cooperation agreement is in the area of organizing and facilitating relief operations, which the League agreed to on 22 September 1987 in its 88th regular session.

### New Direction for Franco-Maghreb Relations Urged

91A40290A Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Abraham Serfaty, Moroccan prisoner of conscience: "Franco-Maghreb Relations and the 'Pax Americana'"]

[Text] There is a great deal of concern in France these days, among politicians and academics who study the Maghreb and the Arab world, about patching up relations with the Maghreb, which it is thought were "damaged" by the Gulf war.

"It is thought," I said. For in fact they were not damaged by the Jaguar raids over Iraq: they were shattered, at least in the minds of the Maghrebian peoples. Certainly, for the "leaders" met by Mr. Vauzelle, a "gesture of good will, of economic cooperation"—meaning money—would suffice to repair the damage.

But we are dealing here with a serious problem, and I wish to set out here several truths, in hopes that these academics, and more generally all friends of the Maghreb in France, will reflect on them.

First, the ultimate fate of the Maghrebians will not be decided by the current leaders of those states, but by their people. Here, in Morocco, the 3 February march in Rabat provided a foretaste—but only the tip of the iceberg—for those who have followed events in recent months in Morocco.

Second, in terms of the concrete situation here, the most probable outcome, at least for Morocco, is not that fundamentalist nightmare whose specter haunts France, but rather a progressive option. But clearly it will not be content with a democracy stuck in what Gilles Kepel calls an "inegalitarian" relationship with Europe; rather, it will build an authentic democracy, just as it will strive for "equal-to-equal" relations with Europe. It is clear too

that such an alternative will require a clean break with the present order, a status quo that Europe still finds somewhat distasteful.

### Arab-Berber Unity

It is also conceivable that progressive forces in Algeria and Tunisia, although they have a lot of catching up to do, will eventually be able to overcome both the current dependency structures and fundamentalist demagoguery. The structural contradictions between Islamism and the cultural and historical foundations of our Maghrebian countries have already been described elsewhere, but it is important to understand that progressive forces can only carry the day if they incorporate the profound aspirations of the oppressed masses of our countries, which make up 80 percent of their populations.

Third, I mentioned "oppression." The dependency structures in our countries—structures supported by the parasitic dominant classes—are responsible for this oppression, which has been noted by many experts on the Third World and that can be dissolved only by a liberation along the lines preached by "liberation theology" in Latin America, not by some kind of magical catharsis. And such liberation brings into play not only all the economic and political problems discussed in social theory texts, but also the identity problems that were "negated" (in the strong, Hegelian sense of the term) by that oppression.

When the progressive forces of the Arab world failed to understand this, they were overtaken by ideologies that elevated to mythic proportions one or another idealized component of our identity—religion and/or some mystical concept of the Arab soul.

Because whether Gilles Kepel likes it or not, the Maghrebian peoples cannot be separated from the Arab world and Arabism. At a deeper level what we have is an Arab-Berber unity; it is rooted in a multimillennial symbiosis between the North African tribes and their lands, a symbiosis that has been enriched and broadened into the concept of a nation by the Arabic contribution, with Islam—principally Kharijite and then Sufi Islam—as its ideological support. This unity is what will enable the progressive forces in the Maghreb to overcome the Islamist myth, but only if they rely on that identity as an indivisible whole—and on this point, personal identity theory and social theory converge; likewise, such a line of march would make it possible for them to escape the mythicized conceptions of Arabism which the Ba'th party has exploited so successfully in the East. But none of that can rob the Maghreb of its Arabness.

During the war of destruction against the Iraqi population, all the regions of Morocco, including—if not especially—the Berber regions, demonstrated unflagging solidarity with the Iraqi people. As a Berber-Arab people, nothing separates or could ever separate Morocco and the Maghreb as a whole from the rest of the Arab world, whose heart—our heart—is Palestine.



Fifth, it is therefore incumbent on France, if it wants to restore durable, strong ties to the peoples of the Maghreb, to reassert the Gaullist policy of national independence; it must break the shackles of dependence that tie it to American policy. The Arab peoples know they can expect nothing from the "pax Americana," whatever fine words may emerge from the present talks. They do not forget; they will never forget the bombs over Baghdad (that name so dear to the hearts of all Arabs, excluding of course the Quislings of the "coalition").

Neither will we Moroccans forget the names of Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Max Gallo, Claude Cheysson, Gisele Halimi, Gilles Perrault, Harlem Desir, Julien

Dray, the "75," or all those organizations and movements that saved the honor of France. We will not forget them, for they saved—for us, as well as for themselves—the France of Light and Liberty.

"France, in Europe and in the world, can and must be the bastion of reason, dialogue and cooperation between peoples," Jean-Pierre Chevenement has written recently.

With that kind of France, that kind of Europe, we will be able to rebuild ties of friendship. Not with a junior partner in a "world order" ruled by Washington and the City of London.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Changes in PNC Representation Sought

91AE0349A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
6 Apr 91 p 7

[Article by 'Abd-al-Jabar 'Adwan: "The Road to a Democratic Palestine National Council Has Been Paved"]

[Text] An examination of what Palestinians have been saying on all levels inside the country and abroad indicates that agreement on adopting the principle of expanding democracy by forming a new Palestine National Council [PNC] is almost unanimous. The momentum is such that demands are being made for sanctioning elections as a method for choosing members of this council. It is here in particular that the momentum could kill the idea of expanding democracy, causing a reaction and a setback which would solidify the council's method and present status, strengthen its members' positions, and firmly establish the manner in which those members are appointed. That is why regarding the question of the PNC, the demand for democracy must continue, and it must be based on elections. Other choices must be maintained, however. These include the remaining points about which Palestinians agree. Having choices is justified by the fact that in several areas, including the occupied land, the decision to hold elections is not merely a Palestinian decision. And that is why we must not go by the principle of "All or nothing at all."

Before talking about elections and other alternatives, I think it would be important to repeat the self-evident premises that underlie the principles of democracy. It would also be important to list the points that Palestinians agree on regarding the importance of revising policy and revamping institutions and the method that is used to do that.

For deputies and representatives in general, the importance of democratic elections lies in the fact that people's wishes are confirmed by their deputies in a council (or parliament). A deputy is accountable to his constituents in his small electoral district, and these constituents are the ones who can keep him in office or vote him out of office if he goes against their wishes or if they find someone better than he is. This is what makes a deputy committed to the opinion of his constituents in his electoral district. They are the ones who control his position in parliament, a position which is not associated with the positions of other parties and people of influence. Much can be said about the advantages of this method, but the foregoing summary defines the importance of the principle of holding elections according to small electoral districts whose sum total makes up the Palestinian people.

What has happened so far in the PLO and the PNC is very far from these principles. Deputies for the occupied land used to be appointed by the president of the council. Their names were kept confidential, and they did not

serve in their positions on the council. The remaining positions on the council were distributed to military organizations, prominent persons, independents, labor unions, and professional associations. But all these people were dominated by one or more factions, and they did not reflect the opinions of any significant segment of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the deputies were not full-time deputies. They attended the PNC's annual meeting, or they came to the meeting every several years for three or four days during which all matters were concocted in a variety of different ways. But what they came out with in the end were concoctions. This in no way means that all the decrees and policies of previous councils were not associated with the Palestinian people, but it does mean that the Palestinian people made it easy for council members to dodge their responsibilities because they were not elected by the people. Council members are frequently criticized for not carrying out their responsibilities and for not finding ways to carry them out. The excuse which was always given to justify that was a statement which says that circumstances do not permit anything better.

These Palestinian experiences and practices were preceded by lack of progress toward the independence which had been proclaimed late in 1988, and they were followed most recently by the repercussions of the Gulf crisis on the Palestinian people. Subsequently, popular and public discussions about the bases and principles for a strong Palestinian awakening were taking place between organizations and within every organization. They were even taking place within the Executive Committee and among leaders of the factions. But primarily, these discussions were taking place among the people inside the occupied land, on the pages of newspapers, and in people's homes. There was consensus or no disagreement in these discussions about the following bases and principles for a strong Palestinian awakening:

The legal authority is to be renewed and confirmed by means of a new national council. (The council's legal term is four years, and the present council was elected in 1985.) This does not mean that the present legal authority is being infringed upon or denied.

A new council is to be installed by means of direct elections which are to be held inside the country and abroad. Council members are to be elected according to population ratios in geographical areas, and the method of small, local electoral districts is to be employed. I would personally add here that "elections are to be held whenever and wherever possible."

A suitable number of seats in the council is to be designated for those who will represent the people inside the country, according to the population ratio.

The council is to determine public policies and it is to be encouraged to monitor these policies and become involved in their implementation on a daily basis. This is to be done by having the council's specialized subcommittees and leaders elected directly by the council.

This proposal is ideal and unblemished, but its demise lies in the fact that the Palestinian people could be prevented from holding elections in one place or another. I am referring here to the fact that there are Palestinian organizations and figures who are proposing that elections be held in the occupied land and in Arab countries under the supervision of the United Nations. If Israel declines, the demand for democracy and for elections would be brought to a standstill, and these factions and individuals would take advantage of that fact to gain popular support and consolidate the prevailing situation out of fear that they might lose their opportunity in the elections. This does not mean that the demand for elections under UN supervision should be quickly relinquished, but it does mean that the struggle must continue.

All this brings us back to the importance of finding alternatives which confirm the previous main elements and principles about which the people agree unanimously. If these alternatives cannot be applied everywhere Palestinian people can be found, the substance and the method of the elections would be changed. These alternatives are:

1. In areas where elections are impossible, such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, council members representing a local electoral district would be appointed by acclamation. Along with each council member who is appointed in this manner the electoral district would recommend a first as well as a second deputy to replace the council member if he is arrested. This will turn the matter into an issue of a broad struggle.

Because an electoral district is made up of all the residents of any town or camp, from 12,000 to 15,000 persons, (See details of that below.), it will be easy for those residents to agree on who will be recommended to serve as council member and deputy. In closed areas with a larger population, such as camps, villages, and neighborhoods, residents are entitled to representation by more than one council member. It is to be noted that individuals of different affiliations, gender, areas of specialization, and age are to be recommended. These individuals must, of course, be willing to go to work.

A high-level committee to monitor these recommendations can be set up. In those electoral districts where disputes develop, regional committees can be set up in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, and so on and so forth to monitor the process of recommending people to serve on the council.

This alternative approach guarantees at least that a council member will try to get close to the residents of an electoral district. It guarantees that all the Palestinian people wherever they may be will be represented according to their numbers in a given geographical location. The importance of having council members elected or recommended by a small electoral district is that prominent figures and upstarts who are out of touch with the pulse of the average man in the street are denied

access to the council. This is consistent with the spirit of the intifadah [uprising] and the accomplishments of its architects.

It would be a mistake to consider the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or Lebanon, for example, a single expanded electoral district. If this happens, a few persons who are established in one area will be elected, and they will not be directly accountable to those who voted for them. Such an approach will bring back favoritism, and those who will benefit from it will be a few persons who are featured in the media and people with money who are controlled by influential people. That is why small, local electoral districts should be sanctioned.

2. The second alternative, which is the less favorable of the two, involves setting up an expanded membership committee to accept personal nominations and local recommendations from individuals who would be sanctioned and approved according to the same distribution of small electoral districts. Specialists (men and women) with a good reputation and a variety of affiliations would be accepted as preferred candidates for each electoral district. This requires that all electoral districts be defined by name and by the number of people who will represent them according to the size of their population.

Neither elections nor either one of the two alternatives will deprive factions of the opposition, labor unions, or independents of their rights. All these groups are part of the people, and it is assumed that they are associated with everything that has to do with the people. Accordingly, the people will give everyone his due. Each one will have to take it upon himself to act and make the commitment to earn this right by becoming part of this small electoral district.

A number of council seats can be designated for those specialists and knowledgeable individuals who are not part of an electoral district of 15,000 persons so that they would not be denied involvement because of our proposals. Those specialists and knowledgeable individuals who do not become council members may be added to the council's action committees so that their experience can be utilized.

Now I come to the part where I explain the principles of distributing electoral districts among the areas where Palestinian communities are found, and I also explain how seats are to be distributed in the PNC.

There are 4.57 million Palestinians in the occupied land (the West Bank and Gaza), in the Arab countries surrounding Palestine, and in other Arab countries. Let's assume that the total number of Palestinians is 5 million and that some of them are outside the Arab homeland. Half of those (2.5 million) are refugees. It is important to make this clear for administrative reasons. UNRWA oversees those refugees by means of precise statistics about each individual and his location. This would make overseeing the elections and geographical distribution easier. There are camps and refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

The rest of the Palestinian people in occupied Palestine have Israeli identity cards which all those who are over 16 years old carry. They can be found in villages and cities where the number of residents is well known. The rest of the Palestinian people in Arab countries and in the world should have responded to the PLO's request one year ago to register in the PLO's offices. They were to pick up special identity cards for Palestinian citizens. The distribution of these identity cards may continue.

There are 500 seats in the PNC. Let's assume that 400 of those seats will be filled by people who are elected or chosen by one of the two aforementioned alternatives. That would leave a balance of 100 seats, and specialists or other individuals may be appointed to those seats. If the number of Palestinians were more than 5 million persons, a simple mathematical process will show that every 12,500 persons are entitled to representation by one person holding a seat in parliament. That is, approximately 7,000 votes only for those who are over 17 years old in each electoral district.

Thus if the town of Jericho (13,000 persons) had one seat in parliament, the town of Rafah and its camps (80,000 persons) would have six, and Khirbah Bayt Ta'mur, Hajilah, Khafar, and Batir (a total of 14,000 persons) in the area of Bethlehem would have one seat. Burj al-Shamali camp in Lebanon (12,700 persons) would also have one seat. Thus, whether council members are elected, if elections are allowed; whether they are recommended by residents of an electoral district; or appointed by a special committee, what matters is that, at the very least, total and detailed geographical distribution is taken into account.

This is not complicated at all, unless some people wish to make it so. Ultimately, no approval from Israel, from Arab countries, or from international [organizations] would be required. What will be required is good will. Asking for a new national council in the context of these principles does not mean at all that the legitimacy of the organization is being discredited. It rather means its legitimacy is being strengthened. Also, this has nothing to do with peaceful solutions and proposals for peace. Ultimately, however, a new national council will help realize peaceful solutions. Also, becoming involved in this matter and doing something about it will not impede the quest or the struggle for peace. Instead, it will make representation more meaningful and, therefore, everybody's effort, commitment, involvement, and sense of responsibility will become more meaningful.

## ALGERIA

### Minister Discusses Politics, Campaigning in Mosques

91A40321A Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Minister of Religious Affairs by 'Abd-al-Rashid Limwari: "Politics in Mosques Acceptable if Aimed at Unity"; place and date not given]

[Text] Taking politics out of the mosques was the talk of many parties before and after the local elections and still is up to now.

The government wants to neutralize the mosques and keep them away from partisan struggles in order to preserve their sanctity and inviolability. Some people believe, however, that this is an attempt by the government to maintain its control over the mosques to serve political ends.

There has been unrest inside the mosques with differing opinions and explanations as to their causes and sources.

There is a new concept aimed at banning partisan politics in mosques in order to maintain their sanctity, but certain Islamic parties believe this to be a lay concept.

In an interview we had with him, the minister of religious affairs offered clarifications in this regard, focusing in particular on the neutralization of mosques and their freedom to perform their honorable tasks. The following is the text of the interview:

[AL-SHA'B] Four draft executive decrees were issued recently aimed at reorganizing mosques. What are the objectives behind this action?

[Minister] There is a draft decree pertaining to the organization of mosques, another one pertaining to the organization of the Mosque Administration at the national level, one pertaining to the Mosque Establishment, and one pertaining to the clergy.

These draft decrees are in fact a practical implementation of the philosophy of the religious endowment law drawn up by the ministry and examined in the first session by members of parliament who will vote on it in a few days. These decrees were enriched during the Mosque Administration's national conference.

These provisions help the believers in their efforts to join hands in a more effective way with a view to developing mosques, teaching the Koran, and guiding religious action and education in the mosque. These are the major tasks the ministry and the associations are undertaking at the national level.

[AL-SHA'B] The Mosque Establishment incidents signify that the government is tightening its grip on the mosques. Does this mean that it had lost control before that?

[Minister] This notion, which we put forward in November 1989, was actually based on a trend that is contrary to this philosophy. It is aimed at expanding the sphere of scholarly and charitable action such as mosque construction and related social activities.

The Mosque Administration is not a department. It is comprised of scholarly capabilities available nationwide. The Scholarly Council, one of the Mosque Establishment bodies, is a scholarly board not yet made available to



others at the national level. It is open to all scholarly capabilities, including loyal preachers who have highly-regarded and recognized scholarly qualifications.

One of its tasks is to participate in religious-action revival and the distribution of human and material tools by spreading Islamic culture and thought and doing its part to preserve the nation's religious unity.

This council is composed of jurists, ulemas with a high level of scholarly education, and holders of scholarly degrees in Islamic studies.

The second council is the Building and Supplies Council which is composed of presidents of mosque associations, Koranic schools, and charitable organizations under formation, as well as other qualified people selected according to their specializations. It takes care of mosque and Koranic school construction, the outfitting and maintenance of such schools and mosques, and fund raising in cooperation with all associations that comprise the establishment, and with individuals and groups.

The other council is the Recitation Council [majlis "iqra"], made up of imams, Koranic instructors, Islamic education professors, mosque instructors, and tutors of Koranic school students. This council's function is to spread the Koran and facilitate its memorization by various means; teach the Koran to children and illiterates; teach required religious courses; study selections from Islamic traditions closely related to daily living and behavioral modification; look after the youth in their formative years; and develop mosques through lessons in Islamic jurisprudence and traditions, Koranic interpretation, and other Islamic studies.

As for the fourth council, it is a welfare council made up of imams and members of Islamic and mosque associations. Its functions are to preserve the sanctity of the mosques; protect their properties; stimulate the endowment movement and guide endowment investments and almsgiving; and take part in solving social problems.

This shows that we are far from strengthening the role of the Mosque Administration and that this vision takes religious life out of this administration and represents a program familiar to everyone.

[AL-SHA'B] Islam is a religion and a state, so how do you differentiate between what is religious and what is political in order to judge whether an individual or a party is engaged in political action?

[Minister] The Ministry of Religious Affairs' 1990 program, which we submitted in November 1989, included the philosophy of this vision from which we drew this unity, especially as the nation developed.

A policy aimed at the nation's unity and defense is at the heart of Islamic education and guidance. It is unimaginable to tell the imam to avoid these values and goals.

As for partisan action, it advocates alienation from certain persons and support for other persons, or, in

other words, it divides the people. Whereas that was acceptable in the one-party era when the mosque was the only forum for expressing a vision, we believe that the acceptance of partisan speech inside the mosques in this era of political expression is an assault on the people's unity. Political speech is one that seeks authority and homage, but homage has special rules in Islam.

For speaking for or against party leaders is an act of political propaganda, as is the slander and vilification of certain people from the pulpit when the audience is unable to reply. In this case, the imam is the judge and jury and the believers are the ones being judged if they are involved. This is what parochial political action is like.

[AL-SHA'B] The new organization consists of a return to a standard sermon at the mosque level. Is this not a new kind of politicization of the mosques?

[Minister] I do not remember a single word in the draft decrees about the sermon. On the contrary, the sermon is delivered by the imam alone out of his own conviction. The sermon is not a medium for specific designation because the aim is to coordinate efforts to attain the necessary goals. The imam is free before God, and our only interest is to offer the best education and training. The imams need continuous training.

[AL-SHA'B] Are there penalties for those who practice politics inside the mosques?

[Minister] Only for violations of the law when the imams or the people are assaulted and a suit is filed. There are no penalties, however, against those who practice politics in mosques.

[AL-SHA'B] It has been said that there is a police inspector at every mosque. How true is that?

[Minister] We have refused to bring the police into the mosques, and we do not wish to bring in the police to protect believer safety and peace of mind.

[AL-SHA'B] You have changed the name of the Islamic Affairs Inspectorate. Are you going to change the name of the ministry?

[Minister] The ministry attends to all Islamic, Christian, and Judaic affairs, and the minister is the intermediary between non-Muslim groups and the government.

### **Interior Minister Affirms Democratic, Fair Elections**

91AA0321B Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 29 Mar 91 p 6

[Article: "Minister of Interior in Press Conference: Are Elections a 'Plague' on Democracy?"]

[Text] These days, political speech in Algeria is distinguished by a desire to bestow on democracy a meaning compatible with the goals the people seek to accomplish in building a new Algerian society. However, such a

project is contingent, as the competent sides see it, on a whole set of concepts that must be present, such as social stability and dialogue which are two basic factors in shoring up democracy as a tool for a universal national edifice.

It was in this context that the interior minister, in the press conference he held at ministry headquarters, outlined three factors related in substance to the ongoing preparations for the upcoming legislative elections. One of these factors, basically, is calling attention to the parties' tentative approval of the amended bill that supplements the election law, with the exception of the "Salvation Front" that opposes the bill and refuses to deal with democracy which the people have affirmed by endorsing the 23 February constitution.

With regard to the electoral districting law, the minister emphasized that the number may exceed 550 districts, and the important thing, as far as the government is concerned, is to enable the voters to have access to the candidates and to ensure an effective representation of the segments of society.

In respect to violence, the minister narrowed the gap between the extremists' excesses and government power by saying, "We will not allow common rights to be violated and will not hesitate to do whatever is necessary to counter extremism," pointing to the events that occurred at Harshah Hall and the attendant open confrontation with violence.

By considering and reflecting on the conference's factors, we find that democracy in Algeria has a single concept, namely the parties' compliance with the people's decision, and it can never represent, under any circumstances, conduct that oversteps the people's will.

For further clarification, the minister affirmed, in the course of his talk, which the desire of the "government" to provide the necessary conditions for the upcoming legislative elections is a purely collective responsibility, and that the objectives in such a responsibility cannot be separated from their results.

By comparing popular, municipal, and national council election results and the subsequent accomplishments, in their light, of the direct and open "dialogue" experience at various levels, we find that the "awareness" that is gradually taking shape on the horizon calls for a reexamination of certain methods used to support democracy that do not allow going beyond "lines" agreed upon, either by assumption or in accordance with the 23 February constitution.

And, if the minister—and this is what we perceived—does not hide the disparate ability to overstep certain boundaries, this does not mean that the "experience" has [word illegible] in some of its aspects or that we [word illegible] the anticipated qualitative "leap", unless [word illegible] the mechanisms of serious democratic action inspired by collective convictions that, by necessity, are

bound to the philosophy of the people who believe in the need to pick the best method to practice democracy.

And apart from this strategic perspective, which defines objectives and regulates the relations of everyone, in the sphere of a new and distinguished experience, with everyone else, democracy merely turns into a flat shape that signifies nothing more than political groups that have nothing to do with reality.

And, in order for the government, as a responsible administrative apparatus, to avoid the mistake of overlapping jurisdictions that affect the natural course of the upcoming elections, it has drawn up a bill containing a set of concepts related to voters' rights and duties.

The government, as the minister said, does not intend to favor one political formation over another, and the principle, in all cases, is to respect the people's wish to bow to the majority's choice of the kind of "rule it believes can guarantee the country's higher interest."

The parties, in all their different platforms, will find the things that underscore our commitment to abide by the principle of "democracy" as an option for the collective exercise of power.

One more fact remains, namely that Algeria, which is embarking on a new stage of responsible democratic action, bears, as a people, the responsibility of opting for the choice that can move it from a single-orientation and single-decision to a multi-forum and multi-idea system.

An objective assessment of the nature of the new stage shows that this stage has special characteristics that require the people to rally around the proper formula for a new Algerian society that can guarantee the people in all walks of life the right to exercise democracy within boundaries drawn by the law and in accordance with the law and nothing but the law.

He concluded the press conference—which dealt with the subject of misconstrued democracy, including the phenomenon of "extremism" with regard to encroachment on the general freedoms that are guaranteed by the constitution—by underscoring the fact that the authorities have the ability to intervene to protect the people's rights and safety, and that the government, as an apparatus, cannot allow radical extremism at the expense of public security. Otherwise, the government alone would bear responsibility for going beyond the limits of the law, especially since some people are still prisoners of the delusion that they can impose what they believe without any consideration for what others believe but they themselves do not believe.

#### **FIS Split Over Participating in Elections**

91AA0358B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
15 Apr 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Qusay Salih Darwish: "FIS's Participation Settles Deep Differences Between Its Leaders"]



[Text] Paris, Algiers—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—By announcing its participation in the premature legislative elections which are to be held on the 27th of next June, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) has settled, even if only temporarily, deep disagreements in opinion among its leaders. Bouzidi, the FIS official deputy spokesman, and Ali Belhadj, the well-known FIS orator, oppose participation in these elections, contrary to what Abassi Madani, the FIS chairman, believes and advocates.

The tendency opposing participation believes that the current circumstances are not electorally convenient for the FIS because the front could suffer an election defeat that erases the credit it gained in last year's municipal elections.

Abassi Madani believes that the FIS could end altogether as a party if it refuses to participate because, since the legislative elections, it has not stopped demanding that the assembly be dissolved and that elections be held prematurely. The FIS has gone even further to demand the resignation of the president of the republic and the holding of presidential elections simultaneously with the legislative elections.

The other factor that Madani is taking into consideration, without necessarily declaring it, is that the FIS is not the only party in the fundamentalist arena and that it was able to beat the others, especially the El Guidance and Reformation Association, because the latter did not take part in the elections whereas the FIS was the forerunner in this regard and the forerunner in declaring the formation of a political party.

Those familiar with the conditions inside the FIS believe that the disagreement over participation in the elections is nothing but a part of broader and more general disagreements within the FIS leadership ranks, considering that internal opposition to Madani is escalating daily, especially among the second-line leaders and the educated youth who accuse Madani of offhandedness, opinion monopoly, and failure to apply the principle of consultation within the movement which has not yet convened its first constituent congress.

Meanwhile, all eyes in Algeria are riveted on the general strike urged by eight political parties in protest over the electoral law that the government has successfully passed in the People's National Assembly which delineates the electoral districts. Given the acute economic crisis, the intensifying discontent, and the government's preoccupation with its continued survival, many Algerians fear that this strike may turn into an explosion of acts of violence and riots similar to those of October 1988.

#### **Party Wants To Postpone Elections Due to Security**

91AA0325B Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Apr 91 p 3

[Algerian News Agency dispatch datelined Melat: "Algerian Party for Equality and Progress: Legislative Elections Must Be Postponed"]

[Text] The Algerian Party for Equality and Progress called yesterday for the "postponement of legislative elections because of a lack of security" as it urged the government to act with prudence and forethought and to prepare the people to select their representative democratically and openly without pressure or equivocation.

This recently authorized party with headquarters in the town of Chelghoum El Aid in Melat governorate said in a statement that "attempts to abort budding democracy in our country are evidenced by the use of violence and force of arms, suppressing basic citizen freedoms, and skirting the law to bypass the instruments and agencies of the state."

The statement denounced "all who would cause social strife and undermine civil peace" and called for serious dialogue and rallying behind a program for minimum development, especially in these difficult transitional times."

The party also called for "rewriting Article 86 of the revised electoral draft law which sets the age of candidates for the National Assembly at 30 years whereas the law governing political associations allows a 25-year-old to form a party."

The statement went on to say that the Popular Association for Unity and Action has, as an opposition party, given its blessings to that legislation and has expressed no reservations in its regard. The statement added that the Association favors not using mosques, primary and secondary schools, and institutes and universities for electioneering of any kind.

The Association concluded its statement by welcoming early legislative elections since their [results] will reflect the proportional size of each political organization in the field.

#### **Analysis Weighs Risks in Hamrouche's Self-Nomination**

91AA0339A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 11 Apr 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Qasiy Salih al-Darwish: "The Ticking Time Bomb Which Hamrouche Detonated Before the Central Committee's Most Important Meeting"]

[Text] The unexpected announcement made by Mouloud Hamrouche, Algeria's prime minister, that he would be a candidate for office in the country's legislative assembly when elections are held next 27 June is still spurring discussions, analyses, and questions in Algeria's political circles. It may be said that this announcement is tantamount to a time bomb whose timing device has been temporarily disconnected. It is a device incorporated by the prime minister into his policy so he can stay in power in the short term and succeed President Chadli Bendjedid in the long term or the not so long term. Mr. Hamrouche, whose preparations for this strategy go back to the time when he was secretary

general of the presidency, started implementing his strategy after he was appointed prime minister in September 1989.

Given the new political assumptions in Algeria, declaring oneself a candidate for office is a normal thing to do, but doing so one week before the Central Committee of the Liberation Front Party holds its meeting is unexpected. It is the Central Committee which is supposed to determine who the candidates will be or at least the standards for becoming one.

Two observations may be made here. First, Mouloud Hamrouche is not confident that he has the support of a majority of Central Committee members even though, with his own distinctive style of discussion and persuasion, he did manage to get that majority on his side more than once during the past months.

Mouloud Hamrouche must have realized that key figures in the Central Committee, who were the country's previous leaders, would declare their own candidacy. He must have known that these key figures, who are sometimes called "the barons" of the Liberation Front and other times "Boumedienites" or the stars of the Boumedienne era, are unequivocally popular with the rank and file of the Liberation Front who view them as the only candidates who can, with their political-ideological rhetoric, tip the scales in favor of the National Liberation Front with the man in the street who had turned away from the front because of the many mistakes the government did make in previous years.

By running for office under a new banner, that of the reform tendency of the National Liberation Front, Mouloud Hamrouche is blocking all attempts that are being made to effect a reconciliation in the Central Committee and to produce unanimous decisions which would make him one of a group rather than a leading figure on the authority's list.

By making this decision Hamrouche risked appearing to be splitting the ranks of the front before the elections, but he chose that risk over another which would have made him appear as a rebel against the front's unanimous decision after the meeting of the Central Committee. This is because being perceived as a rebel would not allow him, not even in theory, to become a leading candidate on the lists of the ruling front.

The second observation is this: Mouloud Hamrouche is making a switch by putting emphasis on "the reform feature" of the front. Instead of betting on the rank and file of the Liberation Front and its traditional public, who consider everything that was called political and economic reform to have been aimed at liquidating the National Liberation Front and putting an end to its historic achievements, he is betting on other segments of society who share the social and ideological background of other political parties and tendencies.

To put it more clearly, Hamrouche hopes that by declaring himself such a candidate in this unexpected

manner, he would appear to be the opposition leader, not only to the Salvation Front, but also to the National Liberation Front. Hamrouche is hoping that this will help him attract new constituencies of voters who will vote for him on that basis or because they would find him to be the least harmful choice.

Informed sources indicate that Hamrouche is considering running for office with his close ministers in rural areas or in remote desert areas which have not been reached by partisan activities. In those areas, which are usually loyal to those in power, the administration and local tribal interests can play a decisive part in the course of the elections and in their outcome as well.

Hamrouche is expected to push a number of young men, whose political ambition is due to personal, not ideological considerations, to run for office as members of his own tendency. He wants them to run against the other party inside and outside the Liberation Front. These young men would represent sensitive, local interests and balances.

Hamrouche has another problem in addition to the one he has in the Liberation Front: he has not yet found the political "opposition" force which will agree to form an alliance with him and organize a parliamentary majority after the elections. At the present time, however, this problem is being deferred because the basic alliances in Algeria will not be forged before the elections. These alliances will rather be forged after the elections or, at least, after the primaries.

Mouloud Hamrouche knows that he will be campaigning by himself this time without the support of President Bendjedid who had looked after him and protected him from failure more than once since the sixth Congress of the Liberation Front Party. On the other hand, he also knows that he can continue to rely on the support of Abdelhamid Mehri, the secretary general of the Liberation Front. Hamrouche also knows that he can rely on the support of the front's administrative machinery which tied its interests and its future to him.

By taking this step Hamrouche is taking a risk whose consequences are not guaranteed because he may lose on two fronts: that of the rank and file in the Liberation Front and that of the man in the street as well. Average Algerians have been declaring their dissatisfaction with the economic policy which Hamrouche regards as the foundation of his approach to reform and in whose name he has been governing.

And yet, Hamrouche is taking a very carefully calculated risk, and he is taking it after thinking long and hard. He knows that unless he takes this risk with its limited chances for success, his prospects for the future will not be brighter. In other words, he realizes that he no longer has anything that he should be afraid to lose. But this does not mean that his hands will be tied behind his back at the next meeting of the Central Committee. That

meeting will undoubtedly be the last one in the committee's history and the one whose importance and influence on its course will be greatest.

### **Party Leaders Air Economic Programs at Meeting**

91A40297C Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Said Ben Ayyad: "There Must be Practical Mechanisms Acceptable to All"]

[Text] As was expected, the first meeting between political party leaders and businessmen was no more than an occasion for party leaders to present their various programs and ideas concerning commercial reforms, while many of the businessmen expressed their regrets at what they perceived to be a lack of any practical results, which would give them the capability to undertake their work with the least possible losses.

It was noted how many of the businessmen defended their present and future with regard to the market economy, while few of them posed the question of higher national interests.

The meeting was an occasion to direct a good deal of criticism at the way reforms were being applied, which might lead to negative developments among the people.

The second day was distinguished by a meeting of the leaders and representatives of several political parties, who presented their various points of view to the businessmen concerning the political and economic reforms, especially those actually being implemented.

### **Ben Khedda: Crisis in Morals and Values**

The first interlocutor was Ben Youcef Ben Khedda, leader of the El-Oumma Movement, and former head of the first Algerian provisional government, who began his speech by saying that Algeria was currently in a situation that has absorbed our attention because of the domestic crisis, especially in the cultural and ethical fields, which has been complicated by the repercussions of the Gulf War. The analysis of the Gulf War is clear: how was it possible for the heroic Iraqi people, with only 17 million people, to stand fast against 30 countries, led by the United States, through 43 days of military aggression and several months of economic blockade? Starting with the destruction that the war left behind for the Iraqi people and their country, Ben Khedda said that a number of lessons could be learned.

Politically and economically, Iraq smashed the Israeli myth that it could not lose, and restored honor to the Arabs and Muslims. The war permitted the United States to gain hegemony over Arab wealth, by using sophisticated methods of mass destruction, and the threat of nuclear weapons.

After analyzing the repercussions on the Arab and Islamic community, Ben Khedda asked how the West could divide the Arab community, which did not allow Algeria the opportunity to unite Arab positions vis-a-vis

support and assistance for Iraq. He pointed out how the Zionist entity is brazenly disregarding UN resolutions under Western protection, while the Palestinians remain victims. Therefore, as he said: "These facts must be taken into account. The West is materialistic, selfish, and devoid of any humanism. Therefore, it prevents us from obtaining technology, and wants to reconfirm our subservience, particularly in foodstuffs, and widen the gap between us."

Ben Khedda added, in regard to this matter: "The West knows very well the traditions of the Algerian people, that they are profoundly attached to their Islamic values. Therefore the West, with its hidden hatred, will attempt to retain its hegemony over Algeria and, accordingly, try to delude us with democratic and humanitarian principles."

Ben Khedda said that overcoming these obstacles, and surmounting the problems and difficulties, would be possible if we believe in and apply the following principles: self-reliance; respect for national independence and unity of the people, and the defense of both; achievement of self-sufficiency; placing the public media at the disposal of political parties; relying on labor and not on oil exports; and, combatting theft, waste, and bribery.

The leader of the El-Oumma Movement continued his analysis, offering to the conferees an insight into his party's program, which "works for adherence to national, cultural, spiritual, and democratic values, and to achieve social justice in accordance with the November 1954 goals."

Ben Khedda then reviewed the negative aspects of socialism and capitalism, especially bribery and the disintegration of morals and values. He called for a return to Islam, and to obtain principles of action and work from Islam. He went on to say that change is required to achieve reforms, by renewing cadres in order to attain credibility.

As a result of debate with conferees, Ben Khedda stated that the failure of growth was due to giving preference to the material over the humanistic, and he criticized the "phenomenon of deceitfulness by officials, and the lack of candor on the issues. The reforms resulted from the incidents of October 1988 and, therefore, are not a gift from the government." Ben Khedda called for giving scope to political parties, so that they could participate in studying reforms, and urged the state to protect public companies, because the country is in danger.

### **Merbah: Stop the Barbarity of Liberalization**

Kasdi Merbah, chief of the Algerian Movement for Justice and Development, delivered his speech in French, because of his belief that the conferees would not understand Arabic. After discussing the repercussions of the Gulf War on our country, he criticized the deterioration of the economic and social situation, despite the fact that the country does not suffer from an economic blockade.

Merbah analyzed his party's position vis-a-vis the current situation, saying that the economy is heading toward liberalization, with a barbarity, marked by political black marketeering [trabendo]. He offered a number of solutions, which his party's program embraced, starting with commercial facts and figures. He expressed his opposition to the barbarity that the reforms are causing.

As for the representative of the Socialist Vanguard Party, al-Hashemi Sherif, he expressed his party's interest in the future of democracy, referring to the weakness of the national economy because of the dinar's instability. With regard to current reforms, the interlocutor called for consolidating them, along with breaking down the walls of mechanisms and methods of bureaucratic practices, and freeing prices from control. He then called for an alliance of directors and laborers, in order to create a kind of trust, including a wide-spread expansion with regard to clarifying his party's program, before requesting the appointment of a national economic and social council, in cooperation with businessmen, public authorities, and social organizations, in support of clarifying the issues.

However, one of those present interrupted to ask: "How can you defend labor on the one hand, and support the liberal program on the other?"

#### **Mehri: Deal With the Crisis Through Self-Reliance**

Then came the turn of the National Liberation Front [FLN] as scheduled; the speaker was 'Abdelhamid Mehri, who referred to the correlation between political and economic reforms. Mehri said: "Economic reforms—in their totality—are aimed at building democracy, that is, freedom to express views, organize politically, and alternate responsibility for governing. They are also aimed at dealing with the serious economic situation, which the country recognizes, whose effects became clear in the mid-eighties, and which still continue to this day.

"It is impossible to deal with the economic crisis without democracy, and this fact makes politicians disregard—to a considerable extent—what the national economy's dangerous situation requires. They only look at reforms from the narrow political angle and, therefore, we see many businessmen who feel a kind of isolation, as if they were unaffected by the ongoing political debate and openness."

Mehri stressed the importance of dialogue between political and economic practitioners, in order to clearly shed light on economic thinking for political public opinion. The role of the political party is to hear and understand citizens' complaints, and then offer solutions and proposals to deal with the various problems. He added: "There is almost a consensus that the economic crisis is a huge crisis of multi-faceted proportions and elements, which has been damaging in the past, and whose effects might be extended for a long time into the future.

Dealing with this crisis will require a long, difficult time and, more than anything else, it will require self-reliance."

Concerning the precise reforms, Mehri went on to say: "The FLN has worked through the government to crystallize them, and to begin to apply them realistically. There are some reforms that are still unclear and, therefore, they require endurance, work, sacrifices, and their allotment of fairness.

"Accordingly, mechanisms must be found to correct any deviation from the reforms." In this regard, he referred to the importance of everyone paying attention to the national establishments, and continuing the dialogue.

#### **Abassi Madani: We Must Cooperate To Find Solutions**

As everyone expected, Abassi Madani, the official spokesman for the Islamic Salvation Front, attended the meeting and delivered a speech. He said that there was no way to separate the economy and politics. Responsibility was shared jointly between them, and comprehensive reforms were unlikely.

He offered the Islamic concept of reform, saying that it means total change of all the community's conditions. He gave his view regarding the current situation, making clear that the crisis goes back to the beginning of independence, while deviation occurred on 19 March 1962, with the removal of the Islamic program, as stipulated in the statement of November 1954. He offered many criticisms of the present regime, calling on the businessmen to cooperate to bring forth positive and practical results that will put an end to the problems.

It is worth mentioning that, before business was concluded, a representative from the Social Democratic Party spoke, as well as Slimane Emirati, head of the Democratic Movement for Algerian Renewal.

#### **Hamas Leader Nahnah Discusses Political Alliances**

91AA0346B *Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*  
in French 4 Apr 91 p 17

[Interview with Mahfoudh Nahnah, Hamas [Zeal] party leader, by Bensalem Brahimi, in Algiers on 27 March 1991: "Hamas Party: No Partisan Use of the Mosques; No to Violence"; first paragraph is REVOLUTION AFRICAINE [REVAF] introduction]

[Text] The (Islamist) Hamas party filed its application for approval at the Ministry of Interior on Wednesday 27 March 1991. On this occasion, its chairman, Sheikh Mahfoudh Nahnah, met with (a few) representatives of the national media. He thus agreed to answer a few questions from REVAF [REVOLUTION AFRICAINE]. For Mr. Nahnah, the essential is to replace violence, interdicts, and diktats with a policy of "kindness" in everything as a political tool. In such a context, mosques should be free from partisan activism.



[REVAF] What is the nature of Hamas's relations with the Islamist formations?

[Nahnah] (obviously surprised) Why only the Islamist formations? Actually, the Hamas movement is trying to establish with other Islamist formations relations that will lead to common objectives and principles. Certainly, there are differences. It is a sign of the maturation of Islamic thought that rejects de facto political and party singleness as well as singleness of thought. The heightening of the prestige of Islam lies in the fact that Hamas tends to turn all ideas to good account, just as it aims to achieve a genuine enrichment of Islamic thought.

[REVAF] And what are your relations with the other political formations?

[Nahnah] We reject any kind of exploitation among the various parties and political movements. Take the mosques for instance. We agree to a politicization of the mosques. However, we are opposed to their use for partisan ends; like at the time of the single party, when the imams were forced to glorify the merits of the successive stages of the Revolution. Any party that respects the constants of society and its moral enjoys our consideration. In this respect, our principle is to cooperate on what was agreed, and to tolerate our mutual differences.

[REVAF] Your position, please, on the election law?

[Nahnah] Our position will be determined only after the election law has been promulgated, and when we know what the material situation of the parties is, and that should be before the election campaign. However, we submit that proxies should not be for more than three people.

[REVAF] Will your political formation have candidates in the elections?

[Nahnah] The election law must be amended, for instance to enlarge the scope of the consultation, and to provide for consultations with the parties concerned. That's all I can say. The Advisory Council will decide.

[REVAF] The legislative elections are approaching fast. Would Hamas consider alliances?

[Nahnah] For us, at Hamas, any alliance is based on our constants.

[REVAF] Mr. Nahnah, what is your reaction to the climate of tension and violence that is perturbing Algerian society?

[Nahnah] We are against all forms of legal and government violence. The Algerian social movement is working to achieve genuine and effective tolerance, to sow brotherhood among citizens, because confusion leads to violence. Violence leads to hatred, and hatred generates anarchy and the internal struggles that prevail in our society. Following the emergence of the notion of a new world order with its corollary, the "Bush" theory, we

must work incessantly to provide a climate of national unity in a context of coordinated efforts, dialogue and love.

[REVAF] What is Hamas's position concerning a transition government?

[Nahnah] It is rather necessary to provide a climate of stability and peace, both of which should also be guaranteed by the state under the law. That's all I can say for the moment.

### Commentary Addresses Saudi Financing of FIS

91AA0346A Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*  
in French 4 Apr 91 pp 17-18

[Article signed Z.F.: "FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] Financing: Money and the Cause"]

[Text] Is "polemic" the right word for the scandal that just broke out around the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] financing from abroad?

It is difficult to say. The authors of conflicting statements are such disproportionate characters, their motivations are so different and, above all, so far apart.... On one side, a prominent member of the Saudi royal family, minister of defense and the second-highest state official in his country. Apparently, he has nothing to gain by acknowledging—or claiming—that the Ibn Saud family financed Islamist parties, including the FIS; on the contrary, he may make enemies, or even cause serious diplomatic incidents as such financing would represent a serious interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. On the other side, the chairman and spokesman of a party notorious for its many about-turns, breaches of promises, and lies, a party that was caught many times making blatantly false statements without being able to show the slightest proof to the contrary.

Certainly, one might be tempted to suppose the existence of a Machiavellian destabilization plan aimed at Algeria (this would support Major General Khaled Nezzar's recent statements that, after Iraq, our country will be the second victim of the Pax Americana), a plan that would tend to increase the potential for a domestic conflict. One could just as easily imagine that what we have here is an operation aimed at putting the FIS back in the saddle by having public opinion believe that it is the victim of Saudi machinations because it sided with the Iraqi people. However, considering that since the FIS was created its leaders have accumulated the most unbelievable contradictions, with a dumb obstinacy that borders on madness, it is very unlikely that they will convince anybody, or even be given the benefit of the doubt. Especially considering the rumor that, when Messrs. Abbassi and Belhadj visited Baghdad during the Gulf war, Iraqi officials, who do not usually make unfounded accusations, reproached them for being financed by Saudi Arabia.

Especially, too, considering that the Iranians have just stated that the FIS had been in the pay of Teheran until recently, when it was cut off.

This being said, presumptions of guilt, no matter how strong and consistent they may be, do not constitute proofs, and legitimate suspicion is not enough to carry conviction. If it turns out, however, that the FIS received funds from one or more foreign countries, it would be in clear violation of the law on political associations, which categorically prohibits funding by a foreign party or another country. Such a violation of the law should therefore result, ipso facto, in the withdrawal of the incriminated formation's approval. Many people, both inside and outside political formations, believe that the question of the FIS financing—which is already viewed as a scandal—should lead to an in-depth inquiry after which the FIS should be cleared of the suspicions that hang over it or rehabilitated—since in Algeria the burden of the proof lies with the accusation.

At any rate, the FIS, whose recognition by the authorities is deemed illegal by many because it is a formation based on religion, finds itself, just a short time before the legislative elections, in a position that is all the more uncomfortable as, far from seriously attempting to dissipate the increasing hostility aroused by its members' violence and breaches of the law, it just uttered serious accusations, bordering on threats, against an institution, the National Assembly. Besides, many deputies have asked for legal action against the FIS which, in their opinion, has broken twice the law on political associations. Apart from the fact that many FIS militants have long made it a habit to trample the law underfoot, the matter of the FIS foreign financing makes this party, in the opinion of deputies and political formations, a mere lobby for extraneous interests and objectives.

### Interviewees Express Concern About Elections

91AA0346C Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*  
in French 4 Apr 91 pp 19-20

[Article by Mustapha Bensadi: "If All Democrats...."; first paragraph is *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE* introduction]

[Text] Based on acknowledged bitterness, and looking ahead to imminent elections, a "punishment vote of unhappy memory" (we were told in an almost guilty tone and with a low profile) is about to turn into a "forgiveness" or "repentance" vote. However, this would require, while there is still time, that "democratic formations stop behaving like children and, together with the FLN [National Liberation Front], finally decide to put an end to violent and fascist excesses, and to do so legitimately and in full compliance with the law." On this, many citizens aged 25 to 50 agree.

About 50 citizens of both sexes, civil servants or professionals, workers of diverse socioprofessional levels, from Bejaia, Algiers, Jijel, Constantine, Setif—all met by

chance, agreed to answer the following question for *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*:

"How do you see the forthcoming legislative elections in view of the current political activity throughout the country and the relations between parties?"

Mr. Zineddine A. (certified accountant), a former PSD [Social Democratic Party] member: "...I'm fed up; it's becoming childish. There are meetings of four, then seven.... A forum here, a forum there, congresses, mutual boycotts, mutual denigration...immature, some are party leaders in an opposition that, after all, is against itself. I'm rather pessimistic...."

Miss Soraya Z. (pharmacist), a FFS [Front of Socialist Forces] sympathizer: "...the legislative elections? I am afraid that...the way things are going. Because the Islamist formations have already formed a united front; that's obvious. Meanwhile it looks as if some leaders of multiparty democracy were having second thoughts, an unavowed allergy to democracy, to the principle of alternating the political party in power. This is serious considering that they proclaim loud and clear their attachment to democratic rules. We should be able to explore their subconscious...."

Mr. Mustapha O. (merchant): "...it appears clearly, and just as dishonestly that fascination with power, power alone is the sole priority in the minds of some leaders of large formations—although they are supposed to be in the avant-garde when it comes to the defense of democracy and human rights. In all this circus, when all is said and done, the one least moved by passion, the one least affected with political blindness, well, it's the FLN. The danger is that the other democrats have a negative fixation on the FLN and isolate it...."

Mr. Boubaker T. (CASOREC executive), former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] militant in Constantine: "...frankly, it's not hard even if it looks complicated. It's so obvious that, at least in the present stage, which is decisive and determining in establishing democracy for good—that's not a joke—the FLN is the keystone of the union of all democrats. If there are democrats, because the FLN at least had the courage to acknowledge, even if they did not spell it out, that there was a time when it was almost like the FIS, without beard and kamis, with its rows of medals from the 'yadjouze,' its speeches in the mosques, etc. Now, the FLN courageously pleads 'not guilty,' and I believe that it's true that there is some heck of a nuance between just one party and a single party. At any rate, in the next elections, that's for sure, there will be no 'punishment' vote any more. Because now we could kick ourselves black and blue. We, the ones who are divided."

Mr. El; Manaa-Dj, railroad worker: "...no one knows what the future will bring, but we can safely say that the FLN has now become a democratic formation. Certainly, it accumulated many mistakes but, as they say, success is a succession of mistakes. All it would take



would be for uncorrupted members, older and competent ones, to take over the leadership. And the ultimate test for the FLN is to rally all, absolutely all democrats around itself in the very next few days. This is vital for the security and true salvation of the country. I am neither skeptical nor optimistic."

Mr. Naim K., teacher, former RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy] member "...I blame the other so-called democratic parties for presenting themselves as saints, angels, cure-all parties whenever they speak of the FLN. We have not seen them yet; the FLN, that's true, is a fundamentalist party. But it wants to be the only democratic party. The same mistake is being made by the FFS [Front of Socialist Forces], the RCD. How stupid. We are already in the Islamic republic we are afraid of, with a passive government that condones it to boot."

Among students, apart from any political awareness, the prevailing opinion can be summarized as follows: The enemy is not the FLN. Neither is it any other simple Algerian, but rather certain hypocritical activist leaders obsessed with, and seduced by the highest office, and who do not hesitate to brandish the Holy Book every chance they get, without any qualms, who push the unemployed masses to mercantilism, to trading in anarchy in order actually to protect, justify and perpetuate fortunes, the industrializing industry. They are also in the pay of feudal or dictatorial Arab countries who are jealous of Algeria now that it has finally awakened. The FLN must react as soon as possible and not trust some members of the APC [People's Communal Assembly]. Confidence in the government and in the BP [political bureau], in the president of the Republic, that's all; and a Democratic Front that is a must to guarantee the future.

#### Columnist Describes U.S. Post-War 'Trap' for Arabs

91AA0325A *Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic* 25 Mar 91 p 12

[Column by Dr. Muhammad Bilqasim Hassan Bahlul: "An American Israeli Trap for Arabs"]

[Text] Three weeks after the American military onslaught against Iraq on 28 Feb 91, I am now absolutely certain that the White House administration—represented by its president, George Bush, who was director of the American Central Intelligence Agency in the 70's—is reluctant to expedite a resolution to two issues.

They are the withdrawal [of alliance forces] from occupied Iraqi territories and the liberation of the Palestinian people and the establishment of its independent state.

Reluctance to expedite a resolution to the first issue stems from the American administration's determination to "Lebanonize" Iraq. [This is to be accomplished] not merely by toppling Saddam Husayn's regime since

he is a strong political leader who, the U.S. administration fears, is capable of securing social stability in Iraq and of rebuilding Iraq even stronger than it was, as he did after the Iraq-Iran war.

The U.S. administration also seeks to engulf Iraq in a prolonged civil war that would result in territorial partitions and would destroy all means of economic and technological recovery. This is perhaps evidenced by the stance of the U.S. representative to the United Nations who was adamantly opposed to rescinding Security Council Resolution No. 661 which imposes an economic, fiscal, and military embargo on Iraq, even though Bagdad has acceded to all Security Council resolutions. He has furthermore maneuvered to hold up a Council resolution on a permanent cease-fire in order to maintain the allied forces, led by the U.S., in a continued state of war against Iraq and thereby apply constant pressure on that sister country. This, by God, is as clear as daylight!

The reluctance to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and settle the Palestinian question under United Nations auspices and in accordance with its Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and 338—we believe that this issue will be more difficult and more complex than the Iraqi issue.

It is our judgment that both American and Israeli administrations are pursuing a preconceived plan to keep this issue off the U.N. agenda in order to strip it of international legitimacy and keep it from gaining a broader dimension of world public opinion. [To allow it do so] would hurt the reputation of the two countries, and especially the United States. Accusing fingers are already pointing to the U.S. demanding even-handedness in implementing Security Council resolutions. This means that the U.S. needs to be as strict with Israel as it was with Iraq over the implementation of resolutions.

The question is whether the U.S. administration will heed the lesson of wars in the Middle East, Korea, and Vietnam, as well as what sparked the two world wars; or whether it will persist in its undemocratic policies of suppression, discrimination, racism, and the subjugation of peoples.

Beware of the policy of entrapment because it will lead to hell on earth!

It is unfortunate that Arab leaders in the Levant are so egocentric they are unable to distinguish between good and bad, between progress and regression, between dignity and dishonor, and even between patriotism and treason.

I believe that [the above explains the context] of Israel's announced proposal for the Palestinian and Arab-Israeli issues which the Bush administration has embraced and in whose context James Baker announced during recent consultations in the Middle East that it would be premature to convene an international conference on the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I believe that belying this context is an alarming conspiracy along the following two lines :

1. Apply American pressure to extricate from the Arab states of the Levant, one at a time, recognition of the Israeli political entity along the lines of the 1978 Camp David accord with Egypt. This has already been intimated to Kuwait, to Saudi Arabia which Israel considers to be the most moderate Arab state, to Syria despite the Israeli administration's apprehension over the strategic Golan Heights, and even to Jordan despite its courageous stand in support of the Iraqi people's heroism in the face of aggression by America and its allies.

2. Engage the Arab states of the Middle East, especially members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in U.S.-sponsored collective negotiations on the future security of the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. It would be possible during such negotiations to propose an economic and military pact sought by American and Zionist strategies since the 1957 Suez war.

It is my belief that those are the lines conceived for the conference proposed by the Yitzhaq Shamir government as a substitute for an international conference. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker considers this a prerequisite to assure the success of an international conference whose role, in our opinion, would be to ratify a preordained political charter—to replace Resolutions 242 and 338—thereby endowing it with international legitimacy and allowing the White House to impose it by force.

The major loser under that scenario will certainly be the Palestinian cause for which a resolution may be sought along the following two lines:

1. Autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza under an Israeli state with Jerusalem as its capital.
2. Establishment of a Palestinian entity incorporated into some other Arab country—preferably Jordan. Kuwait may also be an option.

### Citizens Give Reasons for Boycotting Hajj

91AA0339B Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 27 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Abdelrashid Lamwari: "Will Algerians Make the Pilgrimage this Year? 'As Long as the Americans Are in Control, There Will Be No Hajj. Not Even if It Is Free'"]

[Text] The Algerian people called for a boycott of the Hajj this year in the wake of the western aggression against Iraq. The National Liberation Front Party and the National Association of Imams also called for a boycott of the Hajj.

The question is this: Will officials do something about these calls to boycott the Hajj? It is known that the Ministry of Religious Affairs has not yet announced whether or not Algerians will participate in the Hajj.

A survey of people's opinions about this matter showed that the idea of boycotting the Hajj is prevalent. Will Algerians make the pilgrimage this year or will they follow through with this idea and do something about their appeals to boycott the Hajj?

### Harun Muhammad al-Sa'id, a Journalist: "I Support the Boycott of the Hajj, and I Hope There Will Be a Boycott"

"In my opinion the call for a boycott of the Hajj this year is logical and objective because the land of al-Hijaz is being beset by apostasy and treachery which are manifesting themselves in those Christian hordes made up of Americans, British, French, and other soldiers.

"I believe that if this year's pilgrimage is to be consistent with what a pilgrimage really means in true Islam, it would have to involve specifically the children, the women, and the old people of Iraq who are in dire need of everything that is required for human life.

"In saying this, what I mean to say is that the Algerian people who understand what their fellow Arabs in Iraq are going through are to empathize with the Iraqi people. They are not to make the pilgrimage to the holy land. Instead, they are to earmark all the costs of the Hajj to support the fraternal people of Iraq whose need for assistance today is acute. I believe that this would constitute a pilgrimage, and it would represent real Islam if it were to happen. In all candor, I support the boycott of the Hajj as a Muslim Algerian journalist, and I hope there will be a boycott."

### M.Q., University Professor: "Participation Depends on Security"

"The pilgrimage is one of the pillars of Islam. Nothing but good things can be said about making the pilgrimage. But security is one condition which must be available for the pilgrimage. Another is that the peninsula be under the control of Muslims. If that is not the case, making the pilgrimage would not be possible."

### Muhammad al-Azhar, Physician: "An Independent Religious Opinion Is a Must"

"An independent religious opinion must be issued by a Muslim cleric because this matter has nothing to do with feelings for or against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The independent religious opinion which was issued by al-Shaykh al-Ghazali must also be taken into consideration. Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali called for a three-year boycott of the Hajj."

### Labshak Layla, a University Student: "Islamic Sites Are To Be Placed Under the Authority of a Muslim Group"

"I refuse to take part in the Hajj because the rulers who are responsible for these holy sites are not worthy of the task. It would be better to appoint a group of Muslims to oversee these holy sites instead of the Saudis who

allowed foreigners to desecrate these places. We will not take part in the Hajj before these lands are purged."

**Ammar Bousalem: "Boycott the Hajj Until the Situation Changes"**

"The present situation is actually tragic. It is our opinion that a boycott of the Hajj is a must because at the present time these places are not holy. A boycott of the Hajj is to remain in effect until further notice, that is, until there is a change in government. We have to boycott the Hajj as long as the royal regime and the Emir's regime remain in power."

**Nasreddin Alul, Official Who Announces Call To Prayer and Recites Koran: "The Matter Is Up To Influential Scholars"**

"The pilgrimage is one of the rites of Islam. It is a form of worship, and it is one of the pillars of Islam. God made the pilgrimage obligatory. He said in the Holy Koran, 'Pilgrimage to the House is a duty to Allah for all who can make the journey' [Koran, 3:97].

"Political borders, existing disputes between Arab rulers, and present political disturbances and conditions are irrelevant to the pilgrimage. It is a sincere form of worshipping God Almighty, and human beings do not control it. One does not make the pilgrimage for other people. This is a matter which is up to influential Muslim scholars."

**Ben Omar Karim, Driver: "Where Would We Go To Make the Pilgrimage?"**

"I am against the Hajj because the Saudis permitted the Americans, the French, and others to create confusion in all the Arabs' affairs and matters. Where would we go to make the pilgrimage?"

**S.K., a Secondary School Student: "Scholars Are To Issue Opinions"**

"The Hajj is a religious duty, and it is up to Muslim scholars to declare a boycott because the pilgrimage is not made for Saudi Arabia and for other countries."

**'Ali Suwaylah, Merchant: "We Are Demanding the Liberation of Holy Places"**

"We are demanding the liberation of holy places. After the holy places are liberated, they should be placed under the control of righteous people. We ask God to grant us victory, and we ask Him to defeat the unjust."

**'Ali Sa'id, Worker: "We Must All Boycott the Hajj"**

"It is my opinion that we must all boycott the Hajj because if we do not, Jews and Americans will benefit from the money spent on the Hajj. Arab and Islamic countries should boycott the Hajj: they should stay away from Saudi Arabia and leave it alone."

**Zamirli Muhammad, Retired: "I Will Not Make the Pilgrimage Even if It Were To Cost Me Nothing"**

"I am against participating in the Hajj as long as infidels remain in the holy places. I intended to go to these places, but after the events which the region has experienced, I refuse to go even if going were to cost me nothing."

**Marmawi Ammar, Craftsman: "We Should Boycott the Hajj as Long as Infidels Are There"**

"At first I registered, and I paid the deposit, but I will not go now because the Arabs permitted infidels to come to the holy lands, and that is alarming."

**Sources Say Reactor Data To Be Released**

91AA0361A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 1 May 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Qusay Salih Darwish: "Algeria Acknowledges Presence of Nuclear Reactor To Contain Campaign"]

[Text] Nouachkott—Through its acknowledgment of the presence of a nuclear reactor under construction, Algeria is putting an end to the speculation on this issue which has aroused extensive controversy in recent days. Algeria is also trying to absorb the Western media pressure to which it is being subjected on this issue.

Informed sources in the Algerian capital expect the acknowledgment to be followed by the presentation of full information and detailed figures on the Algerian nuclear reactor in preparation for placing it under the supervision of the International Energy Agency.

The agreement between Algeria and the PRC to build this reactor dates back to 1983. Construction work started at the end of 1986 in the town of Ain Wizar, located 250 km south of the capital. The reactor is relatively small, having a capacity of 15 megawatts. But the presence of one reactor opens the door for building other reactors.

The idea of acquiring nuclear energy practically dates back to the days of the late President Houari Boumedienne, and it constituted a part of his ambitious plan to transform Algeria into a "super" regional power.

This project is founded on a broad base of heavy industries, on developing educational structures and programs and spreading education, and on an important Algerian political presence which permits Algeria to play a first-class role at the African and Arab levels.

Some gigantic projects have surfaced within this context, such as the African Unity Highway which links Algeria with black Africa. It is also within this context that Algerian officials began to feel the need for a land outlet to the Atlantic Ocean via the Western Sahara.

In 1983, the comprehensive process launched by President Bendjedid to review the late president's policy—a review which led to a gradual abandonment of President

Boumediene's ambitious political plan—had not started. This review did not occur until the end of 1985 and the start of 1986.

The idea of building a nuclear reactor had made great progress, and it seems that President Bendjedid was convinced of the strategic importance of a nuclear reactor from the perspective of its connection with the limited Algerian oil reserves, considering that Algeria will experience an acute energy crisis in two decades.

But the official acknowledgment of the presence of a nuclear reactor in Algeria will create numerous internal and external ramifications for the Algerian regime and for Algeria's foreign relations. Internally, the leaders of the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] have exploited the issue to launch a concerted propaganda campaign in order to rehabilitate the FIS's political message, which has been shaken since the Gulf war, and to regain its status in the political arena, considering that this status has declined because of the front's failure to manage the majority of the municipalities which it has controlled since last year's municipal elections and its failure to establish an election alliance with the other fundamentalist forces that are represented by the Association for Guidance and Reformation (Mahfoud Nahnah) and Ennahda Movement (Shaykh Djaballah).

In their election-oriented propaganda campaign, Islamic Salvation Front leaders say that as of the 12th of last June they expected the United States to strike Algeria after finishing with Iraq, and in a similar scenario. In this regard, they base their expectations on the fact that the initial information about the transformation of Algeria into a nuclear power came from the CIA. From this angle, they are trying to embarrass the regime and mobilize the man on the street behind national issues that are connected with the outside world and that permit the delivery of a resonant address unrelated to the local problems on whose basis Algerian voters might cast their vote. To this moment, the regime has chosen to remain reserved so as to block the path of any endeavor to turn this sensitive issue into an issue of oneupmanship in political elections.

Regionally, announcement of the presence of a nuclear reactor and of Algeria's transformation into a nuclear power will relatively speaking change the prevalent power equation in the region even if the current Algerian leadership does not seek such a change. With this reactor, Algeria will be the first Arab and African country to acquire nuclear energy.

It is evident that inasmuch as it is aware of the importance of this fact, the Algerian leadership is also aware of the dimensions and weight of the responsibility of this development to Algeria itself and to Algeria's relations with the countries of the region, especially with its partners in the Arab Maghreb Union.

Internationally, announcement of the nuclear reactor comes at a time when Algeria's relations with the Western countries, whether with the United States or

Europe, and especially with France, are noticeably lukewarm. This tepidity is due in part to the Gulf war. What has been strikingly interesting is that the French foreign minister who visited Morocco, Mauritania, and Libya has not yet visited Algeria even though such a visit was included as part of his Maghreb tour and even though it had been announced officially in Paris.

If President Bendjedid is trying nowadays to manage the reactor issue free of clamor and in a manner that permits his country to keep this reactor and to develop nuclear energy, he will try to reassure the Western parties by familiarizing them with the details of the reactor and with its peaceful purposes, especially since he is aware of the harm and danger of this clamor. President Bendjedid is also aware of the security danger to which Israel could expose Algeria and of the possibility that Israel could stage an attempt to strike this reactor.

EL MOUDJAHID said yesterday that Algeria has offered to open its nuclear program to international inspection.

#### **Commentary Sees Domestic Products, Free Markets as Failures**

91AA0297A Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Mar 91 p 3

[Commentary by Salah Daraji: "Prices Are Skyrocketing, Reformers Promising"]

[Excerpt] In evaluating the national market situation, one does not need economic expertise to understand the size of the gap in commodities and goods required. Supply has reached the point of desertification. It is no longer possible to compare the difference between supply and demand. Our markets are nearly empty of all commodities that the citizens need in their daily lives.

With regard to our national companies, one does not require technical expertise to know that the goods and commodities being produced by these companies do not meet minimum quality standards, to the point that some products seem more like garbage than new products.

Despite that, "we accepted with concern," and were content with the thrust of national justifications that we should buy garbage with our sweat and efforts. However, the concern and the garbage have not been accepted. Our national companies and establishments have been quick to choose other ways for the nation and people. They have applied the concept of independence, by increasing prices to an unreasonable extent, raising them from 50 to 250 percent.

The companies know that the national market is empty. Citizens have no choice but to buy the garbage, alleged to be national production. The companies know that they are alone in the field. Citizens have no recourse but to "drink the poison," while clinking their glasses. As for the state, it has long been asleep, like the sleep of Rip



Van Winkle, and all the protests and criticism have been unable to arouse it so that it can carry out its responsibilities.

It is pitifully funny to hear certain voices in cries of complaint because of productivity goals or the lack of an economic alternative without starving the Algerian people.

The anarchic raising of prices translates into the failure of the so-called market economy, the failure of those in charge of implementing that market. It would be more suitable for them to call things by their names, because those who devised the economic disaster, into which we are heading, are those who—for several decades—continued to arouse the country's hopes. Then, after the well went dry, they tried to suck the blood of the people, on the pretext of "market economy and practical solutions."

No one believes anymore in these distorted and demagogic phrases, because everyone knows the first step toward practical solutions begins with restoring the purloined hopes, and bringing to account those who have bilked the people. After that, the citizens will endure sacrifice, even though pain and sacrifice are nothing new for Algerians. [passage omitted]

#### **Commentary Predicts Postwar Political Losses for West**

91AA0297B *Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Mar 91 p 12*

[Commentary by Dr. Muhammad Belkacem Hasan Behlul: "Second Battle of Gulf War"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The first battle in the Gulf War was a harsh and difficult armed conflict for our brothers, the Iraqi people, whose huge sacrifices have borne fruit on four levels, by:

1. Highlighting the ability to stand fast in the face of American and Western aggression, attempted in the name of defending human rights, with superior weapons of destruction. This steadfastness is an object of pride for the peoples of the Third World;
2. Exposing American intentions, particularly its concept of the new world order;
3. Smashing the Israeli myth, that it was impossible to strike at Israel deep within its own territory; and,
4. Achieving international unanimity on the need to solve the Palestinian issue, which is the essence of the political crises and wars in the Middle East region, and on the need to deal with UN resolutions in a spirit of equality in all cases.

There is no doubt that these results constitute actual victories for the Iraqi people in this first battle of the Gulf War. However, the war has not ended. The second

battle, which began on the date that fighting was suspended, is a political battle. Now, it is no longer between Iraq and the coalition, but its area has spread to the Arab and Islamic countries, as well as to the developing nations. This is just what the United States feared during the first battle and, in fact, it must be recognized that it succeeded in preventing the breakup of the coalition.

Despite everything that could be recorded, in terms of strategic or tactical errors by the Iraqi leadership, history will record that Iraq achieved gains for the Arab, Islamic, and Third World countries in this first battle of the Gulf War. It remains to tell these countries—peoples, political parties, and leaders, with an historic confidence on their conscience—how to preserve these gains and win victory in this second battle of the Gulf War.

Our evaluation is that the weapon that the United States will use, in complete coordination with Israel, and in consultation with the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Egypt, and Syria, in order to thwart or dilute these gains, will be represented by the following three steps:

1. Revival of the famous Eisenhower plan, which was proposed in August 1958, before an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, with regard to creating an institution for regional economic development in the Middle East, with all its countries—including Israel—sharing in its funding, in accordance with the project proposed in 1957 by Washington's General Services Institute. At that time, the purpose was to smash the Nasirist nationalist regime in this region, as well as the unity between Egypt and Syria. It seems today that this proposal, which the Bush administration is pushing, has taken a new form, a Middle East Marshall Plan in two parts. The first is the well-known economic part, and the second, a military part in the form of an alliance, which includes the Arab Gulf states, Syria, Egypt, and Israel, under American leadership.

2. Inducing Iran to foment civil war in Iraq, by stirring up the Shiites in Iraq's southern region, under the guidance of their spiritual leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Hakim, who is in exile in Iran, and by stirring up the Kurds in the northern region, under the leadership of 'Umar al-Barzani, who lives in Iranian Kurdistan.

The goal is to overthrow Saddam Husayn's regime, which American tanks failed to do during the first battle of the Gulf War. Iraqi steadfastness in the face of the new imperialist and Zionist attack is even more necessary in this second battle than before, despite the campaign of inducements to bring about a democratic regime, which would be led by foreign agencies.

Unfortunately, it is clear that the Iranian leadership, by its encouragement of this civil war, under the call for the Iraqi leaders to apply democracy, has entered into the American game, which is certainly aimed at smashing Iranian military, economic, and technological capabilities, just as it did with Iraq.

Our brothers in Iran ought not forget that the second strategic enemy in the Middle East region—for the American White House men—is Iran.

3. Smashing the PLO from within, by fomenting partisan pluralism, division, and fanaticism, with the use of whatever methods necessary, including the assassination of prominent politicians, in order to divert people from the basic issue, which is to liberate Palestine and establish its independent state. The PLO would also be defamed in the eyes of the Palestinian masses in the occupied territory, Arab and Islamic public opinion, and world public opinion, to the effect that it is merely a terrorist, extremist organization, which thinks only of its self interests and marginal disputes, and thus, is not qualified to represent the Palestinian people, searching for a solution to the Palestinian problem. Therefore, an alternative must be sought from among moderate Palestinians inside the occupied territory. Without doubt, what is motivating the American administration in this regard is that the PLO stood by the Iraqi people during the Gulf War.

## EGYPT

### Consultative Council Discusses Regional Security

91AA0281A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
30 Mar 91 p 5

[Article: "AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Surveys Views on Arab National Security—Political Forces Demand Formation of Court of Justice, Improvement of League Charter and Mutual Defense Agreements"]

[Text] Cairo (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau)—Egypt's Consultative Council today begins intensive sessions to discuss the issue of Arab national security in light of Arab and international interest in this issue after the end of the Gulf crisis, Kuwait's liberation from aggression, and the return of its legitimate government.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT surveyed the views of political forces about the concept of Arab national security and their ideas for the future. To begin, Dr. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ilah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Egyptian parliament, stated that there must be a comprehensive examination of Arab national security now that the Arab nation has been subjected to the most serious threat to its existence. This time—for the first time—the attack came from within, by way of Iraq, on an independent, sovereign state. Dr. 'Abd-al-Ilah stated that the concept of security must be based on a number of fundamental points. First of all, joint Arab institutions and agreements must regain their role and vigor, particularly the Arab League. This requires realistic amendment of its charter in step with developments and changes in the Arab and international arena. The sought-for and desired improvement of the Arab Mutual Defense Agreement also comes under this heading.

He went on to say: "Positive implementation of the provisions of this agreement, and Egypt's and Syria's participation in boldly sending their joint forces to defend fraternal Saudi Arabia against Iraqi threats and participate in the war to liberate Kuwait and stand on the side of legitimacy—let these things be the real beginning and point of departure for any updating of the provisions of this agreement."

### Political Concepts

Dr. Mufid Shihab, chairman of the Committee on Arab and Foreign Affairs and National Security in the Egyptian Consultative Council, held that certain political concepts must stand out in the discussion of this vital and central Arab issue. To begin with, all Arab regimes must become convinced that national security is by its very meaning a kind of insuring of the state's existence from within, a warding off of threats, and a provision of a stable life for the people, with development and political participation. He pointed out that the concept of security can be taken to apply to a state on the local level, or to a group of states on the regional level, or on the international level, which is the responsibility of the United Nations.

He explained that Arab national security is an intermediate stage between local security and international security. Kamal Henri Badir, chairman of the Defense and National Security Committee of the Egyptian parliament, stressed the need for establishing definite considerations when setting down a clear concept of Arab national security and the need for guarantees to assure that the Iraqi tragedy against Kuwait does not recur. Badir said that the first principle of such national security is the existence of a clear formula and its specific application to Arab conflicts. This would come about through an Arab court of justice. Through the proposed amendments to the Arab League Charter a binding force should be provided to implement the league's decisions, even against countries that did not share in passing the resolution.

Sabri al-Qadi, chairman of the Arab Affairs Committee in the Egyptian parliament, held that those who put the first and last touches to the formulas and principles for Arab security must keep in mind the changes that have taken place in the region and must avoid the places where danger lurks in the region. He indicated that the dangers have moved beyond the stage of lying outside the circle of the Arab world and have moved inside. This was the result of Iraq's attack on Kuwait with its accompanying sharp division in Arab ranks between supporters and opponents of the Iraqi invasion—between those who sought their own interest or reaped benefit and those who insisted on legality and its realization whatever the cost.

Al-Qadi said that one must overcome this severe trial that occurred because of the Iraqi invasion and make an earnest effort to mend the split in Arab ranks. He indicated that this effort must also take account of the



fact that the fraternal Iraqi people must not bear the guilt of the war criminal Saddam Husayn. We are now seeing how the Iraqi people are resisting this tyrant from within, despite the savage massacres they are suffering at the hands of Saddam Husayn's henchmen, the Republican Guard. This has led the United States to warn Saddam and his henchmen of the danger of using legal and illegal weapons against the Iraqi people, who have shouldered their responsibility and are resisting this nightmare that caused their isolation from the Arab course.

### Border Disputes

Major General Ahmad Rushdi, former Egyptian interior minister and member of parliament, said that Arab national security according to the concepts under discussion must be primarily based on the necessity to lay foundations that will guarantee that each Arab state respects the regional sovereignty of the other. The file of border disputes, however sharp they may be, must be closed irrevocably. This should occur through clear, definitive resolutions emanating from a special committee. It should be formed by resolution of the Arab League when a decision is made to establish the Arab court of justice whose existence has become a necessity in order for all the Arab peoples to move toward living in peace, particularly now that we are on the brink of finding solutions to the central Arab problem embodied in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

### Settlement

He said, "I will not fail to mention here the need to make the best possible use of available opportunities to bring about a peaceful settlement of this problem, so that the people of this region can devote themselves to development operations without any of the conflicts and disturbances that halt these operations in one way or another."

Yasin Siraj-al-Din, a Wafd Party leader, stressed the need to expand the circle of cooperation to encompass development areas that create economic stability.

He indicated that the concept of security must move into areas broader than the military concept, so as to include the areas of full Arab cooperation.

Siraj-al-Din said, "Despite our grave reservations about the positions of the Palestinian leaders on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait—positions which have harmed the Palestinian cause—solution of the Palestinian problem is the key to ending all the crises in the Middle East. Our Arab brothers should move with all earnestness to solve this problem in the framework of the new world order that we are experiencing, an order that rests on the power of international law and the need to adhere to the principle that international law is an inseparable part of this order."

### Natural Home

Isma'il Fahmi, former Egyptian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, said that the Arab League is the natural home of all the Arabs and that they must discuss all issues through it.

Fahmi stressed the need to hold an Arab summit preceded by a good change to establish a suitable formula for Arab national security and to establish the sound Arab solidarity that will ultimately achieve the goal of protecting the entire Arab world.

He said that in light of the views and ideas to be discussed it would be possible to build a sound foundation for the new Arab security system. This will be something in step with the Arab League Charter and the Arab Mutual Defense Agreement.

He said that by means of this development the security system could become binding on all Arab states. They would be able to negotiate with other countries either collectively or individually, because there would be a clear course and agreed-upon principles to which the countries of the Arab League were committed.

Finally, Counselor Wahid al-Dali, an expert on Arab affairs, emphasized the need for Arab security arrangements to be based on the Arab League Charter, the Joint Arab Defense Treaty, and economic cooperation. These security arrangements should be essentially defensive.

He indicated that the Egyptian and Syrian Arab forces now in the Gulf were the nucleus of the Arab peace-keeping force in the region. This force would undertake to keep the peace as soon as the non-Arab forces withdrew. Participation in these forces would be by full mutual consent between the parties.

### Minister of Industry Interviewed on Public Sector Development

91AA0271A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic  
25 Mar 91 p 5

[Interview with Industry Minister Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab by Ahmad al-'Attar; place and date not given: "Value of Public Sector Production To Be 18 Billion Pounds This Year"]

[Text] Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, stated that the production of the public industrial sector would increase this year (1990-91) to about 18 billion Egyptian pounds. In his talk to the economics page, the minister clarified his ideas on public sector development. He explained that the new holding companies would replace the present public sector organizations and that these companies would have complete freedom to deal in all assets of the production companies affiliated with them.

Eng. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab added that he thought that in each company a deputed member should

be selected to be in charge of supervising the implementation process for it. The deputed member would not also have to be the chairman of the company's board of directors, although it might be possible for one person to hold both positions together.

[Al-'Attar] Public sector development is one of the most important problems on which the government is concentrating at the present time. What are your ideas on the meaning of development and on how to achieve it?

[Abd-al-Wahhab] Public sector development means giving management in the public sector freedom to make decisions that harmonize with the overall economic trend toward market mechanisms. This means the presence of new conditions and competition. Management therefore must be qualified and able. It must have powers to confront all factors and requirements as soon as they come up on the job. The present public sector law must be changed in order for this to happen. The law must clearly and unambiguously grant the required freedom to the management of each company. Thus, we will eliminate all external interferences in company operations; the only interference will be to monitor the achievement of the desired goals, not measures. The achievement of this encompasses a number of areas: freedom and suitability of investment, the method of financing it, the production mix, prices, the flexibility of goods in the markets and the effect of this on price, as well as the work force and the organization of job structures in the companies. Achieving all this requires a new law for the public sector, not merely amending the present law. In this framework, a fundamental effort will be made to prevent interference from above either by directive or by monitoring regarding the ongoing operation of the companies. Interference will be limited to monitoring goals. This consequently entails a change in the organizational pyramid of companies and their affiliation. This is where the idea of holding companies comes in. They will not be merely a change in the name of the present public sector organizations. The most important characteristic of the new holding companies will be their ability to transact purchases and sales in a portfolio of securities of the group of companies affiliated with each of these holding companies. This includes restructuring their affiliated companies, conducting mergers, and transferring or introducing investments and activities. The holding company will thus act as owner of all the assets of its affiliated companies. Decisionmaking in all this will belong to the management of the new holding companies. In this area they will be controlled basically by an economic rhythm that includes domestic and international market conditions and technological factors. In my opinion, if leaders able to manage the companies properly are chosen, then I think that the new law will not be merely a natural development, but will be an extremely important economic shift. What is involved here is not merely a change of law, but also a change of concept. We have already defined the economic goals and policies desired in this area. Next comes drafting the law that will work toward

bringing this about. I think that the proposal for the new law will be submitted to the cabinet for discussion and approval in the coming period. It will then be brought up for discussion in the relevant bodies, such as the industrial companies. The law will then be presented to the People's Assembly in late April or early May for discussion and approval. The new public sector law can be expected to go into effect from 1 July. It has been our custom during the month of Ramadan to meet with leaders of companies and organizations in all industrial sectors to break the fast at sundown, followed by a working meeting. We use the meeting as an opportunity to review with them the thinking that the proposed new law will contain. After the proposal is discussed and approved in the cabinet and People's Assembly, there will be a discussion of how this thinking was fashioned into the form of a proposed law.

#### **Holding Companies and Economic Standards**

[Al-'Attar] Will the new public sector system be applied in full as soon as the new law is approved, or will it be applied in stages?

[Abd-al-Wahhab] The cabinet and People's Assembly will have the final decision. However, I think that the new law will contain a transition period as one of its provisions. The new law will enter the application stage on 1 July. First, the new holding companies will replace the present public sector organizations. The holding companies will have all the powers that the new law grants them. This includes establishing rules and redistributing and restructuring companies. During the coming year, the holding companies will prepare the necessary arrangements and provisions to reshape the companies, so that this will be in accord with economic standards. For example, a holding company for the fertilizer industry might be formed to include the companies that produce fertilizers and those that produce the raw materials—phosphates—used in producing fertilizer. Phase one will last about a year—until June 1992. During it, most of the public sector will have been reorganized by the formation of the new holding companies and of the group of companies affiliated with each. By June 1992, 70 or 80 percent of the new system will be complete, with full formation of the new system of holding companies and their affiliated companies taking place in January 1993.

#### **Standards for Evaluating Company Leaders**

[Al-'Attar] Some present leaders of public sector companies feel worried about possible changes in the leadership of some companies after the new public sector law goes into effect. What will be the standards for leader evaluation and retention?

[Abd-al-Wahhab] There are no reasons to worry. We are proud of the public sector's management leaders. There is no doubt that they are among Egypt's top managers. In a subsequent stage, many of them will take up responsibilities in other sectors. The new law on high-level

management will set for the top managers of companies a time period from when the law comes into force, after which they will have to be reappointed. We believe that reappointment is a reaffirmation of confidence. In my view, the main standard for management leader retention is the achievement they have realized.

I stress that we will subject no one to a situation that threatens his standing. In this regard, the transition from one stage to another will take place quietly and objectively, with attention to all surrounding circumstances.

[Al-'Attar] [Beginning of sentence omitted in source] and of the composition of boards of directors of public sector companies in the past. Will this method be reviewed? To what extent would it be possible for the deputed member to be present in each of these companies?

[Abd-al-Wahhab] In general, there is a formula for company management throughout the world. A board of directors sets working policies within the company. It deposes or assigns one of its members to the operation of supervising their implementation. As for this member, it is not necessary that the chairman of the company's board of directors be the member deputed to implement the board's policies. In my view, given the existence of companies with goals and with flexibility of movement and linkages of interests with other companies and bodies—and professionalism will represent a distinguishing mark of performance in them—it is desirable to review the composition of the company's board of directors. Currently, the composition of the board of directors of companies is often closer to a board of executive directors. At their meetings, these directors discuss what has been and what has not been implemented and the reasons for it. I think directors must meet on a periodic basis for there to be coordination and cooperation among them. However, a company's board of directors has another function: it defines what is desired to be done. It is not necessary that the person who defines what is desired to be done and undertakes to monitor its implementation should himself be the person who undertakes the implementation of this operation.

[Al-'Attar] Will the chairman of the company's board of directors devote himself full time to the job?

[Abd-al-Wahhab] I envisage the chairman of the company's board of directors as devoting himself full time—if he also holds the position of being the deputed member with the company. However, it need not be stipulated that the chairman of the board of directors devote himself full time to the job if he does not also hold the post of deputed member. In cases where the person does not devote himself full time, one person could hold the position of chairman of the board of directors in more than one public sector company—provided that the general law of companies permits this; the law does not permit it now. If this general law is amended to permit one individual to hold the position of chairman of more than one public sector company, this

could happen in the coming period—if the new public sector law provides for this possibility.

[Al-'Attar] Is this because the desired number of persons qualified to hold management leadership jobs is not available?

[Abd-al-Wahhab] If the desired number of persons qualified to hold management leadership positions becomes available, we will completely welcome it. I am merely saying that I think there is an objection to a person's holding the position of chairman of more than one public sector company—in the event that the laws are amended to permit it. If the chairman of the board of directors does not hold the position of deputed member, his job basically is to chair the meeting of the company's board of directors, direct the session, and discuss the subjects under consideration—this in order to make the required decisions and monitor implementation. This alone is his role basically. He might therefore not devote himself exclusively to the job. But if he also holds the position of deputed member, he will also be in charge of supervising the implementation of desired operations. An exclusive commitment in this case is something fundamental. In my opinion, there are two basic prerequisites for a single individual to combine the chairmanship of the board of directors of more than one public sector company: he must have the capacity and ability to carry out the work, and there must be no conflict of interests between the two companies.

### **Government Blamed for Islamic Investment Disaster**

91AA0298B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 30 Mar 91 p 3

[Article: "Government Responsibility in Investment Set-back"]

[Text] Dr. Shawqi al-Sayyid, legal counselor, has submitted an interpellation of the government from off the floor of parliament concerning the investment disaster and has sent it to Dr. Ahmad Fathi Surur, the speaker of the People's Assembly. The interpellation asserts that the government failed to take decisive measures to solve the problems of depositors and that its statement consequently has emerged deficient and unable to solve the problem. Turning the companies over to the public prosecutor or the socialist prosecutor's office and taking custody of the funds had complicated the problem.

Dr. Shawqi al-Sayyid stated in his interpellation that the problem of depositors in investment companies was still creating unhealed tragic cases affecting a large number of citizens. They, together with their families, numbered over 513,000, or 5 percent of the population of Egypt. The money deposited amounted to 4.5 billion pounds. The tragedy had affected not only the depositors, but also Egypt's economy, freezing its resources and the money of its people.

He condemned the government and accused it of weakness and negligence. He lay full responsibility for the

disaster on it because of its failure to create effective means of surveillance for about 10 years—since the issuance of Presidential Decree 520 creating the General Financial Market Organization in 1979. The organization had left matters alone without fulfilling its responsibility, as defined in the decree, of protecting financial market transactions from cheating, deception, and speculation. He also stated that although the government had suddenly taken a bold, energetic step—for certain reasons revealed by investigations—had issued Investment Law 146 of 1988 to correct what had gone unnoticed since the creation of the organization in 1979, and had set a time limit for the return of funds, this did not relieve the government of its responsibility. Egyptian citizens will not absolve the government of responsibility because the matter has been handed over to the investigating and prosecuting authorities. They will not be satisfied by the handing over of the companies to criminal prosecution, because this represents no solution for them. They want to obtain their money, despite the decrease in its purchasing power, or at least a part of it and bear a loss.

Dr. Shawqi al-Sayyid demanded that the government move swiftly and seriously to solve the problem. The government statement that Prime Minister Dr. 'Atif Sidqi had delivered before parliament had confirmed the government's inability to take decisive steps to solve the problem. The outcome of government action as recorded in the statement was that six companies brought their rules into conformity. Four of these companies had issued debentures and had begun to make payments on them, with the government undertaking to liquidate the financial assets alone by sale, purchase, or auctioning off preferred investment certificates to deal with the returning of funds—so that the companies would be able to return what was owed to depositors under the debenture program. Nine companies had returned funds and had asked not to be brought into conformity. Forty-six companies had been reported to the socialist prosecutor, and forty-two to the public prosecutor. In addition, there was the al-Rayyan case, which was still being examined by the judiciary.

The statement had thus fallen short. It lacked any suggestion or proposal for solutions to end the tragedy of depositors. There were still cases in which a decree taking the company's funds into custody had been issued—the accused persons had been sent to prison more than three years ago, the funds remained in custody, their administrators remained restricted in freedom until the present time, and the depositors had derived no benefit. Indeed, the setback had become even worse because the equipment had not been put to work or even sold.

## IRAQ

### Kuwaiti Paper Interviews Opposition Spokesman

91AE0343A London SAWT AL-KUWAIT AL-DUWALI in Arabic 5 Apr 91 p 8

[Interview with Ahmad al-Hububi, Iraqi opposition figure, by 'Abd-al-Tawwab 'Abd-al-Hayy in Cairo; date

not given: "SAWT AL-KUWAIT Interviews Ahmad al-Hububi, Leading Figure of Iraqi Unity Current, Secret of Iraqi Aircraft Downed Over Tikrit"]

[Text] His political label says that he is a leading figure of the Iraqi unity current and twice a minister. He was permanently imprisoned because his principles collided with those of the ruling Tikriti Ba'th Party and was therefore taken from the tank corps prison at Abu Gharib and placed in the fearful prison of Qasr al-Nihayah.

He is Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Hububi, or "Abu-Ghassan." We now interview him. The questions come thick and fast: Who sparked the Iraqi uprising, given its many fathers? Why wasn't the unity current sufficiently represented at the Beirut conference? Will Saddam be tried by religious and civil law? Is Saddam remaining in power as a tool of the West's interests? Is the Iraqi uprising lengthening Saddam's rule or ending it? What about the end-game scenario?

The answers succeed each other, followed immediately by questions, in the stream of the conversation.

He is the leader of the unity current, which in Iraq is a dominant current based on the consent of the Arab peoples, not on coercion and compulsion. He was twice a minister: once in the government of 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif in 1965, and a second time in the government of Tahir Yahya in 1967. He was permanently imprisoned because his Arabist principles collided with those of the ruling Tikriti Ba'th Party. He was therefore taken from the tank corps prison at Abu Gharib and placed in the fearful prison of Qasr al-Nihayah.

He is Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Hububi. The al-Hububi family is an old one whose branches spread from the steppes of Najd and the plains of eastern Saudi Arabia north into southern Iraq, from Basrah to Najaf and Karbala'.

July is a month of strange coincidences for Ahmad al-Hububi. It has brought him by turns signs of good fortune and omens of misfortune and bad luck—both together, as day merges into night and succeeds it.

Over the course of years in the one month of July, he was born in Najaf in 1931, and obtained his law degree from Baghdad University in 1955. In this month in 1959, he was imprisoned in the tank corps prison at Abu Gharib on the charge of leading an armed struggle against the Iraqi Communist Party, which was ruling Baghdad under the cloak of 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim. In July 1961, he left the Istiqlal Party, which was led by Ahmad Mahdi Kubbah, to found the Arab Socialist Party with 'Abd-al-Razzaq Shabib, head of the lawyers' union, and Dr. Malik Duhan al-Hasab, head of the teachers' union. In July 1963, he returned to Baghdad after four years of exile in Cairo. In the same month in 1965, he was appointed minister of municipal and village affairs in the government of 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif. Afterwards, he was appointed minister of labor in the government of Tahir



Yahya in 1967. In July 1968, the Tikriti Ba'th Party leapt into power in a silent palace coup. They set about liquidating both the unity people and the Islamists. Ahmad al-Hububi was imprisoned in Qasr al-Nihayah. He saw with his own eyes 57 of Iraq's leaders executed in successive batches in the courtyard of the fearful prison—seven in each batch. In the same month of 1970, the deputy prime minister of Iraq, Saddam Husayn, summoned him and sought to mollify him into accepting any office he would chose; but after a long conversation that alternated between enticement and intimidation, Ahmad al-Hububi declined on the ground that he would be traveling to Europe for medical treatment. He told Saddam, disengaging himself evasively, "When I return, there will be time to talk it over."

To this day he has not returned! He toured the lands of Europe for months and then returned to his home port in Cairo on 26 September 1970. Since then he has been living comfortably in Egypt, although he sometimes feels restive under the burden of nostalgia for the soil of Iraq.

Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Hububi, Shiite by sect, Egyptian by temperament and by his fondness for smiling and joking, is married to a Saudi woman, although she is a member of the al-Hububi clan by origin. He has two daughters and two sons, the oldest of whom is named Ghassan. Our interview with "Abu-Ghassan" now begins.

### Dominant Current

[Abd-al-Hayy] I asked the Iraqi unity fighter Ahmad al-Hububi: I know that you planned to travel to Beirut to participate in the general conference of Iraqi opposition forces held in the Bristol Hotel starting on 11 March, but that you did not go. What prevented you and the representatives of the unity current from going?

[Al-Hububi] I would not be exaggerating if I said that the Arabist unity current is the dominant current in Iraq and that the Islamic current is an ally of the unity current. Arabism is not far from Islam, and Islam cannot do without Arabism. The Iraqi Islamic movements are mostly Arabist in orientation and give their blessing to Arab unity as a way toward wider Islamic unity. The disasters into which the government in Iraq has been swept have convinced everyone that democracy, consulting the people, and respecting their say is the real alternative for stable government. The goals raised at the Beirut conference did not go beyond agreement on overthrowing Saddam's regime and establishing a democratic alternative. There was talk of establishing a government in exile. They contacted me from Beirut to ask my opinion and that of the unity current, but I did not support the idea. The external alternative is artificial; the alternative that emerges from within the country is genuine. The unity current was represented in Beirut by two of its major figures, Hasan al-Naqib and Mubaddir Louis, but it was not enough representation. At least ten prominent unity current figures living in Cairo could have taken part in the conference.

[Abd-al-Hayy] What was the obstacle?

[Al-Hububi] Lack of time.

[Abd-al-Hayy] (He said no more, but I knew from my sources that Egyptian intelligence had contacted al-Hububi and other figures of the Iraqi unity current to inform them that the Foreign Ministry recommended that they travel to the Beirut conference. However, most of them have no passport. Obtaining passports would have taken several months of complicated procedures for them, and no official agency was kind enough to facilitate the task!)

However, the conference was not limited to members of the 17 political parties and organizations that signed the joint activity agreement in Damascus on 26 December of last year, but was broadened to include about 450 participants representing 23 parties and organizations, apart from independents. Some of these parties and organizations have had past disagreements with each other and have fought with arms and sharply-worded political communiques.

Do you think it will be an easy thing for all these forces to unite after such a long mutual conflict, and is their coalition serious?

[Al-Hububi] It is possible, now that everyone has been burnt by what has happened and is still happening on Iraqi soil. There is no one-man alternative, no individual alternative; the only alternative is the Iraqi people. It is in everyone's interest to agree on a minimum: overthrowing Saddam's regime, establishing a democratic government, granting freedoms, and electing a constituent assembly to draft a new, permanent constitution. Everyone agrees on these goals after 23 years of political hardship.

[Abd-al-Hayy] At the upcoming Riyadh conference, will they succeed in forming a coalition government uniting all parties?

[Al-Hububi] I told them my opinion about forming such a government. I said that it would be a cause of disagreement, not of coalition. They then went back to discuss holding another conference that would be attended by all the unity figures whom circumstances had not allowed to attend the Beirut conference. But we have not agreed on a time or place for such a conference.

[Abd-al-Hayy] What are your comments on the final political communique of the conference?

[Al-Hububi] It was read at the end of the conference. I read part of it that was published in the newspapers. They promised to send me a copy of the full text of the communique, but I have not received it yet. I cannot express an opinion before I see the whole thing.

[Abd-al-Hayy] One Iraqi opposition group tried to appear in Beirut as having been the one that had sparked the Iraqi popular revolution. Someone modestly intimated that he was leading it!

[Al-Hububi] Don't believe any of them. It is a revolution made and led by the Iraqi people. No individual, party, or organization ignited it. It arose with great spontaneity and of itself. It was led by souls wounded by the disaster that has befallen Iraq and by Iraq's tremendous losses in a war without a cause. It began in al-Basrah in particular, not because of foreign Shiite intervention, as the regime in Baghdad claims, but because al-Basrah is close to the battlefield, where one can immediately see the defeat with all its humiliating horrors. The Iraqi revolution will continue, relying in its continuance on those who struggle within the country. It has now lasted more than three weeks. I do not believe that Saddam or his remaining henchmen can extinguish this sacred flame. It will inevitably reach its goal, by God's command.

But the uprising of the Iraqi people needs some oil for its lamp, so that it can continue to burn. It needs help from within and from abroad. The eyes of the world must turn toward it.

[Abd-al-Hayy] Iraq's tyrant Saddam has lost the popular base of his government. He has failed in terms of Iraq, the Arab world, and the international community. He destroyed both Kuwait and Iraq. He subjected his army to a shameful defeat without a true military credo. He fought and killed Iranians, Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Iraqis—allies, even before opponents. Isn't it right to seek retribution against him and impose punishments for war crimes under religious and civil law?

[Al-Hububi] From the Arab, Islamic, and international point of view, he deserves to be tried. He is a criminal by all standards and laws. First, in terms of the Arab and Islamic ethos, he broke ranks, set the Arabs back, harmed the Palestinian cause, and distorted and tore up the slogan of Arab unity. Saddam is a universal calamity!

[Abd-al-Hayy] American intelligence sources expect Saddam and his regime to last until the end of the year. If he holds on to his rule and power, to what extent do you think he can confront the storm of the Iraqi uprising and Arab and international pressures?

[Al-Hububi] I think the countdown on his regime has begun. As for when it will end exactly, I am no expert to give an exact reckoning or estimate. He is now sinking into the abyss, and will sink quickly!

[Abd-al-Hayy] Could Iraq be "Afghanized," with a lengthy struggle between opposition forces and the government, as has been happening in Afghanistan for more than a decade?

[Al-Hububi] The opposition in Afghanistan is fragmented, scattered, and fighting among itself, while the opposition forces in Iraq are not. The government of Najibullah differs from Saddam's government, just as the international circumstances are different. Moscow supported the Kabul government, while no one now supports the government in Baghdad. Therefore, what is happening in Afghanistan cannot repeat itself in Iraq.

[Abd-al-Hayy] (The interview with former minister Ahmad al-Hububi, a leading figure of the Iraqi unity current, continues.) Despite Washington's satisfaction with the Iraqi uprising, one train of thought holds that it is in the interest of the United States to preserve Saddam and use him as a tool to carry out the interests of the West after he is curbed and tamed. What weight do you give to this hypothesis about American policy?

[Al-Hububi] I don't think the hypothesis is correct politically. Saddam is defeated and finished. He is meekly and submissively carrying out all the demands of the coalition. He is ready to agree to even more of the coalition's conditions in return for staying in the seat of authority.

However, for the United States and the other coalition countries, Saddam is a card that has lost its value. There is no doubt that they are looking for an alternative. The alternative according to the Western conception is different from what it is in our conception. The calculations as well as the interests are different. The Iraqi opposition forces are looking for an alternative that emerges from within Iraq by the free volition of all groups of the people; the West is looking for an alternative from within the ranks of the Tikriti Ba'th Party or the military establishment. Perhaps they have kept Saddam for a brief time, so that he can set defeated Iraq in order again and so that they can extract from him as many political and military concessions as possible!

[Abd-al-Hayy] But American intelligence says that the Iraqi uprising is a factor working to prolong the term of Saddam's government, not to end it. They base their argument on the fact that this popular revolution is impelling those who have the best chance of toppling Saddam to seek safety for themselves behind him and to hold fast to him out of fear that the country will break up. How would you argue with this remarkable analysis?

[Al-Hububi] I would not be exaggerating if I said that there is not a single Iraqi now who does not want to get rid of Saddam and his government. I exempt only a paltry number of opportunists who believe that their existence depends on his existence. They are represented by certain units of the Republican Guard, whose members he selected personally, and on whom he has lavished gifts and salaries.

As for the ruling party and even his family and clan in Tikrit, everyone agrees on getting rid of the tyrant. Everyone has been burnt by him, even the Tikritis who are bound to him by kinship. Of them, he killed Hardan al-Tikriti, 'Umar Hiza' al-Tikriti, Tahir al-Tikriti, and 'Adnan Khayrallah al-Tikriti. He poisoned Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, "Abu-Haytham," whose son Haytham is now leading an armed group in the ranks of the opposition in Tikrit.

The two Sukhoi-22 aircraft shot down by coalition planes over Tikrit recently were attacking his people and clan, bombing them with napalm!



[Abd-al-Hayy] Do you believe Saddam when he declares that he has decided to establish a democratic society based on the constitution, the rule of law, and a multi-party system, while he is pounding the Iraqi people north and south with his armored vehicles? How can democracy be born under the weight of bloody oppression and the explosion of bombs?

[Al-Hububi] He is a liar, a cheat, a deceiver, a tyrant, and an autocrat—these are his traits based on his political history. He is trying to deceive the United States with this democratic proposal, just as he is trying to placate the Shiite masses by means of the recently formed ministry headed by Sa'dun Hammadi, a Shiite. But he is not truthful in any attitude. Where was the democracy he seeks when he executed 22 leading figures of his party, whose only crime was that they had tried to spread some democracy only in the ranks of the party?

[Abd-al-Hayy] Will this constitutional and political trick extend the life of Saddam and his regime?

[Al-Hububi] I don't think so. A falling man cannot stop the law of gravity!

[Abd-al-Hayy] How do you picture the scenario of Saddam's fall? Will he resign, to be succeeded by Taha Yasin Ramadan, whom he recently appointed to the position of vice president? Or will he be succeeded by 'Izzat Ibrahim, on whom the Baghdad newspapers recently bestowed the title "deputy general commander of the armed forces"?

[Al-Hububi] Saddam will not resign. He will not give up power voluntarily. He will not respond to the will of the people. His inevitable fate is that he will be killed by elements of the popular revolution, or a military movement will liquidate him, or he will resort to flight if enormous dangers encircle him on every side and his last defense arrangements collapse in Baghdad.

[Abd-al-Hayy] Do you think it likely that a military coup will take place, led by out-of-favor army elements, such as defeated Defense Minister Sa'di al-Juburi, Chief of Staff Husayn al-Rashid, Air Force Commander Sa'b al-Tikriti, and Republican Guard Commander Iyad al-Rawi?

[Al-Hububi] We accept any means that rid us of Saddam, restore the power of governance to the people, and secure the principles of democracy, whatever means these might be—popular revolution or military coup. But we do not accept a military government that will again turn back the clock to what once was.

[Abd-al-Hayy] After the physical liquidation of all Iraqi political leaders in the course of 22 years of Saddam's rule, is there anyone fit to lead the country left either in the army, the party, or the ranks of the opposition? What is the alternative to Saddam, notwithstanding the truth that no man exists who is indispensable?

[Al-Hububi] The Iraqi people are a creative people. Rather than just one alternative, the people will find a

hundred alternatives to impel into the ranks of leadership from qualified nationalist elements at home or abroad.

[Abd-al-Hayy] Contemporary Iraqi history tells us that Baghdad's rulers from Qasim to Saddam have been gripped by a tendency toward expansion and aggression. In your opinion, with Saddam's departure, could Iraq's expansionist and aggressive policy against its neighbors also depart, or will it be renewed in a different way?

[Al-Hububi] As a unity person, let me say that there is a dominant tendency in the Iraqi people toward the establishment of Arab unity—through a meeting of the wills of the Arab peoples and their free choice, not by over-running them in the manner of Bismarck.

What was done by 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim when he demanded Kuwait in 1961, or what Saddam did in 1990 when he occupied Kuwait by force of arms is not a good standard of measurement. It cannot be generalized to include an entire people, in opposition to their genuine character and nature.

[Abd-al-Hayy] The Security Council's draft cease-fire resolution includes 23 points. Among the most important of these are, first, Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's international borders according to the agreement of 4 October 1963 signed by Iraqi Prime Minister Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Second, Iraq is to announce its commitment to compensating Kuwait for the damage to its environment, returning stolen property such as gold, bank deposits, and equipment, and compensating Kuwait for the installations that were destroyed. From the point of view of justice, not of submission, what are your thoughts about these conditions?

[Al-Hububi] Returning stolen goods! How humiliating for a head of state to confess that he has stolen things belonging to another people and that he will return them!

On the whole, the conditions of the cease-fire resolution are conditions for submission—conditions that a victor dictates to the vanquished. How many similar conditions of submission there have been that peoples have been freed from after the fall of their leaders who brought their countries defeat and humiliation! It happened in Germany and in Japan!

Justice does not consist in having the Iraqi people and any regime that comes after the end of Saddam bear the heavy burden of the results of his crimes and disasters. How can they cover the enormous sums of compensation to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and possibly also Israel?

## ISRAEL

### Political Personalities Discuss Postwar Middle East

91AE0358C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew (Passover Supplement) 29 Mar 91 pp 6-8

[Article by Pe'er-li Shahar: "The New World Order Starts at Home"]

[Text] Today we are talking about a new world order, about how the United States, the world's only superpower, will not be prepared to leave the Middle East in the jaws of a volcano.

Within the overall political campaign, we are sure that the contacts that have begun will continue and that they will cause severe shocks. There are no optimists on either the right or the left.

The chairman of Mapam, 'El'azar Granot, assumes that a Palestinian state in exile will come into being, not headed by 'Arafat.

MK Ya'ir Tzeven speaks of a new Palestinian framework. One way or another that means a situation that will force Israel to enter into the thicket of negotiations.

Deputy Minister Yig'al Bibi believes it possible that Shamir's suggestion to make peace first with the United States stems from a desire to delay progress as much as possible.

The Druze Zaydan 'Atashi feels that since there has been no peace here since the creation of the world, the prospect that peace will arrive in precisely our generation is about zero. According to him the problem is deeper, a problem of mutual hatred.

MK Sarah Doron sees the opportunity created now as a breakthrough, like the coming of Sadat to Jerusalem. But she says the seismograph is still moving and nothing is sure.

Politicians talk about the question of negotiations for peace and the political developments in the region after the Gulf war.

#### **'El'azar Granot, Chairman of Mapam: Egypt Has a Central Role**

Making it very explicit that what I say is not a forecast but merely a temporary appraisal, I will touch on two issues: peace between Israel and the Arabs and the conclusions for the "peace camp" in Israel.

The solution of the Palestinian problem remains a necessary condition for every other peace agreement. Therefore, any attempt to circumvent it is doomed to absolute failure. In my estimation the PLO (Tunis) has begun to wisen up in a significant way. It began to do so at the end of the war. The rapid achievement of supremacy within two or three days over Palestinian forces in Lebanon in everything having to do with the launching of the Katyushas toward Israel, and the Palestinian agreement to the stationing of Lebanese troops in South Lebanon demonstrate the change in attitude at the end of the war; and the decision to allow the leaders in the territories to hold talks with Baker shows that a quick reappraisal was accomplished within the Palestinian leadership, and the organization is trying to return to the political stage as the exclusive representative of the Palestinian people in every political negotiation.

All who deal with the issue (the Arab states, headed by Egypt; Europe; the USSR and the United States) recognize that at this stage, at least, there is no substitute for the PLO. Within the PLO, it seems, there is no one who might challenge Yasir 'Arafat's leadership, at least not at this stage.

I would not rule out the possibility of the establishment of a Palestinian government in exile. Such a development would facilitate the negotiations, for the Americans and for Israel, too, with a recognized Palestinian leadership. We might suppose that such a government would not be headed by Yasir 'Arafat, who would continue his position as the intended president of the future Palestinian state, if and when it should come into being. That supposition, if it turns out to be true, would make things easier for both the United States and Israel, and, what is more important, would make it easier for the PLO to conduct the peace negotiations without that constituting a stumbling block to its very existence or progress.

There is no doubt that Egypt will play a central role in the future peace process. At this stage I am impressed that Egypt is directing all its efforts at pacification within the Arab world, between those who split during the course of the Gulf war, and the establishment of renewed cooperation, under her leadership, which is no longer contested by Iraq.

If I am correct in this assumption, it would be unwise to expect a warming of relations between Israel and Egypt at this stage—even though we might suppose that the attempts of various elements, among them opposition elements in Israel, will continue in trying to persuade the Egyptian leadership to open a dialogue with sober elements in Likud headed by Foreign Minister David Levi.

Since we cannot direct or influence the policy of the Government of Israel, and given the absolute conviction that only an alternative government could respond to the historic challenges facing us, the political forces set to establish an alternative government must draw the necessary conclusions for their action and common purpose by presenting a clear alternative to the Israeli public. Mapam has done something in this direction with its suggestion to the Labor party to consolidate a common front between Mapam, Ratz, Shinui, and Labor. That front must come into being, even if the entire Labor party would not be a partner to it.

#### **MK Dr. Ra'anana Cohen (Labor Party): A Change in Arab Attitudes Toward Israel**

This war was a kind of conceptual earthquake. The Arab nation and Arab intellectuals have still not digested the event. In my opinion they do not have the tools to understand what happened and to arrive at any kind of conclusion about the new situation that has been created. But everyone agrees that a sea change has occurred in the Arab world. This is the first time that the Arab states have found themselves in a war against another Arab state, on the side of the West.

What characterized the region were the controversies between Arab states. This is the first time in the modern history of the Arab world that Arab countries stand alongside the West and fight against a sister country, their own flesh and blood, having the same cultural, social and religious orientation. This is a starting point that we have to adopt, whether in the political echelon or among the public that thinks about these problems and is trying to understand the current reality.

There is a change in attitude here about the Arab world and about inter-Arab politics. The real and imagined boundaries of what was accepted as permissible or forbidden from the point of view of the Arab world have been overtaken and even eliminated with Desert Storm. By understanding that point, we can prepare ourselves for the discussion of the questions of peace and negotiations.

In my estimation, there is a possibility that within a short time the attitude of the Arab world toward Israel will change. That is true on the Syrian front. Even if it is to be expected that the Syrians will not give up the Golan, we have to be ready for a Syrian willingness to suggest far-reaching peace solutions to Israel, such as the demilitarization of a part of the Golan Heights. We must achieve a peace agreement with the Syrians, on condition that we not jeopardize the security of the State of Israel and our settlements on the Golan Heights.

The Americans will press for negotiations and interim agreements between us and the Arab world, especially with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. The process may end with the creation of federations between various states in the region that would be linked with economic agreements. I believe the idea of a common Arab market, talked about even before the war, will be resurrected. It will now get a strong push forward with Egypt as a partner, and perhaps even as leader. There will be an increasing tendency toward internal migration of inhabitants of Arab states with unemployment to countries such as Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states. That is the case because those countries will require working hands as a result of the need for reconstruction of war damage. That is why the Arab coalition created before the war will continue and find significant expression in the economic sphere. From the point of view of the Middle East, Turkey, which until now has been a country that has not gotten involved in the political events, will demonstrate greater involvement because of prospects for Syrian-Turkish rapprochement, with an attempt to settle their border disputes and controversies. Turkey will become an influential country—because she controls the principal water resources in the region: the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates. Hence her possible influence over Syria and Iraq.

To sum up, the war has created both prospects and dangers. The Arab world has begun a rapprochement with the West, and its view of the West has changed: no longer a colonial force bent on conquest. The risk is that within the Arab world those fundamentalist forces that

see this war as a religious war (Jihad) will gain, while accusing the members of the Arab coalition of treason and even apostasy. That possibility would undermine the prospect for a rapprochement toward peace. It is still early to say which of these two possibilities will win out. It is important for us as Israelis that the Arab world adopt the first approach, and we have to try to advance that possibility by expressing readiness to work toward peace.

#### **MK Sarah Doron, Chairperson of the Likud faction in the Knesset: Israel—a Part of the Region**

This was a regional and perhaps even world earthquake. The surprise was absolute because we thought that, after the conclusion of the Cold War, the era of wars on a large scale was over. But in my opinion it is difficult to ascertain or predict what will happen in the future because there are still aftershocks in Iraq and we have not yet seen the end of the campaign.

From Israel's point of view the important implication is that Israel was proven to be a part of the region. Even Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states recognize that Israel is the only democracy here. We see the beginning of reconciliation with Israel's existence, and it may be that following that we will see recognition and coexistence. But in my opinion this will be a slow process. Those who are impatient will not contribute to advancing the processes but, rather, will turn them back. The seismograph is not quiet; the changes in the region are still occurring. The fact is that Saddam still sits in Baghdad.

I would move patiently and cautiously to meet the changes and, in my opinion, since the establishment of the State, these are the most significant changes that have occurred in the region since the beginning of the century. The visit of Sadat was part of the process. I had a portion in the heavy responsibility of voting for the Camp David agreements, and all my doubt notwithstanding, I have no regrets. He was astute and understood that he had to come to an understanding with Israel. Now we are at the beginning of that readiness on the part of the other countries. I do not know if they are entirely ripe for it yet, but if so, channels are being opened for discussions. I do not expect U.S. pressure, but rather an attempt at greater involvement. We saw that in Baker's visit here.

#### **Dov Lautman, President of the League of Industrialists: Industry, the Economy and Immigration**

I want to say right off that I will not deal directly with the political issue but will examine the implications of the war on industry and the economy. We have to do that from three points of view: first—what are the effects of the war on the scope and size of immigration? Second—what are its effects on Israel's defense expenditures? Third—to what extent will Arabs from the territories work inside Israel?

To the extent that the Gulf war has no significant effect on these three variables, then, in my opinion, we should

not expect a change in the development trend of the Israeli economy from what it was prior to the war. In other words, the happenings in the economy during the emergency period, which were expressed by a striking slowdown in activity in most branches, will have no real medium or long-term effect on economic development.

We should acknowledge that a number of businesses were certainly hurt during the prolonged emergency situation, which caused slowdown to the point of paralysis in several economic areas. But from the overall economic point of view, there is no real significance to the collapse of a few businesses here and there. It turns out that the overwhelming majority of industrial plants withstood the difficulties of the emergency period and are now returning to normal activity after the conclusion of the war and the end of the emergency period. I am very happy that the effects of the war on Israel's foreign trade were relatively minor, both in the area of export and of import. The fears that Israel's location in the combat zone would hurt foreign trade turned out in retrospect to be false. The large majority of export deals were consummated, and industrial plants experienced no real difficulties in purchasing raw materials from abroad.

As to immigration, it is still too early to say what the scope will be in the coming months. This is the key variable that will determine the state of the Israeli economy and of industrial development in the immediate future. The degree to which we have Arab labor from the territories is also very important for economic trends, especially because of its effect on the activity of the construction branch.

Israeli industry in 1991 and even on the eve of the Gulf war significantly lessened its dependence on Arab labor from the territories, from a record high of about 22,000 Arab industrial workers from the territories, to about 10,000 and even less than that in the beginning of 1991. But, of course, industry is also influenced by the scope of activity in the construction sector, so that if the latter slows down, certain industrial branches will also be affected.

Another important variable for the economy and for industry is Israel's defense expenditures. It seems that some growth can apparently be expected in local purchases by the defense establishment in the aftermath of the war, but its effect on the level of industrial activity will apparently be marginal. For the longer term it is still impossible to tell what the level of defense expenditures will be and whether defense exports will be affected by the Gulf war.

To sum up, next year, after the Gulf war, the rate of expected industrial growth will be lower than what was expected at the beginning of the year. A part of this slowdown stems from the effects of the war and a part from other reasons, like the world-wide recession in the United States and some European countries. It seems to me that what is more important is not the level of

industrial development next year so much as what will happen in the coming years, whether we are smart enough to develop a rate of industrial growth that will enable us to absorb a million immigrants or not. The way things look from the short-term trends, it seems that we are not on the right course, and that is a pity.

#### **MK Israel Qesar, Histadrut secretary: "Stop Playing Games"**

There are several conclusions from the Gulf war. There are two basic concepts that have to be stressed when we talk about the subject. One is the significance of the Gulf war for the State of Israel; the other is its implications for the positions of the Labor party.

As for the second issue, we are not in the government. Even if we were in the government, the more power to those who act according to the principle "reduce rather than expand." I cannot see the satisfaction in declaring publicly where the border will be. If we get to the point where we have to make political decisions, we will go to the people and ask its advice, something which thus far is uncommon in our democracy.

Likud can do one of two things: Either it can take the initiative to move up elections, and that is what is required, or it can get to a crisis with the Americans in the negotiations and choose to go to elections. In that case we should get up and say: Stop the interfactional games and innuendo, let us see how we can sharpen the debate between us and Likud. We can be the ones who show the nation that we are the right alternative that can provide a response that we can live with—first, the Arabs of Israel and afterward all of the Arab states, and that we can get along with the other partners, too.

Before the war there were factions within the party that wanted to see the PLO as a legitimate representative with whom to negotiate, which was contrary to our platform. But now, after the Gulf war, I feel in my heart that we have at least gotten rid of that controversy within us. After all, anyone who arrogantly raises the PLO banner, will fall together with them. Unfortunately, there are such proposals. But, after all, the PLO is finished as far as the Americans are concerned, the PLO is finished in Europe and even in a large part of the Arab world.

One simple thing is clear to me: There is one basic contrast between us and Likud—Likud says "Not one step," while we say "Territories in exchange for peace." Which territories? We do not have to get into the details now. Do we have to talk about a Palestinian state? I do not know, and no one knows how the dynamic of the negotiations will develop. Perhaps there will be a federation with Jordan. This area is very fluid. We have seen how what was an alliance the day before yesterday, is totally gone today. We are talking about regimes resting on the shoulders of dictators and tyrants. There is no certainty that if we start negotiations with someone today, he will be around to complete them tomorrow.



One more conclusion from the Gulf war: The UN played a role here. I want to know how I will be able to conduct negotiations without the UN having a role to play. For it is not an objective UN and one lacking an army. Anyone who comes to negotiations has his interests to protect, and the UN is not a professional, impartial arbitrator.

If I had to choose a policy, I would look for ways to get as close as possible to the United States. If we are going hand in hand with the Americans, we are still not talking about substance. In fact, the debates will be about substance, but in important areas they have a common interest with us. We will talk with an agreed upon commission that will be acceptable to both us and the Palestinians. If there should be a possibility for talks with an elected or agreed upon Palestinian representation, and also with Jordan, that would be acceptable to us. There are a lot of advantages to such a structure. But first of all we must stress the differences between us and Likud.

**Yig'al Bibi, Deputy Labor and Welfare Minister,  
National Religious Party: A Wave of Resignations From  
the Government**

Those who are now conducting peace negotiations are trying this time to stress peace with the Arab states rather than an agreement with the Palestinians. In my view, that is a mistake! It is precisely now that they should put all the more emphasis on peace with the Palestinians, because that is the root of the problem. We can make peace with the Arab states at the end of the process.

This was the place to find a local leadership that could represent the Palestinians, especially after such a representation had met with Baker, in a situation in which the popularity of the PLO is on the down turn. I am amazed at how they deflected interest away from what is essential! I would expect that the momentum of talks with the Palestinians would continue, and suddenly they are talking about negotiations with Syria or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. In my opinion we have to find a solution at home and only afterwards get to the surrounding states. I have a feeling that they will try to prolong the process. I am talking about those elements that are not interested in seeing the peace process progress, because it is worthwhile for some of the political parties to run for elections in another year and a half on the political issue. For some of them it would not pay to run on the issues of the economy or the absorption of immigrants, and therefore, in my opinion, they will try to prolong the political issue to as close as possible to the elections in order to have that as their focus. We should also not forget that if they succeed in delaying and prolonging the discussions, we will also run into the presidential elections in the United States.

But if I am wrong and if nevertheless a process develops in which the United States and European Community press, we must expect a wave of resignations from the government. Gandhi and Tehiya will resign, and that will threaten the stability of the government. Then we might

possibly see attempts to establish an alternative coalition of peaceniks headed by Ma'arakh. For if Gandhi and Tehiya resign, there will be those in Likud who, in order to assure themselves of a next term, will want to move up the elections.

If so, we can expect a two-track course: the moving up of elections or, alternatively, an attempt to establish a government of peace forces. I do not believe that a government of the left will arise with the ultra-Orthodox. Therefore it seems to me more logical that there will be early elections. There is no doubt that we can look forward to that.

I also want to say that those who will prolong the negotiations hope that in our unstable area something will happen to save them from the negotiating table. Something like the joke—either the oppressor horseman will die or the horse will die. In the economic situation, if there will not be a change, we will have lots of problems. I do not know many countries that submit a budget with a deficit of 8 percent in gross national product. There is also no doubt that the water problem, the cuts in caps to farmers and other problems, put the economic issue in no less a serious situation than the political one. Therefore it seems to me that the course will be for early elections with the political issue presented as dominant.

**Zaydan 'Atashi, a Druze Leader: Eternal Hatred and  
Envy**

As an observer who considers himself rather astute in Middle Eastern matters and as one of the apologists for Israel abroad, I see three courses:

1. The most difficult of them—the Middle East has not enjoyed real prolonged peace for 4,000 years. Not with the Romans, the Persians, the Greeks, the Mamelukes, the Turks, nor the Arabs—there was never peace here. Therefore I do not expect real peace in the future either! If over the course of 4,000 years so many peoples and religions have passed through here who could not manage coexistence, I have no basis to say that peace is possible here. Every war, even the smallest, arouses all the extremes in the Middle East. Like the Druze say—when you strike a copper tray, the entire tray resonates.
2. The issue of renewed nationalism accompanied by religio-fundamentalist motifs, both within Islam and within Judaism, leaves no room for a route that would lead us all to the anchorage of peace. For we all know that the moment religious hatred is unveiled between two peoples, there is no hope for them to live together. Examples—Lebanon, the conflict between Christians and Muslims, and it has never been quiet. Cyprus, the struggle between Christians of Greek extraction and Muslims of Turkish extraction. Therefore, because Israel and the Middle East constitute a problem of like dimensions, coexistence between the various religions, nationalities and identities in our region is impossible. If Islam has not succeeded in making peace with itself, why think it can make peace with Judaism?

3. If there is no mutual readiness on the part of both Israel and the Arabs to undergo a test period, perhaps a prolonged one, I do not see an agreement. Unfortunately, I will not get to see peace in the Middle East in my lifetime. Nevertheless, that does not mean I should forego efforts to improve the atmosphere and make peace. We should not despair. I hope that I am wrong, but I know that the real problem is not peace or war. The real problem is hatred between two different peoples and religions who make up the Middle East. The Arab who says he does not hate the Jew is a liar. And if the Jew says he does not hate the Arab, he is even more of a liar. We must first overcome hatred and envy. If we can create a system of confidence during a transition period, then maybe, maybe we will also get peace. Nevertheless, Israel will be here as long as the world exists.

**MK Amnon Rubinshteyn, Shinui: Changes in the PLO**

It is clear that the influence of the United States has increased, and that is a positive development for Israel. If Arab partners can also be found, it is possible that a new period will develop here that will lead to peace negotiations. A whole lot depends on what happens on the other side in the position of Arab governments in general and Syria in particular. Following the Gulf war, Damascus has taken on prime importance. In my view, there will not be an immediate Arab turnaround ala Sadat. We should not pin undue hope on Saudi Arabia, where I do not see her having an interest in opening peace talks with Israel. This is a religious Muslim country for whom Israel represents all that is foreign. Therefore I see a change, perhaps, in Damascus. King Husayn would want to come back to the Palestinian issue, but does not know if he can. I see a possibility for changes in the PLO.

[Pe'er-li Shahar] Is the initiative for negotiations with the Arab countries above all a trick on the part of the Government of Israel?

[Rubinshteyn] I do not know, but I think it is a trick. Most MK's believe we have to reach an agreement with the Arab world. But we are all united in the view that there is no prospect for such a settlement without a solution to the Palestinian problem, and in order to get that kind of settlement, there has to be an international framework. Where everyone will sit down together. Nevertheless, I can say that the avoidance of a unified stance on the issue of 242—territory in exchange for peace—is a semantic strategem familiar to us.

**MK Ha'im Oron, Mapam: 'Nyet' Will Bring Confrontation**

I have both an optimistic and a pessimistic appraisal. Pessimistic—really for reasons that are internal to us and external. I am not sure that the priorities of the United States, Egypt, and Syria (and, of course, of Israel), are to advance the issue of the conflict, as is predicted here for the coming months. There are still other questions. When I look around, I see the need of each of the regimes to confront internal questions, questions having to do with itself alone. I am not sure but that if we look at the

overall picture, we would find a situation in which dealing with the conflict would be very far down on the list of priorities.

That forecast is a certain path to renewed confrontation and, without making predictions as to time, it means a confrontation in more difficult circumstances than before. An additional possibility—because of the continuation of the government's existing policy, Israel will be forced to pay a decisive Zionist price on the issue of immigration, while taking a calculated risk. I would say explicitly that the government may prefer to give up the immigration and its absorption out of greater ideological preference for the "complete Land of Israel."

The more optimistic forecast is that confrontation of the political question will not be postponed and that an internal Israeli battle will be fought, one of the most difficult since the creation of the state. That, because all the political and economic issues will make themselves felt full force.

We have heard Shamir say 'nyet' over the Golan Heights as well as Levi, and we heard 'Olmert in the United States. It is hard even to imagine the confrontation between the blocs over questions that cannot be escaped. It will touch the territories, the occupation, relations between us and the Arabs and the price we are willing to pay for integration in the peace process or in the option for building a new order.

If we add to that the increasing crisis in the absorption of the immigration, where out of 120,000 unemployed 10,000 are new immigrants and 110,000 are Israelis, and the crisis in housing—we then face the question of questions: How can the government organize itself without resources? We must understand that in order to muster 20-30 billion dollars in the world after the Gulf crisis, the smiles and platitudes of the prime minister and his minions will not be enough.

Linkage has been created between the political and social totality, where the failure to absorb the immigration will become the focus of the connection. Israeli society must come to a decision on these questions. For the alternative—running away from decisions that will be hard and painful—is a process of prolonged and continuing internal degeneration. The push for an agreement is made all the more urgent, especially after the Gulf war. Anyone who deludes himself that the Palestinian question will fade from the agenda because of preoccupation with the Gulf will find out just what a delusion that is. Every passing day proves that this is the problem that continues to stand at the heart of the conflict. In this case, too, we cannot treat the heart alone, but also those phenomena that affect the other limbs and require parallel treatment.

**MK Ya'ir Tzeven, Mapam: The Palestinian Flag Worked**

For 23 years I have argued with some of my friends on the left who were impatiently waiting for the American

pressure that would extract Israel from the territories. That expectation, in my opinion, caused a certain measure of muscular atrophy for a part of the peace camp. But now the rules of the game are changing. A new world order does not mean a world of idyllic harmony, but it certainly does mean new international rules. Those rules have withstood their first test, a very hard and complicated one, in the Gulf war. The name of the game is stability. That is, in fact, why the war broke out. In order to ensure it, much diplomatic and political effort is now being invested. The sources of instability in our region are varied. The most serious: the enormous gaps between rich and poor, the question of burning thirst for scarce water, pan-Arabism and Islamic fundamentalism.

Pan-Arabism unites around the flag of hatred for Israel, with the message that impels and unites being the call for a solution to the Palestinian problem.

When Saddam Husayn tried to incite the masses in the Arab coalition countries, he at first tried the "Robin Hood" gambit—the war of the poor against the rich. That did not work!

Afterward he raised the banner of holy war, jihad. That did not work! After that he raised the Palestinian flag. That worked! Albeit not to the extent he wanted. Significant portions of Islamic fundamentalism also look to 'Al Aqsa on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem no less than to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it is impossible to deal with the foci of instability in the Middle East without starting to deal with the Palestinian problem, and not in a gradual, drawn out fashion. In parallel, perhaps slightly later, we could begin to deal with the second track, that of relations between Israel and the Arab states.

Therefore anyone who thinks that the punishment for the mistakes of the PLO and its adventurous coying up to Saddam Husayn will come in the form of removing the Palestinian question from the political agenda, is simply wrong. The PLO and 'Arafat are already paying a rather heavy price via the damage to their international position in the course of making peace with the Egyptians and perhaps also with the Saudis and the Syrians. They will be forced to pay an additional political price in the form of having to make their positions more flexible and submitting to agreed-upon inter-Arab arrangements, and perhaps also in the personal arena.

In the eyes of the Palestinians and perhaps also in the eyes of the Arab states, there is no substitute for the PLO. But that does not mean they will not pressure the PLO to take the initiative and establish a new national framework with which it would be easier to talk, which would not be formally identified absolutely with the PLO. One way or the other, after the PLO's last zigzag, it will have to go to not inconsiderable pains to persuade people that it has not abandoned its decisions of the fall of 1988 on the matter of its readiness to recognize Israel and stop the terror.

As to the Government of Israel, the key question is whether Shamir can go more than just a part of the way in the political process—both on the Palestinian track and that of the Arab states—until he gets to the decision point at which he has dug himself in. If that should happen, the nation will have elections (or a referendum) on that critical point. I am very optimistic about the results in this case. The chances are good that the majority of the nation will make the required decision—peace is preferable to conquered territories.

More dangerous is the second possibility—that Shamir will dig in with his objections at the very opening stages and will deal in evasions and stratagems to waste time in the hope that 1992, as the year of elections in the United States, will be a dead year. I foresee a bitter paradox in coming surveys: I believe that we will find a certain moderation in public positions but, on the other hand, a certain increase in the electoral prospects of the right. That is to say: The positive processes of change in the public opinion will not find political electoral expression. This is another pressing reason for the left to reexamine its attitude on the issue of a referendum. I raised the issue a year ago in internal discussions in Mapam and intend to raise it for open discussion in Mapam and the peace camp.

#### **Nissim Zawili, Secretary General of the Moshav Movement, Labor Party: Movement Toward Early Elections**

I believe that the political blindness of the right toward the Palestinian problem will intensify. Likud will take a procedural approach. They will not say no to negotiations and will not say anything caustic about the peace process. But they will delay progress as they did with the Baker program. There is no point in advancing political avenues towards countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have significance in the overall scheme of things, but which do not advance a real solution to the problem in the Middle East.

The radicals on the right will continue to lead. I hope that the younger generation that came into the government last term is a more pragmatic one in its political approach, but it is not arrogant and does not try to persuade or deflect the Likud from the radical line it is following. The world will take the bait because I do not believe the Americans will try to force our hand. True, we are talking about a different administration, but this administration, too, will consider it about time to open negotiations—even with Syria.

If the Likud succeeds in persuading the religious parties, it will move elections forward in an attempt to get out of negotiations and squeeze the right wing bent of public opinion to its advantage. If elections take place on schedule, there is a chance that Likud will lose. I do not see any reason why the religious parties would agree to move elections forward, and within Likud there will be no crisis, out of fear that the religious parties would form a narrow government with Ma'arakh. Therefore, we are

likely to see a push in the direction of early elections on the part of Gandi, Thiya and Likud. The religious parties will get up on their hind legs to prevent this, and it may be that Likud will decide to dissolve the partnership.

In any negotiations that take place, we are likely to see a Likud that is only play acting. They will fall back on the old slogans, like autonomy, they will set up a commission like that of Burg that will talk for a few more years without solving the problem. Because Likud does not see in separation from the Palestinian people the solution that I see. It will display a readiness for negotiations, but it will stress the need for a solution to all the conflicts in the area and we will remain outside the world.

#### **Finance Ministry Director on Wages, Unemployment**

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[Article by 'Oded Shorer]

[text] This Wednesday completed two months since Shalom Zinger's appointment as Director General of the Finance Ministry.

"Believe me, I feel as though two years have passed. I thought I understood completely the burdens awaiting me in the Finance Ministry. Apparently I was wrong. That is the difference between running a private business and running a state economy. You finish an 18-hour workday and you have a feeling that you just began," says Zinger, in his first press interview since he entered the Finance building. He still has not had time to organize his desk. He brought only the ashtray from his former office in Bank HaBeynle'umi (International Bank). A necessary accessory for a heavy smoker like him.

Like an experienced actor, he sits in the corner and plans how to sell his words to the public.

His message is simple: The Finance Ministry will not pass out money. There is no money.

#### **In the End Wages Will Fall**

If we want to absorb immigration without bringing the level of unemployment to 20 percent of the work force, we have to work hard and earn less. The deficit in the budget will rise temporarily, inflation will rise a little, and the Finance Ministry will jealousy guard profitability of exports (orderly devaluations) and relatively low market interest. And the bottom line is that wages will fall, right?

"If the rate of export growth remains at a 'normal' level of between 3.5 and 4.0 percent, rather than reaching approximately 10 percent, the level of unemployment actually could reach 20 percent. These numbers are not just something theoretical. We are talking about people."

He promises to enter energetically into the subject of the sale of banks and to strongly reject the sale of government companies as a substitute for mobilizing capital in the market so that more sources of capital will be freed for the private sector.

He promises to compel the pension plans and saving programs to invest in the free market without government support.

Zinger hopes that in the end some sort of package deal will be signed in the economy which will prevent shocks in the labor market, but warns that the Finance Ministry will not sign such a deal without considering the price - especially if the price includes again insuring special bonds at high interest for the Histadrut (labor union) pension funds.

He explains that the legal struggle against pay increases which the management of the Electric Company paid without authority still continues.

He reveals that the ministerial committee for economic matters set up a team of general managers at its head for war against the Arab boycott and for rigid enforcement of mutual acquisitions of foreign companies in Israel.

#### **Not a Contractor for Successes**

He reveals plans which have crystallized in the Finance Ministry, to be acted on in the near future, for a government investment company with capital of 150 million new shekels outside the framework of the Law of Government Companies, which will be managed by representatives of the large investment companies in the economy.

He details a plan to use the heads of Israel's large companies, especially managers of branches of international companies, as economic ambassadors who will try to explain in foreign countries why it is worthwhile to invest in Israel.

Is it not a bit difficult to bite off all of this together? "I never said that I am a contractor for successes," Zinger says.

"The main message for potential foreign investors is this: This is a country whose population is going to grow by 25 percent with everything which that implies. The added population constitutes a reservoir of professional expertise and it will lower the cost of labor, that is to say two birds with one stone. In addition to this, the Finance Ministry declares its commitment to export profitability. I think that the messages are clear, and there is a pragmatic opportunity here."

Even if they scrape him with salt water, they could not remove from him the banker within, the confidence in the art of the possible. No banging his head on the wall. Zinger decides.

Decide for better or worse, but decide. He removes papers from the desk. The cooperation between him and



the Minister of Finance is conducted in a peaceful atmosphere. Like Moda'i, Zinger does not like to put off subjects on the agenda. The fact that when Moda'i receives working papers on Sunday, he answers on the next day, Monday morning, does not make him feel pressured.

"What guides me is the good of the country. I sit here responsible for state funds and I deal with the country's money as though it were my own. When I have to decide whether to give or not to give, I ask myself if I would give it if it were my own money."

"The fact that this is a government office has not changed my way of looking for aid to various bodies in the economy."

The central subject, in the eyes of the Director General of the Finance Ministry, is absorption of immigration. Everything is secondary to that goal. Today the economy has an unemployment level of 10 percent.

So that supply of new workers does not increase the present rate of unemployment, (and nobody is speaking of lower rates of unemployment), the economy needs achievements like an average yearly growth of 10 percent, growth in Israeli raw product of 8-9 percent a year and growth of business product of approximately 10 percent a year in the next four or five years.

"These are very high goals. If the economy does not stand up to this, unemployment will rise higher and higher."

Import needs during the next five years are estimated (excluding defense needs) at 160 billion dollars. How will this be covered? "Even if we achieve in exports the goal of average growth at the rate of 8 to 9 percent a year, we will cover about 115-120 billion of the needed outlay, and when we add aid from all our traditional sources, we are still left with a hole of 20 billion dollars.

"Part of our effort to expand exports centers on a broad campaign which we intend to carry out in the world against the Arab boycott. We intend to deal with the Arab boycott in the most intensive way by using the improvement which has occurred in our political situation following the end of the Gulf crisis.

"We want to open additional markets in the world to Israeli exports. Dealing with this began with a ministerial committee for economic matters, which discussed the matter and decided to create a team of general managers led by the Director General of the Finance Ministry."

#### To Examine Mutual Acquisitions

"This topic will receive vigorous attention on the political plane in the realm of legislation, with talks between countries on the economic plane about mutual trade policy. One of the suggestions being examined now is to halt acquisitions by companies and government bodies

or by those supported by the government from foreign suppliers who do not carry out mutual acquisitions in Israel."

As a devotee of the approach supporting minimal government interference, Zinger says that he feels the government's role is to create a framework which will encourage foreign investments in Israel.

He sees the policy of the Finance Ministry in three main axes: growth, guarding stability, and certainty. Growth through giving preference to the business sector so that it will benefit from the growth in local demand, guarding against gliding into high levels of inflation, setting clear and defined game rules in economic policy from the beginning so that an investor who comes to Israel will know exactly what awaits him.

The Finance Ministry hopes that wages will go down. How does he intend to achieve this? He is working to lessen various rigidities in the labor market, like certain adjustments in the minimum wage law, toughening the criteria for receiving eligibility for unemployment benefits, canceling wage linkage between the business and public sectors, removing the limitations on working in shifts, and improvement of labor mediation.

Some of these subjects are already part of the framework of discussions toward some kind of package deal.

The Finance Ministry pulled part of the suggestions which were already laid before the Knesset with the intention of arriving at a social pact by agreement and not to force this through legislation. Zinger hopes to realize the goal of lowering wages in some trades and opening group wage agreements in order to help increase profitability in the export sector.

#### Not At Any Price

"The package deal has not been finalized, but we have reached a verbal agreement on a considerable portion of the topics. The deliberations on it have been a little extended both because subjects were brought up which were not directly connected to the emergency situation we are considering, like factories and other businesses which are in trouble and the demand of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) to link the agreement to the protection of arrangements with pension funds.

"This was one of the bones of contention which prevented a full agreement being achieved. The discussions were partially stopped because of the disagreement on the subject of pension funds. On the other subjects there was a feeling that we would agree. The matter of pension funds is rather sad because in spite of the support of the Finance Ministry which supplies the funds which special bonds, their situation continues to be difficult. There is no doubt that the old arrangement has to end.

"We must look for the right path to get out of this situation and to bring the pension funds to the market at the end of the process.

"It could be that if we agreed to lengthen the arrangement with the pension funds for the issue of a bond at 6.3 percent for an additional year, I could perhaps announce the signing of a package deal today. But we insist on only one

### Supreme Court Justices Profiled

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pp B12-13

[Article by Eyal Ehrlich]

[Text] Last Sunday, the Committee for Selection of Justices chose Eliahu Matza' as the 11th Justice of the Supreme Court. Although nobody speaks of it openly, the legal community knew that a real battle had spread over "the Sephardic seat," which had been empty since Justice Avraham Halima retired. The nine members of the committee needed more than one sitting in order to reach agreement.

Three members of the committee are Supreme Court justices (the President, Me'ir Shamgar, and Justices Shoshana Netanyahu and Gavriel Bach); two represented the government (Moshe Nisim, and Minister of Justice Dan Meridor, who according to law serves as chairman of the committee); two representatives appointed by the Knesset (Professor David Liba'i of the Ma'arakh (Alignment) and Yig'al Bibi of Mafdal (NRP—National Religious Party) and two representatives of the Legal Bureau, Ya'akov Rubin and Zvi Meytar. According to unwritten custom, when speaking of appointments to the Supreme Court, its representatives on the committee nominate the candidate. This custom is treated as holy, and since the founding of the State no Supreme Court Justice has been chosen in opposition to the opinion of the justices.

In the present case the justices were united behind the candidacy of Matza'. Rather surprisingly, real opposition developed against them: two representatives of the Legal Bureau and two members of the Knesset. Representatives of the Bureau supported the appointment of Mikha'el ben Ya'ir, a judge of the Tel Aviv district court, who is considered a "rising star." The two Knesset members opposed the appointment of Matza' for practical reasons. In the debate which took place about a month ago, Minister Nisim preferred not to cast the deciding vote.

Just before the committee was convened this week, it became clear to its members that the chairman Dan Meridor had decided to consider only Matza's candidacy for the position. Representatives of the Legal Bureau and the Knesset members sent Meridor a letter in which they demanded that there not be consideration of only one candidate, but that the rest of the candidates (Ben Ya'ir, Ya'akov Kidmi—director of the courts—and Sha'ul Aloni, the Tel Aviv district court judge) also be considered at the coming meeting. This letter threatened to shake up the relations between the powers in the committee and to cancel the custom which actually grants the

last word to the justices where appointment of justices to the Supreme Court is concerned.

An important member of the Legal Bureau explains: "We have entered on a struggle of principle against Shamgar's acting as if in reality Supreme Court justices decided who will be justices, and through this they turn the committee into a rubber stamp. The game is a betrayal and the head of the bureau, Ya'akov Rubin, was not ready to be a part of it.

The organizing of the four letter writers did not help. Actually, the committee also did consider other candidates, but Minister Moshe Nisim turned the scale when he decided to support the recommendation of the justices. Thus Matza' was chosen by a majority of five to four.

In judicial circles it is whispered that Ben Ya'ir was not chosen because of his age—50. Had he been chosen now, this would also have made him, very soon, president of the Supreme Court, after Professor Aharon Barak. According to law, a justice who reaches the age of 70 must retire. The incumbent president, Me'ir Shamgar, will leave in 1995, and in his place Aharon Barak will be appointed president. Barak will reach 70 in the year 2006 and then, according to custom, the most senior justice, Ben Yair, will be appointed president after him. Shamgar and Barak preferred to wait before deciding who will head the Supreme Court after them.

The Supreme Court is the most prestigious institution in the country and in recent years it has become more (and more) powerful while gnawing constantly at the position of the Knesset and the government. In the next few years five of the ten senior justices will be likely to retire. Eliahu Matza', 56, is the first of the new appointments. The twelfth seat remains vacant in the meantime. Concerning the status of the Supreme Court, it is worthwhile to examine where it is heading.

According to law, the Supreme Court has two functions: to serve as a court of appeal for verdicts and decisions of district courts, and to serve as a High Court of Justice. In this role its main functions are to keep watch over the activities of the administration, to object, and sometimes also to provide the aid which will heal the illnesses of government activity. Both tasks are important and respected, but there is no doubt that its role as High Court of Justice is what has given the Supreme Court its special position.

It is possible to point to two outstanding phenomena which characterize the activities of the Supreme Court when it performs as High Court of Justice: it has crystallized, over time, a series of basic rights, which make up, in actuality, a constitution for the State of Israel. At the same time, the areas of its involvement with the activities of both the government and the Knesset has broadened considerably.

As we have said, the Supreme Court has basically written an informal constitution, woven together section by section along all the length of its thread into a final unity.

Me'ir Shamgar's ascent to the Supreme Court in 1975, and Aharon Barak's in 1978 were added layers of bricks to the developing tendency toward inserting basic rights into Israeli law. In contrast to the Knesset's failure to crystallize a constitution, the High Court of Justice has shown, especially in the last ten years, courage and resourcefulness worthy of all praise. The team of Shamgar and Barak has succeeded in bringing about a situation where today it is clear to all that the Supreme Court does not hesitate to establish basic rights as part of the law in Israel.

The other outstanding phenomenon characterizing the Supreme Court when it functions as High Court of Justice, is the growing involvement in the activities of the government and the Knesset. The Barak-Shamgar team has continued the trend that began to be significant in the mid-60's, and led the High Court of Justice on the path which has canceled or lessened obstacles that in the past prevented the court from becoming involved in activities of the administration.

A further obstacle for these petitioners before the High Court of Justice, which is much less problematic now, is that of jurisdiction. In the past it was the custom that the court was not ready to enter into the discussion of many disputed subjects, political subjects for example. In recent years we have been witness to a significant broadening of the range of subjects which the court is willing to consider, even if a strong odor of politics wafts from them. Thus, for example, the High Court of Justice accepted a petition which nullified a Knesset decision.

The main stream of Supreme Court justices widens jurisdiction considerably but does set boundaries. Along with this, there are in the Supreme Court two extreme viewpoints: Justice Aharon Barak takes a stand according to which every subject is eligible to be judged, while Justice Menahem Alon limits the realm of jurisdiction in a very real sense. These two polarized opinions met in the High Court of Justice which ruled on coalition agreements which had been signed when the government was formed, and the clash between them led to the expected explosion.

Alon wrote in his decision, among the rest, "It is inappropriate that the legal system should push itself into the jaws of politics, with its seductions and storms. In contrast, Barak wrote, among the rest, "Locking the gates of public trial before a petitioner who claims that a political agreement is invalid does not seem acceptable to me.... I do not see any suspicion of politicization of judgment."

At the same time that the obstacles which petitioners have had to hurdle have been lowered, the High Court of Justice has revealed in recent years an activism whose way of function is worthy of mention. This trend expresses itself in a very long row of judgments among

which we can mention the verdicts which overturned the decision of the government's legal adviser and recommended serving an indictment against bank chairmen and against journalist Noah Kliger of "Yediot Aharonot." Similarly, the verdict which overturned the decision of the chief military advocate and ordered an indictment served against Colonel Yehuda Me'ir; the verdict which allows the newspaper "Ha'ir" ("The City") to publish an article about the Mosad (Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Missions), in opposition to the censor; the verdict in which the High Court of Justice ordered the parties to reveal the coalition agreements, etc.

The activism of the High Court of Justice, and especially of Justice Barak, displeases many jurists. Thus, for example, a former president of the Supreme Court, Judge Moshe Landau, wrote an article in "Iyunei Mishpat" ("Studies in Law") against widening the curtain. He wrote that since the first years of the State, the High Court of Justice has been careful to limit and hedge itself, but that now it is characterized by "self-assured activism and almost complete loosening of the bridle of self-restraint."

But the main activity of the Supreme Court is to function as Court of Appeals. Every year, the Supreme Court judges about 750 civil appeals and about 750 criminal appeals. Recent years have been distinguished by innovation in many areas of law, and the year 1990 is considered a record year. The general public knows the Supreme Court justices mainly because of the High Court of Justice. All of its justices come from the government sector or were judges previously.

**Me'ir Shamgar**, 66 years old. In his youth was an Etzel (Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi; "the Irgun") fighter and was exiled to Africa at the age of nineteen, where he spent four years in detention camps. A regimental commander in the Israeli army and military advocate general for seven years. Loves to and knows how to manage. From 1968 to 1975 was legal adviser to the government. Has served on the Supreme Court since 1975 and been its president since 1983. The unquestioned leader of the Supreme Court, truly distinguished. Very fundamental and serious jurist, well-read, with common sense and a sense of justice, and he is already spoken of as the successor to Agranat. Arrives at work every day at quarter of seven and leaves at seven in the evening. Although under his leadership the institution of High Court of Justice adopted a liberal approach to everything connected to **right to request review of administrative action by the Israeli Government (right to review)**, jurisdiction and basic rights, he represents a defense oriented position which does not rule out blowing up and sealing houses. Will retire in another four and a half years. Close friend of Aharon Barak.

**Professor Menahem Alon**, 67. Ordained Rabbi, lecturer in Jewish Law. Appointed Supreme Court Justice in 1977, filling the "religious seat." In 1983, was the Likud candidate for president of Israel, but was beaten by

**Hayim Herzog.** Has served as deputy president of the Supreme Court since 1988. Conservative on the subject of the **right to review** and considered one of the few members of the Supreme Court who still profess this doctrine. In the realm of jurisdiction he is considered extremely conservative. On the other hand, considered a liberal in the area of criminal punishment and opposes pre-trial imprisonment. Where religious subjects are concerned, is considered very liberal: he wrote the decision concerning Lea Shakdi'el, which affirms that a woman can be a member of a religious council. Among the justices is considered a modest, pleasant man. Many good people describe him as a remarkable person. At the same time, lawyers complain that he sometimes roughly cuts them down.

**Professor Aharon Barak.** 55. Legal genius. Each of his decisions brings something original and is characterized by intellectual momentum and ability at formulation that are astonishing. Received his doctorate at age 27; appointed full professor at Hebrew University law school at 36. In 1975 took Shamgar's place as legal adviser to the government. Served as legal adviser for the Israeli delegation at Camp David peace conference. In 1978, appointed justice of the Supreme Court. Very rational and analytic. Sweepingly liberal on the issue of jurisdiction. Arouses much criticism in academic circles and even more envy. In another four and a half years he will be president of the Supreme Court and will serve in this position for 11 years. A pleasant, cordial man. In spite of the fact that he and Alon are viewed as opposites in legal thinking, they share a true friendship. There are those who claim that in spite of his daring front, he keeps an eye on public opinion. Considered security oriented.

**Dr. Shlomo Levin.** 58. Formalist, expert on procedure. Conservative in the area of **right to review**. Especially because of the fear of overload if the obstacles to **right to review** are removed. His decisions are considered brief and clever. Considered a cold fish who does not get emotionally involved.

**Dov Levin.** 65. Was an Etzel (Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi) fighter and considered a "nationalist." Well-known because of the **Demjanuk[sp]** trial. Was magistrate and district judge in Tel Aviv. Has a reputation for harsh sentences, but very diligent in protecting the rights of the accused. Lawyers complain that he shuts the mouths of those he does not like. Enthusiast of soccer and Jewish cantorial music. Also serves as chairman of the National Council for Prevention of Traffic Accidents.

**Gavriel Bakh.** 64. Native of Germany. Was a member of the Hagana. Studied law in London. In 1969, was appointed State Attorney. Supports broadening the involvement of the Court. Considered one of the most humane and likable of the justices. Evenly balanced, liberal, and honest.

**Shoshana Netanyahu.** 69. The second woman on the Supreme Court (the first was Miriam ben Porat.) Considered very rightist in her positions (the aunt of Bibi

Netanyahu). Expert on laws of damages. When she does not like a lawyer appearing before her, she can be venomous. Seen as having rather low output. When she retires, District Judges Tova Strassburg-Cohen of Haifa and Dalya Durner of Jerusalem will vie for the "Woman's Seat."

**Eliezer Goldberg.** 59. Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1985, after serving as district judge. Considered very industrious. At first, was described as colorless, but as time passed, he made an excellent impression. Specializes in criminal law and extremely concerned with the rights of the accused and the citizen. Fair towards lawyers.

**Ya'akov Meletz.** 68. Served in the Hagana, and after finishing law school joined the Israeli police force and worked in the Investigative Branch. Twelve years ago was appointed District Judge in Tel Aviv and appointed five years ago as state comptroller. Following Shamgar's interesting exchange exercise, he switched roles after only a year with ex-Justice Ben Porat. Pleasant and agreeable, lover of compromise between conflicting sides. Considered security oriented. Religiously observant though not Orthodox, a lover of Jewish cantorial music and an excellent chess player.

**Theodore Or.** 57. Two years ago "drawn" from the Nazareth district court and appointed Supreme Court Justice. Expert on laws of damages and considered highly knowledgeable. A great formalist and security-oriented, who does not undermine the Army position. Sociable, a chess player and sports enthusiast. The first string foul-kicker for HaPoel Balfouria.

**Eliahu Matza'.** 56. graduated from law school in 1963. In 1972, enlisted in the regular army and served as a military judge. Appointed in 1978 as magistrate of Tel Aviv; has served since 1984 as Tel Aviv district court judge. His trials were conducted in an exemplary manner and his relations with lawyers were good. Matza' is not considered a shining light, and there is no indication of how he would stand in cases of serious infringement of the rights of the individual by the establishment.

Because of the great importance of the Supreme Court, especially when it is performing as the High Court of Justice, there is room for great suspicion towards politicians who take part in choosing justices. At this point it is suitable to compliment the present minister of justice, Dan Meridor, who serves as chairman of the Committee for Selection of Justices. In the two years he has filled that role, expressions of unusual praise for him have been heard from every corner of the legal system. Not only does he himself not bring any political interests into the electoral committee, he shields the judiciary against never ending arrows from the political arena. Because of his attempts to protect the independence of the system, he serves as a target for harsh attacks, especially from circles on the extreme right who see in the judiciary a body which is threatening and leftist.



Along with this, there are those who fear that members of the Committee for Selection of Justices are unintentionally filling the Supreme Court with justices who can change the face of the High Court of Justice.

Moshe Negbi, today the legal commentator for "Hadashot," has followed the work of the High Court of Justice for years. "In my opinion, there are first signs of retreat from the tremendous progress of the High Court of Justice in the 1980's. To my sorrow, I can point to two cases last year which began the retreat. We are speaking of the **Baeski** verdict in the High Court of Justice concerning wiretapping, and Shlomo Levin's verdict in the High Court of Justice on the "Yesh Gevul" ("There Is a Limit") movement with regard to orders to open fire in the territories.

A senior member of the judicial system who was asked to comment on claims about reaction in the policy of the High Court of Justice, refuted Negbi's claims. Concerning the **Baeski** decision he claimed that we are speaking of a very concise decision which should in no way be seen as a precedent. Concerning the High Court of Justice on "Yesh Gevul," he suggested that there actually is a minority of justices on the Supreme Court which still believe in limiting the **right to review** (Menahem Alon and Shlomo Levin) and that they could sometimes by chance form a majority. But in a case like this, if there is further discussion, a larger quorum (five justices) could overturn the verdict.

Concerning the claim that the emphasis is on appointing technocrats and not on the values of the justices, the claim was refuted with the explanation that the Supreme Court justices are able to learn a great deal about the candidate after he has served half a year as acting Supreme Court justice.

Ya'akov Rubin, head of the Legal Bureau, believes that there is room for improvement in the way judges are chosen, especially Supreme Court justices: "Here, unlike in the United States, there is no public examination of the candidate and his opinions. I would prefer that in the examination of a candidate more emphasis be put on his character, outlook, and knowledge. In an appointment to the Supreme Court, I would not hesitate to examine his views on fundamental topics on the agenda of the High Court of Justice, like jurisdiction, **right to review**, establishing constitutional principles, etc. I am for the electoral committee appointing a subcommittee which will examine each candidate and leave the protocol to the rest of the committee members. We ponder this subject all the time. There is room to consider improvements in the way candidates are chosen."

One of the tools that the electoral committee uses today is a course for candidates for the judiciary which is given by the Institute for Continued Education for Judges which neighbors the Supreme Court. It appears that every candidate for the judiciary (for all the courts) is directed by the subcommittee which interviews him to

register for the one-week course at Neve Ilan, but registration is not obligatory. Each course is attended by approximately 25 candidates, who are carefully observed by judges who pass their opinion of them on to the committee. Ya'akov Rubin has two criticisms of the course: "First, I think a week is too short a time. Second, the Legal Bureau is not represented among the instructors and discussion leaders of the course. Only judges are represented. I brought this up during the deliberations of the committee and did not receive a real answer."

And a last point concerning the appointments: there is no doubt that the president of the Supreme Court's position in the Committee for Selection of Justices allows him to do almost anything he wishes in the realm of appointments to the Supreme Court. From a number of members of the Committee I have heard sharp criticism of Shamgar's functioning during the appointment of Ya'akov Meletz to the Court two and a half years ago.

Evidently, Shamgar carried out a convoluted and complicated maneuver when the Deputy President, Miriam ben Porat, reached the age of 70. He offered Meletz a seat on the Supreme Court and pushed Ben Porat into the place vacated in the Comptroller's Office. In the committee, there were those who were angry at Shamgar's exercise, not because they thought that Meletz was not suitable, but because he had been chosen to serve a term of five years as comptroller, just a year earlier. Shamgar's suggestion that Meletz move over to the Supreme Court after such a short time seemed in their eyes to be contrary to the public good.

Among jurists of the first rank there exists great concern about the continuing functioning of the High Court of Justice as the ultimate guardian of the rule of law in the State. Attorney Avraham Gal, who in the last years was involved in many key High Courts of Justice, is very worried. "There is an optical error", he explains. "People do not understand that the High Court of Justice has limitations, as part of the establishment. The expectation that the judicial authority will succeed again and again to successfully resist all the pressures and upsets of balance from all the other authorities, goes against the laws of the physics of such systems.

"It is impossible that the executive or legislative authority should allow themselves to stubbornly sway from the frameworks of democracy and individual rights, and that the judicial authority should succeed again and again to mend the tears and repair the breaches. I fear that moment, and it is not so far away and imaginary in my eyes, when its strength will not stand by it and with it democracy in Israel will begin to crumble. They complain all the time about the High Court of Justice, both in the Knesset and in the government. Simple people expect that the High Court of Justice will battle everything that is illegal in the State. This cannot work.

In reality, there are threats, sometimes brutal, against the judicial system. Concerning the position of the High

Court of Justice on the subject of deportations, we have to remember that when Yitzhak Rabin was minister of defense, he said that "the High Court of Justice has to be bridled." What exactly does "the High Court of Justice has to be bridled" mean? It is the guardian of the law. The Knesset is also plotting against the High Court of Justice, and in order to get around it on subjects which would not stand up to the examination of the High Court of Justice, it passes laws, as in the matter of special funds, for the High Court of Justice does not disqualify laws.

"This is a basic breakdown in the essence of democracy, when funds are handed out without criteria. This causes the cheapening of the Supreme Court. If the business becomes more common and easier, this will be at the expense of democracy and the rights of the individual. When the country works according to the system of one hand washing the other, it is impossible to expect that every Monday and Thursday the High Court of Justice will appear, like the little boy in the fairy tale, and say that the king has no clothes."

In September 1992, the Supreme Court will occupy its new building between the Knesset building and the Hilton Hotel in Jerusalem. This will be one of the most beautiful public buildings in the country. The new court building was erected at the initiation of Shamgar, with the help of his connections with the late Madame Rothschild. The government did not invest a penny in the building and within the legal system there is hope that politicians will also not interfere with appointments to the Court.

### Young Soviet Immigrant Family Profiled

91AE0358A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew (Sabbath Supplement) 29 Mar 91 pp 21-23

[Article by Gid'on Levi: "Mainly They Like Cottage Cheese"]

[Text]

### They Especially Love Cottage Cheese

Just before I left her, I asked her what everyone asks now: Where will you be on the Seder night? Valery did not really know what I was talking about. Nor did Andrei. Afterwards I explained, and they recalled that they really had been invited for the Sabbath eve to a sort of dinner with Betty from the "Image" modeling agency. For last year's Seder they were still in Leningrad, far from Judaism, from Israel, from publicity, and from the glow that had now begun to surround her, Valery Alfimov, the new meteor in our modeling skies.

You know her first of all from that billboard against the background of a threatening truck on a cold European night. The billboard was photographed in a gas station in Ramat Gan. In a long raincoat and with cool, stunning beauty she then burst into the skies of our bus terminals via that billboard. Afterward one began to see her in the

magazine stands, in fashion shows and in advertisements, always seeming foreign, different, mysterious, not from here. After that came the obligatory documentation in the gossip columns. Valery and Andrei traveled to Beersheba; Valery drank vodka; Valery traveled to Milan; Valery returned from Milan. With the Nordic European features she brought us, she immediately stands out. This week I saw her walking with Andrei in the streets of south Tel Aviv. No one could help but gawk. In a country where blond means perfection, her 182 centimeters and hair flowing in the wind give her lots of name recognition.

She is also a new immigrant from Russia—proof that not all immigrants are frustrated engineers or unemployed nuclear scientists. Not even pianists or physicians who clean our streets here. Proof that, with a little bit of luck and beauty, there are other possibilities—the Alfimovs did not participate this week in the demonstration outside the Knesset by immigrants calling for bread and work. They also did not queue up in the terrible line outside the new employment house for immigrants in Jerusalem. They have bread and work but, for the time being, not much more than that.

They travel by bus and walk on foot. If her likeness is to be found in the bus station she happens to be in, Valery presses herself into the far end of the terminal. She is ashamed. Meanwhile success has not yet spoiled her: she is amazingly friendly, gets excited at every gesture and thinks she has a terrible chin. Maybe I have something, she admits, later, and tells Andrei something in Russian. Andrei brings the dictionary from the other room: shriveling. In Russian they say there may be some shriveling inside me. What is the shriveling? She does not know how to define it. But for those who are interested: Valery Alfimov is much more beautiful in life than in pictures. In a grey Marlboro T-shirt, jeans and sneakers while she was feeding her little Yosi cottage cheese, and with her face free of makeup, Valery was prettier than all the pictures in her work books.

You have to think about it. After all it was an article for Passover on one successful absorption of immigration.

Thus she was born less than 21 years ago in Leningrad. Her grandmother was Finnish, father non-Jewish, mother Jewish. She knows that many doubt that because of her facial features. Did your friends in Russia know you were Jewish? "Look, here you do not believe me, so certainly there they did not think me Jewish." Andrei's father was also not Jewish. Did you know anything about Israel? "Absolutely nothing," she giggles in her very advanced Hebrew, with her foreign accent that is not at all Russian.

In her work file, the "book" in the professional jargon, you will not see her smiling. In real life she does it a lot. Did you know that you were Jewish? Another captivating giggle. "In our family we did not pay attention to it." Nevertheless she knew of course that Jews lived in Israel and from TV she learned that there were also

Arabs in Jerusalem and that there was a wall and that "the Negev is the Negev." Israel did not touch their hearts. On TV they said that the Israelis were big occupiers and they thought the Israelis were all soldiers. She says she did not even know if there was architecture in Israel.

Most of their friends who could, traveled to America, to New York. Valery and Andrei also wanted to leave: They are young and in Russia there is no hope for anything. Andrei says that they knew it was no good in America either, and Valery adds that it is a mess in America. Too large a country for their taste, just like Russia. They could not stand the Germans in any case, the Italians were too noisy, London was too gloomy, so that France was the only country they considered, but in the end they decided on Israel.

Andrei's cousin had immigrated to Beersheba and reported that it was not paradise here, but it was not bad either. Valery says that in Leningrad the people are snobs, like in Tel Aviv. The periphery is the periphery and Valery needs a fast-paced rhythm, so Tel Aviv suits her. But in the beginning they were in Beersheba.

When she was young she wanted to be a movie actress, but in school she studied clerical work and shorthand. Three years ago she met Andrei in the street. He was driving a car; she says he saw real long legs in jeans, stopped and asked her where she needed to go. He was not crazy about her face. A little while ago they saw the film "Taxi Blues" and did not like it. They were already tired of all the rubbish in Russia. She does not at all like the questions they ask her, like who is her favorite actress.

She was barely 18 when she married Andrei, Andrushka, as she calls him. She was not yet 19 when Yosi, today Yosi, was born, a blue-eyed child whose flaxen yellow hair flows over his shoulders, an unparalleled imp who attends the WIZO hostel. "My husband said that without this child there is no family, and I think he made it to make sure I would be by his side forever." Andrei was in the next room just then. There are two and a half rooms in their rented apartment in the center of Tel Aviv, totally bare walls except for a Shuqi Ziqri calendar. A long, green rug in the living room, a refrigerator in the living room, the baby's bed alongside their bed in the other room. At the end of the living room is a metal dining room table with twin chairs. Only a red balloon hanging in the middle of the room colors it a little. In Russia they lived with Andrei's mother in a two-room apartment. It was actually nice, says Andrei. Valery makes a bit of a face.

The doorbell rings; it is a telegram from Andrei's mother in Leningrad: Why do you not keep in touch? Who has time? Actually maybe this evening they will call. Valery's parents are also in Leningrad. Her mother is 45, a massage instructor, and what could she do with that here? Andrei worked in Russia at "jobs" as he defines it, without going much beyond that: he bought and sold.

He is 28, very polite and unemployed for the time being. Most of the time he is Yosi's father when Valery is modeling and being photographed. When we met, Monday of this week late in the evening, it was after a day of photo sessions that began at 1700 in the morning and continued non-stop until evening. Valery was the freshest one in the room. In Russia she was photographed once or twice for the weekly MODA, not exactly a success story. On 9 May last year they left Leningrad and on the 10th landed at Lod. They were somewhat excited, but mainly they were tired because of the long flight via Budapest with the child.

From the airport they contacted the cousin in Beersheba, and he told them what to do: Say that they wanted Beersheba. At six in the morning they set out—a day in the immigrant hostel, a week with the cousin and afterward in the rented apartment in the non-prestigious 'D' quarter. The first thing they noticed was the weather. They left the airport and suddenly there were palm trees and a warm breeze. Afterward in Beersheba they noticed that it was a little dirty. Valery says that at first she was a bit afraid in Beersheba because there are a lot of Moroccans around who are like the Georgians she knew from the USSR, who steal, bother people and frighten them. Therefore in the beginning she did not dare go into the street alone, but little by little she gathered up her courage and other than looks, nothing happened.

Already on their second day in Israel Andrei inquired of the immigration center mother if Israel had anything like a beauty contest. They told him that just then there was a contest in town, for the Beersheba crown. He found out the details, Valery signed up and was photographed for the first round. Things got stormy in Beersheba. Angry mothers of excited contestants telephoned the organizers of the contest with very nasty complaints about the new contestant: she was married, she had a child and she was too old. Valery won, of course, and very quickly began to model in the Dead Sea hotels. Everything else is history.

Hanita Tzentner brought her to Tel Aviv, to the "Image" agency. After four months in Israel she was already on the modeling circuit in Tel Aviv. After five months she was already famous. Everybody thinks she gets millions, and they can barely pay the debts on the household goods they bought. They cannot even think about a car.

They came to Israel with 40 kg in four suitcases and that was it. They did not even bring glasses with them. But in Russia they would pay immediately after work, while here they wait three or four months until the money arrives. "Everyone says look at the Russian from Castro Modeling, but no one wants to pay." And Andrei adds: "It is better the other way around—they should pay more and talk less." They seldom go out because they do not have money for a babysitter. On the street people already ask for Valery's autograph.

They say they will stay with us here; Andrei says they will live here and work abroad. "We will never be real Israelis, we will merely take something from here. Yosi

will be an Israeli." What do they think about us? Silence and an exchange of looks. What bothers them here? Andrei leads off: "It bothers me that you do not read books a lot here. I do not see books in the homes. In Russia every apartment has lots of books." Valery: "After I was in Milan and saw such beautiful people, all so clean, boys and girls with such chic, it is a little hard here with the vulgarity and slovenly dress." Andrei cannot wait and breaks in: "There will be a big party in town and people come in sandals, almost in their underwear. When I came with a tie, like I am used to, they thought I was from Mars."

But of course they love the warmth of the people and, in general, they do not regret for a moment that this is where they went. Actually it is good in Israel. And here it will also be very good for the child, not like in America, and the weather is so good here. The main thing: the Israeli cheeses, especially the cottage cheese. Not in Leningrad and not in Milan did they taste anything so good. Andrei, by the way, makes sure she does not eat cakes. When he said that, his wife's eyes sparkled: How she loves cakes! But Andrei is quick to note that she also loves fruit and vegetables, and she cannot but agree.

Shortly she will again crown our streets with billboards for "Soviet jeans." This time it will be a less cold and much more contradictory look, really seductive. In general, I did not see two pictures of her that were alike. One time she was full-figured and another time thin, once a little girl, then a woman, once naive, then provocative. She says that is good in modeling.

Experts on the matter predict an international future for our Valery. The 24 days she spent now in Milan have not yet brought her the desired breakthrough. But she quickly returned home to Yosi and to Andrei. She does not like to talk about her prospects. She says that, after all, she still has time—the world's famous models today are 25-28 and she is not yet 21. Andrei is sure that she will make it. Where will they be ten years from now? Andrei says they may already be millionaires and in Israel. The war and putting Yosi into a sealed room? "Mamat" [infant carriage protection device] made them more patriotic Israelis.

They still find politics very hard, they are not yet oriented here. There are a lot of parties here, and one thinks one way and the other, another. Therefore it is hard for them to know. But Andrei said that he read just today an article in the paper he agrees with 100 percent.

Territories in exchange for peace. When I was already thinking about going on to another topic Andrei explained: The territories are for us and peace is for the Arabs. Valery nodded her head in agreement over and over.

## JORDAN

### Rationale for Iraqi Withdrawal Given

91AE0354A Amman AL-LIWA' in Arabic 27 Mar 91 p 24

[Article: "Nuclear Threat, Rebels, Unsuccessful Bet on Arab Man in the Street, and Soviet Deception Most Important Reasons for Withdrawal"]

[Text] Responsible Iraqi leaders indicated that the Iraqi leadership dealt with the aggression's strategic objectives without delving into operational details and allied objectives which were to crush the Iraqi army's combat ability and break Iraq up into petty states, two schemes Iraq has been able to foil. As for the matter of withdrawal, it had been decided upon long before, but the American forces consistently refused to undertake a commitment not to attack the withdrawing forces.

These Iraqi leaders make a distinction between two matters: 1) withdrawal from Kuwait; and 2) agreement to halt military operations.

Regarding withdrawal from Kuwait, these leaders note that it occurred amid the greatest of deception operations which stunned the American forces who failed to detect it until it was almost over. For when the ground war got under way in Kuwait, the only Republic Guard force left was one division whose command had crossed Iraqi borders, and it was able to pull back following a dreadful battle with the American forces, leaving in Kuwait a mere 50,000 Popular Army troops who, prior to the operations, had pulled back to 15 kilometers from the border.

Available information indicates that the Iraqi forces withdrew as the oil fields were set afire, and they began making operational preparations almost immediately after the Khafji operation. Iraqis talk about this matter with pride, saying that, whereas America had technological superiority, the Iraqis were superior in using strategic deception.

As for the cease-fire agreement, they attribute it to the following reasons:

1. At the time the agreement to cease hostilities was reached, the Iraqis were not in bad shape, in light of the enemy's two strategic objectives. The Iraqi army tested its power when a Republic Guard division faced three American divisions in al-Nasiriyah and Zi Qar, surrounding two of them and striking a third one. Iraqi troops also resisted the landing that occurred at al-Nasr athletic field and Ra's al-Salimiyah in Kuwait, an action on a par with the American troops' swift penetration of Iraqi desert land. The Iraqi leadership decided to take advantage of this almost-even military situation to rescue the withdrawing troops.

2. The Iraqi political leadership received a warning to stop the shooting and to issue immediate orders to



withdraw or else American and British forces would use nuclear tactical weapons which would have meant the annihilation of 3 to 5 million Iraqis. This included the stipulation that if the two surrounded divisions in al-Nasiriyah and Zi Qar were wiped out, orders would be issued to the nuclear forces to attack. The Iraqi military command had received information that nuclear weapons had in fact been moved to Kuwait.

3. A serious unexpected event began taking a more negative course as time went by. For at the same time that American ground operations got under way, an extensive guerilla warfare was launched by rebels in the south and elements arriving in Iraq from the north, and sabotage operations in the Iraqi army's rear suggested that serious trouble lay ahead.

4. Iraqi troops in the hinterland were vulnerable to American air superiority and almost no face-to-face combat took place, save for three battles. Otherwise, American forces used helicopters to deal with Iraqi tanks.

5. The air bombardment was so dreadful that the Iraqi forces lost all ability to get food and supplies to troops deployed throughout Kuwait and Iraq. The Iraq soldiers' health situation was so critical that one doctor stated that the majority of Iraqi prisoners in Kuwait suffered from dehydration. The situation was so bad that it was impossible to engage in a prolonged war.

6. The Iraqis put great trust in the Arab man in the street and did not count on the relative calm that transpired in these arenas. This left a bad impression on everyone.

7. There were many news reports that the Russians deceived the Iraqis twice. The first time was when, in one way or another, they gave the coalition forces the codes to the Iraqi air defense equipment, almost neutralizing the Iraqi missile system and forcing the Iraqis to use only their anti-aircraft guns to face this heavy amount of raids. The second time was when they embellished the idea of withdrawal with their guarantees, but were surprised by the American forces' dreadful massacre against the withdrawing troops when the hostile forces committed their crime in an open area against Iraqi troops withdrawing in trucks, under the pretext that final agreement on the arrangements had not been reached, even though President Saddam had announced personally the decision to withdraw as the Soviets had requested, based on the wishes of the Americans and the British.

Whatever the case may be, political circles point out that a cease-fire was reached under terms and documentation that have not been made public yet, and they insist that the American forces did not achieve all their objectives because the blockade of the two surrounded American divisions was lifted in return for an American commitment not to join forces with the insurgents in the south in such a way as to cut off the Republican Guard and to enable the opposition to partition Iraq.

## KUWAIT

### Planning Minister Interviewed on Normalization

91AE0346B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
27 Mar 91 pp 46-47

[Interview with Sulayman Mutawwa' by Hani Naqshabandi; place and date not given]

[Text] Perhaps the most salient result of the current crisis, in the context of events experienced by the Arab Gulf, which ended with the liberation of Kuwait, is the search for a formula for building a Kuwaiti society that benefits from past errors. Accordingly, Kuwaiti officials have been discussing ways to benefit from these errors to build a more giving and progressive future for Kuwait.

AL-MAJALLAH met with Sulayman Mutawwa', the planning minister in the independent Kuwaiti Government, in an interview which not only touched on the Kuwait of the present, but also on the Kuwait of the future, without returning to the past, which has entered into the possession of history. The Kuwaiti minister addresses the particulars and obstacles of the reconstruction process and the most important areas of focus in the near and long term.

[Naqshabandi] What shortcomings existed in previous plans? Can you comment on the postliberation future of projects that were suspended after the invasion?

[Mutawwa'] Before the invasion, we were engaged in drafting a new plan that was to begin in 1991. However, that plan was canceled due to the invasion. Now, after liberation, we have found that many matters require serious review while others require minor changes.

Among these matters is the composition of the population itself, the labor force, and its competency and skill level—in the sense of seeking a better labor force. For example, we found, in the past, many shortcomings in the labor force, whose low skill level was reflected in low productivity and a costly presence. Such a labor force is unnecessary, inasmuch as it now provides most of the people's services, services for which the people pay nothing, so that investment in these services yields a very meager return.

Also under review are the general- and higher-education policy in light of gaps that existed in the past, and national manpower and the labor force. Part of the policy will focus on the ascendancy of Kuwaiti national manpower, whatever the cost, in areas pertaining to the country's welfare.

We will also examine policies on infrastructure programs. These programs are influenced by state revenues from the export and refinement of oil. It is difficult to express a view regarding these matters at present, because we are losing income equivalent to close to six million barrels per day, which is burning into the air. This is in addition to the loss due to our absence in the

refined products market, given that the plan provides for Kuwait being an exporter of oil products, not just crude oil.

These are all samples of questions which will be posed for evaluating future plans and rebuilding.

[Naqshabandi] Did you find Kuwait as you imagined it would be after it was liberated from a seven-month occupation?

[Mutawwa'] However much we try to compare what we imagined to what we see, we are happy for the most part at finding many citizens still alive. Moreover, they have changed for the better relative to the past, in that they have become much more self-reliant. I hope that this trend will continue, because it will help in outlining and implementing plans for Kuwait's future.

Regarding the destruction, I believe that there is an Iraqi plan to create difficulty for whoever governs Kuwait. When Iraqi forces left Kuwait, they intentionally destroyed facilities and organizations to make it impossible for the Kuwaiti Government to manage its affairs, especially when the government would find itself lacking many elements that facilitate the administration of its affairs, such as electricity, oil, and water. These shortages make the Kuwaiti citizen grumble internally, which is consequently reflected in his dealings and interaction with the government. I believe that the Iraqi regime was hoping that this grumbling would be a motive for a revolution, coup, or anything to make the Kuwaiti Government lose sleep.

### Inestimable Damage

[Naqshabandi] What is the estimated cost of rebuilding Kuwait?

[Mutawwa'] It is difficult to estimate the cost of reconstruction. Moreover, Kuwait must be rebuilt so that it is better than before, because not everything old is good. Second, it is difficult to calculate the estimated cost of reconstruction, because losses and damage have yet to be assessed in many places. For example, all of the units in the computer center were stolen. The service provided by such a center is included in the calculation of loss. Therefore, many factors enter into any discussion of the cost of reconstruction.

[Naqshabandi] But what will be the total cost?

[Mutawwa'] That question is actually difficult to answer, because, each day, we are finding that what we thought was sound is damaged, and vice versa. Consequently, we must be cautious when giving a specific figure. It is very difficult to provide an estimate, unless we assume that Kuwait was completely destroyed and then calculate the cost of replacing and rebuilding everything.

[Naqshabandi] Which ministries will have priority regarding planning and the budget?

[Mutawwa'] In the near term, we are concerned with providing basic, essential services, so that the people will be able to see the light, address the needs of their families, and obtain medicine and other essential needs. Therefore, the focus will now be on the Ministry of Electricity, Telephone, and Water.

In the long term, when each ministry submits its plans, and these plans are approved, the needs of the ministries will be coordinated according to what the government's policy will be.

The truth is that a plan has yet to be formulated. It is difficult to determine priorities. The important thing is to provide services and to achieve stability for everyone.

[Naqshabandi] When do you expect capital to return to Kuwait, whether for investment or to deposit?

[Mutawwa'] Before the invasion, Kuwait had a surplus of capital and consequently exported capital. Any change in this policy, which must be submitted to the government, should focus on seeking ways and means through which Kuwait can benefit from the investment or deposit of capital. I hope that this will happen as soon as possible.

[Naqshabandi] Will Kuwaitis who remained in Kuwait throughout the occupation have special privileges?

[Mutawwa'] No Kuwaiti who remained in Kuwait is demanding any privilege now. That would smack strongly of mercenariness. The citizens who resisted will not demand anything for themselves, but for society as a whole.

However, what they say and demand must be taken into account. Their merit in this is the fact that they stood their ground and suffered much.

[Naqshabandi] Has the final date for the return of Kuwaitis from abroad been determined?

[Mutawwa'] No specific date has been set. The return will begin as soon as basic, essential services are being provided.

Individual Kuwaitis cannot return as they please. The return will be conducted in organized groups, so that it will go quickly. We only seek some sort of progress, even if it is slow. The important thing is careful planning, which is preferable to a quick return that achieves nothing.

### Rebuilding Concerns, Problems Discussed

91AE0346C London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
27 Mar 91 pp 14-18

[Article by Hani Naqshabandi]

[Text] Some are expressing great reservations about what is happening in Kuwait, given the water shortage, the shutdown of electricity, and the lack of food and basic services. However, these problems should come as no

surprise, coming as they are in the wake of a crisis of proportions seldom experienced by any country in the way that they have been experienced by Kuwait, which pridefully called itself the pearl of the Gulf until the invasion. The Kuwaiti Government is thus facing multiple challenges that encompass everything within its purview vis-a-vis its people, who have suffered from the yolk of a seven-month occupation that has deprived them of much of what they had become accustomed to.

However, despite the raising of some pessimistic voices, there have been many positive developments, and few are aware of these developments. Last week, about 60 bank branches opened their doors, and the government began to issue new currency to preclude the circulation of funds stolen from banks, organizations, and homes during the occupation. The Kuwaiti Government has also intensified its efforts in negotiations to gain the release of all Kuwaitis detained by Iraq since the start of the invasion. The Iraqi Government has always denied the existence of these captives. However, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Kuwait's defense minister, informed the allied forces that Iraq is holding more than 6,500 Kuwaitis whose names have been confirmed. The government stated that Iraq is holding 4,531 Kuwaiti soldiers and 2,096 civilians, who were detained by the Iraqi authorities before the withdrawal from Kuwait. The Iraqi Government actually agreed to the release of 5,040 Kuwaitis last week, and captives began returning aboard Kuwaiti aircraft originating in the Saudi city of 'Ar'ar after the prisoners had been transported in trucks from the city of al-Ramadi in southern Iraq. The Iraqi authorities had been holding the prisoners secretly in the city of al-Mawsil in the north.

A Kuwaiti source stated to AL-MAJALLAH that the potential for an initiative [on the domestic political scene] is problematic, in view of the government's concern with its internal affairs, its fulfillment of the demands of the domestic population, and its preparations for the return of Kuwaitis abroad. Nonetheless, it is active on the foreign, political front, inasmuch as UN Deputy Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari arrived in Kuwait for discussions with officials in the scope of an important tour that will be the subject of a report to be submitted to the UN secretary general.

Concurrently, Kuwait achieved a diplomatic victory in Cairo when the permanent representatives to the Arab League convened last Sunday for the first time since the Arab League returned to its permanent headquarters in Cairo last year. The assistant general secretary of the Arab League, As'ad al-As'ad, described the meeting as an important step toward restoring calm in the Arab world, so that the rift can be mended. The meeting, which was attended by Kuwait but not by Iraq, included 20 Arab states and represented a political victory for Kuwait after its liberation.

Observers have noted the harshness of the Kuwaiti Government's treatment of the problem of the Iraqis' theft and removal from Kuwait of stolen assets and their

destruction of most of the country's utilities. At the insistence of the Kuwaiti Government, Iraq has acquiesced to most of the Kuwaiti Government's demands, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz has informed the United Nations of his country's firm intention to return to Kuwait, as soon as possible, the gold, Kuwaiti bank notes, museum pieces, and civil transport aircraft which Iraq seized from Kuwait. There are widespread reports of complicity in these thefts on the part of states, which received stolen assets in exchange for political support of the invasion. These reports state that the Iraqi Government recently asked the Sudanese Government to return 750 kg of gold bullion which the Iraqi Government had delivered to Sudan.

### **The Possible and the Impossible**

The government's most salient activities, apart from the release of Kuwaiti prisoners, include the opening of banks, the provision of financial aid to citizens, and the replacement of the country's currency. On the day on which the return of financial life was announced, 56 out of a total 180 bank branches opened their doors. The balance remained closed because of a lack of employees and the unavailability of electricity to operate their computer systems.

Although some economists believe that the government will be compelled to change the exchange rate of the Kuwaiti dinar relative to the dollar due to the serious consequences of the invasion, the Central Bank of Kuwait has nonetheless set the dinar exchange rate at \$3.47, the same rate that was in effect just before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990.

Foreign political initiatives are important, but they nonetheless do not directly affect the life of the people in Kuwait. In the city of Kuwait, the main concern has become obtaining the basic needs of life. The Kuwaiti Government realizes that Iraqi forces spoiled the country to complicate the domestic situation and to make the government appear impotent. It is believed that the facilitation of financial life will facilitate the provision of services and commerce, which will in turn restore the country to an acceptable state.

A Kuwaiti official states that it is difficult for the people to know of the enormous preparations that have been undertaken for the return. It is impossible for the people to become familiar with the complex details that preclude the timely provision of these services. Sites are mined, passable roads are limited, the region's ports are blocked by military obstacles. The process [of providing services] is most difficult. He adds that there are dozens of pressing matters, including the release of prisoners, serious political negotiations, coping with security, tracking the affairs of Kuwaitis abroad, passports, new currency, food, tracking companies commissioned with urgent tasks, and many other such matters. The initial plan was to provide the basic needs of Kuwaiti citizens who have remained in the country, including food, medicine, telephone services, and other services.

Programs in the first stage include the reactivation of essential services, such as the water and food distribution networks, health services, roads, and the reactivation of oil installations. About 70 percent of the contracts awarded for these tasks, which are worth billions of dollars, have been concluded. They were concluded with international companies. Some representatives of international companies hesitate to come to Kuwait, on the pretext that the security situation has yet to stabilize, and they prefer to wait until several basic utilities are refurbished.

The Bechtel Corporation, the second largest U.S. public works company, has begun to supervise operations to reactivate vital oil installations, half of which were set on fire by the Iraqis. Bechtel, which has operated in Kuwait for more than 40 years, was also contracted to repair and build the pipeline network, pumping stations, tanks, and refineries, and it will also participate in extinguishing the burning wells along with the only three American companies specialized in this regard, including Red Adair's company.

### **The Government's Resignation**

Although the Kuwaiti Government has replaced the country's currency, issued new passports, disbursed financial aid, tracked the affairs of a half million Kuwaitis abroad, and is attempting to provide water and food services under difficult circumstances through temporary means, the tone of complaint is palpable among ordinary Kuwaitis. Kuwaiti ministers arrived in Kuwait in the initial days of the liberation to start implementing the tasks assigned to them. The government resumed its functions on 8 March 1991. Before then, on 28 February 1991, the Emir of Kuwait issued a decree forming a supreme security committee to formulate a policy for maintaining security and safety in the country. However, that effort ended when the Kuwaiti heir apparent, Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah submitted, on 21 March 1991, the resignation of his government, which was composed of 22 ministers, and which had been formed only 43 days before the invasion. Subsequently, Shaykh Jabir al-Sabah, the Emir of the country, entrusted Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah with the formation of a new government "to handle the postwar period."

Many were not surprised by the resignation of the Kuwaiti Government. Some even expected it after complaints had accumulated regarding a lack of services. Among the justifications [for the lack of services] cited by a group of Kuwaiti officials is the following, which was emphasized by Planning Minister Sulayman al-Mutawwa'.

### **Justifications for the Delay**

The Kuwaiti Government had to cope with the domestic needs produced by the crisis and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Government has never faced such a situation, nor for that matter has any country in the world. Clearly, some preparations regarding basic food

and water had been made. Some people nevertheless believe that the government delayed in providing [basic needs]. For its part, the government was surprised, despite its prior preparation, by unexpected reconstruction needs, such as electricity generators, which the Iraqi regime destroyed in the final days of the occupation. The destruction also extended to the underground power grid, which by itself is a sufficient reason for the protracted shutdown of electricity despite the immediate start of work to rebuild the grid.

One Kuwaiti official told AL-MAJALLAH that he expected that efforts to assess the volume of damage would be impeded by the inability to ascertain what has and has not been damaged. Some sectors believed to be intact surprised the government by turning out to have been destroyed, and so on. Regarding sanitation, another official stated that the state's concern for the safety and security of citizens is superseding its concern with refuse collection.

In addition, mines fill many of Kuwait's facilities, the coasts, oil fields, and even the homes of citizens. Such a situation impedes the provision of services, and many are unaware of the obstacles blocking the provision of these services.

One Kuwaiti official stated that the Kuwaiti Government was more desirous of the domestic population than the latter was of it, and that the government's rapid appearance at all levels will serve as a basis for the provision of services, which has been hampered by obstacles purposely set up by the Iraqi regime inside Kuwait, and citizens must appreciate this.

The truth is that, although the provision of basic services has been a primary demand made of the government, there are other demands that must be taken into account and which are no less important. This includes the security situation, which was disrupted after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. A clear trend is apparent toward rebuilding from the ground up, based on the priorities defined by Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah to the American congressional delegation that visited Kuwait after liberation. Security tops these priorities, followed by reconstruction, then political reform. Perhaps the greatest security concern requiring immediate measures is the problem of weapons. Weapons have saturated the Kuwaiti population, and their proliferation threaten the state's sovereignty and moreover its unity. These weapons could be exploited by foreign parties or groups that wish to impose a new order on the country.

### **Sitting on a Powder Keg**

After Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait in a disorganized manner—which residents described as the image of fear incarnate, which beset the invaders after their leadership announced the sudden withdrawal from Kuwait—piles of weapons and ammunition were left behind on the roads and in Iraqi caches spread throughout the city.



In the meantime, the allied forces were continuing their advance on the city of Kuwait, which had become emptied of Kuwaiti resistance personnel. This dangerous accumulation of weapons was brought on by the desire of some inhabitants, regardless of whether they were in the resistance, to acquire these free weapons. Most of these persons justify this as necessary to protect themselves from any revenge operations that might occur before Kuwaiti or allied forces gain full control of the city.

Realizing the situation, the Kuwaiti Government hastened to ask resistance personnel before the Desert Storm battle to surrender their weapons to allied forces when the latter entered the city. The same call was repeated in early March by Kuwait's Defense Minister, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad. It is not known precisely to what degree resistance personnel or Kuwaiti citizens have responded to the government's calls to give up their arms, although it seems that some of them are resolved to retain them.

It has so far been difficult to determine what position the Kuwaiti Government will take on weapons that have been stockpiled in some or many houses in Kuwait. However, it is thought that it will ultimately be able to set a time period in which to begin purging the country of the danger of the powder keg on which it is sitting, which will begin concurrently with the stabilization of the civil situation and the restoration of services.

#### **Palestinians in Kuwait**

Another security problem is that of the Palestinians in Kuwait. A large question mark surrounds their role during and after the crisis and their future in the country. Palestinians can be divided into three groups based on their position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The first group, which is a minority, supported the invasion directly. It is said that a group of Palestinians belonging to cells operating in Iraq were used by the Iraqis to enter the city to convince Palestinians to cooperate with the Iraqi Army and to incite the Kuwaitis against the Palestinians. The second group comprises those who did not support the invasion but did not condemn it. The third group includes those who cooperated directly with the Kuwaiti resistance, fought within its ranks, and were subjected to the same ruthless action of the Iraqi security agencies to which Kuwaiti resistance personnel were subjected.

The Kuwaiti Government has declared repeatedly that its treatment of Palestinians at present will not differ from its treatment of them before the invasion, and that only those who cooperated with the occupation authorities will be punished, be they Palestinian or Kuwaiti.

Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah has stressed this position repeatedly, as have several Kuwaiti officials, including Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, who, on 14 March 1991, condemned the attempts at sowing doubts and [creating] incidents through which some seek to exacerbate problems between Palestinians and Kuwaitis.

It seems that the Kuwaiti Government realizes that the group which cooperated with the Iraqi occupation has left the city, withdrawing with Iraqi forces themselves, and that the group that was unable to flee will be punished when it is captured.

The Kuwaiti Government also realizes that the PLO, with which it differs sharply, is attempting to use individual cases as a pretext to defame Kuwait's reputation and to reverse its image abroad from one of a country that has been oppressed to one of a country that oppresses.

Perhaps this is why the reassurances of Kuwaiti officials have not allayed Palestinians' fear regarding their future in Kuwait. Some of them believe that the current situation will not help the government react appropriately as long as circumstances remain unclear and the government has yet to impose its control.

The fact of the matter is that statements by Kuwaiti officials have at the same time imposed a type of protection on the areas where a Palestinian majority resides, Hawli and al-Nuqrah, out of fear of acts of reprisal on the part of some Kuwaitis who remained in the country throughout the occupation.

#### **Monetary Policy Planning Discussed**

91AE0346A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT  
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 28 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Muhammad Ibn-al-Husayn, the director of planning in the United Bank of Kuwait in London by Hani 'Abd-al-Salam; date not given]

[Text] London—After the issuance of the new Kuwaiti dinar and the start of implementation of decisions made by the Central Bank of Kuwait regarding transactions with the new dinar in the financial market, several questions have arisen regarding financial transfer procedures, the new dinar's strength relative to foreign currencies, and how that affects investments made by companies wishing to participate in Kuwait's reconstruction.

SAWT AL-KUWAYT met with Muhammad Ibn-al-Husayn, the director of planning in the United Bank of Kuwait in London, who first congratulated the Kuwaiti people on the liberation and the return of legitimacy as represented in His Excellency the Emir, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, and his faithful heir apparent Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah. He stated that transactions with the new dinar have not started because sufficient quantities of the new dinar have not been available to foreign banks, and because the Central Bank of Kuwait has yet to provide clear information on the method of transacting with the new dinar.

Regarding the new dinar's position and rate in the international market, he stated that the new dinar is pegged to the old dinar, and that the Central Bank of Kuwait has determined that the new dinar's exchange

rate is the same rate that was in effect for the previous dinar on 1 August 1990. He added that some restrictions continue to remain in effect regarding the conversion of the Kuwaiti dinar and its circulation abroad, and that its rate in the international market is the same rate as that announced by the Central Bank.

Regarding rumors of counterfeiting operations undertaken by the Iraqi Government and the latter's theft of large amounts of Kuwaiti dinars, he stated: Actually, we have no information to the effect that Iraq has printed Kuwaiti currency. All we know is that the Iraqi authorities seized large quantities from the safes of Kuwaiti banks. We know that the Central Bank of Kuwait is aware of the numbers of these stolen sums and has issued a decree suspending transactions with them. He added that sums stolen from Kuwaiti banks will be treated as a stolen, counterfeited commodity.

Regarding a question about the determination of the sum of only 4,000 dinars as the maximum amount that an individual can convert into foreign currency, Al-Husayn responded as follows: The determination of the sum of 4,000 dinars per individual for transference abroad derives mainly from the policy followed by the Central Bank of Kuwait, especially at this time. The thinking is that this sum is sufficient for the needs of the ordinary individual at present and will preclude any rush to transfer all sums out of Kuwait.

He added: As for the protection of the dinar, I believe that the strength of the dinar derives from the economic position of the state of Kuwait. Kuwait is a strong, rich state that can maintain the strength of its currency. The cessation of oil exports does not mean that Kuwait is facing a major crisis, because, in addition to its oil resources, Kuwait has enormous foreign investments considered strong coverage that supports and strengthens the dinar's position in the international financial market.

Regarding the effects of the replacement of the dinar, al-Husayn stated that the replacement of the Kuwaiti dinar is only a change in form intended to protect the dinar from theft and counterfeiting, and it has no effect on economic conditions.

Regarding the changes in the bank and the problems it has faced since 2 August, al-Husayn stated: We, as a Kuwaiti bank, are located abroad, and most of our investments outside Kuwait have not been affected much. True, there was some confusion and anxiety in the first days of the invasion, especially in international banks that deal with us directly. However, this lasted for only several days, and matters returned to normal with regard to the bank's foreign and domestic activities. We were well aware that the liberation of Kuwait was approaching and that there was no cause for worry. Our activity continued in a natural, ordinary manner.

Regarding the restrictions that were imposed on account holders in the initial days of the invasion, he stated that these restrictions were imposed by international banks to

prevent the transference and withdrawal of deposits all at once, and the restrictions lasted for only several days.

Al-Husayn expressed his confidence in the current phase through which the state of Kuwait is passing. He stated that the bank is fully willing to provide all facilities and to participate in supporting projects aimed at rebuilding the state of Kuwait. He stated that the bank imposes no exceptional restrictions. It only follows a policy of adherence to general banking regulations and the determination of the type of investment and the identity of the client. He stated: We, as a bank, are willing to study any plans and projects proposed to us with a view toward our participation as a partner in the process of rebuilding Kuwait.

#### Editor Interviewed on Liberation, Future

91AE0344A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
27 Mar 91 p 61

[Excerpts] The Kuwaiti media played a leading role in the war of liberation. Despite the fact that Kuwaiti newspapers stopped publishing after Saddam's troops stormed their offices, they soon resumed publishing from this or that country, though with fewer pages. The Kuwaiti media's activity was not confined to well-known Kuwaiti newspapers and the Kuwaiti News Agency [KUNA], since other publications and newspapers of different sizes were also published by Kuwaiti committees and popular bodies. Among those publications was the AL-MURABITUN, the first small-sized newspaper to be published inside Kuwait, which beginning with its seventh issue started publishing from London for reasons which its chief editor Dr. Nasir Jasim al-Sani' will explain in this interview with AL-MAJALLAH. Before the invasion Dr. al-Sani' was assistant deputy minister for administration development affairs and a visiting university professor. But after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait he became a member of the Kuwaiti higher consultative committee in London, the Higher Council for Supporting the Kuwaiti People's Steadfastness, the Preparatory Committee, and the Committee for Drafting the Final Statement of the Kuwaiti Popular Conference which was held in Jeddah. He was also a member of the Kuwaiti popular delegation, which visited the Arab Maghreb countries; the Islamic Committee for Peace in the Gulf, located in London; and the team for the reconstruction of Kuwait—the work force sector—located in Washington. He is also assistant secretary general of the World Body for Solidarity With Kuwait. [passage omitted]

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is your feeling about the liberation of Kuwait and the return [of its citizens]?

[Al-Sani'] Unquestionably there is feeling of exhilaration over returning home, a feeling mixed with the sufferings of reconstruction and relief from the pains that our steadfast people have endured. We should not lose sight of the sufferings and challenges we feel toward the sons of Arabism and Islam outside the country, to say nothing of the challenges of beginning all over again at home.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How do you view the declaration of martial law and the question of resuming parliamentary life in Kuwait?

[Al-Sani'] There is no doubt that the declaration of martial law is a necessity dictated by security considerations and the present circumstances in the country following liberation. The country's constitution permits resorting to such laws in extraordinary circumstances. Despite the fact that the constitution provides that proclamation of martial law and extending its term is the prerogative of the National Assembly, the constitutional vacuum and the absence of the National Assembly at this stage necessitates taking steps that would ensure continuity of work through the issue of martial law decrees.

As for parliamentary life, it was one of the issues that were determined at the Kuwaiti People's Conference last October in Jeddah and confirmed by official statements issued by the crown prince and prime minister and the ruler of the country. In order to achieve this goal, general elections should be held immediately after security is established in the country within the coming months, something on which the people and the government are unanimous.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Kuwaiti parliamentarian Mubarak al-Duwayliyah suggested at a press conference reported by news agencies a month ago the forming of a national unity government immediately after liberation that would undertake the task of running the country. What is your comment on this proposal?

[Al-Sani'] There is no doubt that the current stage is unique in the annals of our nation; it is of an extraordinary character which this country had never before experienced. Perhaps there was some negative criticism directed at the government's performance during the crisis, but it is only fair to note a number of points of good performance by the present government. Since it is customary to reshuffle the government after every parliamentary election and, sometimes, even between parliamentary sessions if necessary, it is preferred and, indeed, necessary to form a new government now that would take into consideration the almost drastic changes that have taken place in the political, security, and public utilities fields. To achieve this goal one need not lose one's senses. National responsibility is a joint venture between the government and the people which needs to be carried out immediately. This matter should be dealt with realistically in accordance with a national consensus similar to that reached at the Kuwaiti People's Conference in Jeddah.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What are the most significant immediate challenges for Kuwait after liberation?

[Al-Sani'] Among the most significant challenges in my view is removing the effects of occupation. Foremost among these is to continue to demand and to press for the release of detained Kuwaitis and the establishment of security. Remnants of the aggressors and their collaborators are still in the country, and dealing with this

matter wisely no doubt remains a vital issue. Among the priorities also is the resumption of basic services and the easing of difficulties for our steadfast citizens. This calls for a dynamic administration whose decisions are guided by professional technical advice and who would exploit the manpower resources which the Kuwaitis set up under occupation, such as the committees for family solidarity and others. There is no doubt that carrying out a major cabinet change remains one of the measures consistent with the nature of the coming stage.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How do you envision Kuwait 10 years ago?

[Al-Sani'] After crises, countries emerge stronger. I would expect the same for Kuwait, among whose people the practice of consultation [shura] and respect for the law is predominant, not only according to the 1962 constitution but also out of a desire for a more developed form of popular participation. I foresee a country that applies the Islamic Shari'ah in all aspects of social and economic life in which people compete in productivity and hard work and believe in their Arab affiliation and Islamic roots, a country in which the woman plays a basic role in raising new generations and also contributes to productivity. I foresee a country with a small but productive administration in which the national private sector plays a major role in accordance with the principles of equality and equal opportunities, a country with a distinctive educational system capable of producing conscious and serious generations. I foresee a country with its own internal security system protected by alliances that begin with the Arab Gulf region and end with every Arab citizen who respects the rights of others in every part of the world.

Without exaggeration, I can see Kuwait in the coming century as a unique example in the modern age.

## MOROCCO

### Retail, Wholesale Prices Rise in Jan

#### Retail Prices Up 0.3 Percent

91AA0338A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 29 Mar 91 p 13

[Quotations marks as published]

[Text] In January 1991, the Statistics Directorate cost-of-living index (210 items) reached 434.7 points, compared to 433.4 the previous month. This represents an increase of 0.3 percent, or 6.4 percent over the same month of 1990.

All product groups contributed to this rise. The food index rose 0.4 percent owing to variations in the following subgroups: meat (up 1.7 percent), fish (up 3.2 percent), fresh vegetables (down 3.1 percent), other vegetables (up 1.2 percent), fresh fruits (down 7.8 percent), other sweet products (up 2.2 percent), and spices and

condiments (up 10.9 percent). The clothing index moved up 0.6 percent as a result of variations in subgroup indexes such as outer wear (up 0.5 percent), underwear (up 0.2 percent), cloth for clothing (up 2.5 percent), and shoes (up 0.8 percent).

The "housing conditions" index increased 0.2 percent as a result of variations in the following subgroup indexes: "heat-light-water" (up 0.3 percent), furniture and household linens (up 0.3 percent), household appliances (up

0.4 percent). The "transportation-leisure-miscellaneous" index rose 0.1 percent owing to changes in the following subgroup indexes: private transportation (up 0.1 percent), public transportation (up 1.0 percent), communications (up 0.3 percent), durable goods (up 0.6 percent), entertainment (up 0.6 percent). Last, the "maintenance-health-personal care" index edged up a slim 0.1 percent. This is a result of the increased cost of "maintenance services" (up 0.1 percent), personal care (up 0.1 percent), and health care (up 0.1 percent).

	November	December	January
	1990	1990	1991
GENERAL	432.9	433.4	434.7
BY CITY:			
Casablanca	439.1	440.7	441.4
Rabat	449.2	448.7	450.9
Fez	433.3	430.8	431.3
Tetouan	409.5	410.9	413.7
Kenitra	395.0	394.9	396.4
Marrakesh	446.5	449.5	453.6
Oujda	425.2	424.1	421.1
Agadir	450.8	449.2	451.8
BY PRODUCT			
Food	441.7	441.2	442.8
Clothing	354.8	356.7	358.8
Housing conditions	367.1	369.1	369.9
Maintenance-Health-Personal Care	338.4	340.9	341.2
Transportation-Leisure-Misc.	519.0	520.1	520.9

Source: Statistics Directorate

### Wholesale Prices Up 0.4 Percent

91AA0338B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 29 Mar 91 p 13

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] In January 1991, the Statistics Directorate wholesale index reached the 289.1 level, compared to 287.9 the previous month. This represents an increase of 0.4 percent.

This rise is due essentially to the farm sector, where the index rose 0.8 percent. The main culprits were the "cereals and dried legumes" index (up 6.4 percent), particularly "winter cereals" (up 7.8 percent), and the "fishing products" index (up 3.8 percent), especially "grade-B fish" (up 6.8 percent).

In contrast, the "animal husbandry products" index declined 4.9 percent.

The manufacturing index moved up 0.2 percent. This increase comes from the "metallurgical industries" group (up 0.5 percent), essentially "metal working" (up 1.6 percent), and the "food industries" group (up 0.3 percent), especially "other food industry products" (up 0.6 percent). In contrast, the index for the group "other light industries" declined 0.3 percent.

The general wholesale price index for January 1991 increased 8.4 percent over the same month of 1990.

The wholesale price index is calculated for 231 items (base 100: 1977) and covers finished agricultural, manufacturing, and energy products for sale on the local market.



	December	January	Variation
	1990	1991	(%)
Agriculture Sector	278.5	280.8	0.8
1. Cereals and dried legumes	263.3	280.8	6.4
2. Industrial and food oil crops	239.0	244.5	2.3
3. Fresh produce	327.6	319.2	-2.6
4. Orchard and vineyard products	310.5	309.9	-0.2
5. Animal husbandry products	208.9	198.8	-4.9
6. Forestry products	344.8	345.7	0.3
7. Fishing products	400.4	415.6	3.8
Manufacturing Sector	294.0	294.5	0.2
I. Energy	376.5	376.5	-
II. Food industries	263.3	264.0	0.3
III. Clothing and textiles	209.5	209.5	-
IV. Metallurgical industries	366.1	368.1	0.5
V. Other light industries	305.1	304.4	-0.3
Total	287.9	289.1	0.4

Source: Statistics Directorate

### 1991 Tourism Losses Estimated at 50 to 70 Percent

91A40336A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 29 Mar 91 p 5

[Article signed N.E.: "Tourism: Saving the Second Half of the Year"]

[Text] Most of the year has already been lost, but many professionals count on late fall to avert disaster.

"The worst is over, the worst is beginning," Mr. Othman Alami, manager of Atlas Voyages, quipped, summarizing the situation as follows: the war is over, travel will resume, but now we must straighten out the situation.

Above all, as far as cash flow is concerned, the two months ahead will be the hardest for many tourism-related businesses, such as travel agencies, hotels, transportation companies, and restaurants. And prospects are still not very bright. The Gulf war has affected the tourism industry throughout the Mediterranean, not just in Morocco.

Yet, when the war ended, travel resumed...except in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey.

Apparently, there is still some mistrust of the four Mediterranean tourist countries that are Muslim countries. Mistrust does not go together with tourism. This truth is now cruelly brought home to Moroccan professionals.

For the "congress and incentives" branch, the year will remain practically blank. Mr. Skali, manager of S'Tours, pointed out that you can promote tourism only if the clients believe that their destination is absolutely safe, not when a doubt persists, no matter how unwarranted. Although people are starting to talk positively about Morocco, he added, there is still some lingering reserve; this is why he does not expect any true recovery before 1992.

We heard similar comments from Atlas Voyages, another "congress and incentives" operator. "We detect only a small recovery on markets like Japan, the United States, and Greece," Mr. Alami emphasized, pointing out that Spain is still hesitant and that Italy will not take off again until mid-April. As for France, Morocco's largest provider of Western tourists, it is the slowest country to respond. Yet, there is no lack of marketing and promotion efforts on the French market. The French committee to support Moroccan and Tunisian tourism has made quite a few contacts in France, including at official level.

The Ministry of Tourism, the ONMT [Moroccan National Tourism Office], Royal Air Morocco, and Moroccan professionals have been busy. Fram (70,000 French tourists in Morocco per year) just started a full-page advertising campaign in the French media.

"There are no spectacular results yet," we were told by Mrs. Fantini (Orange Tours), "but the campaign has hardly started."

A promotion and public relations event aimed at French decisionmakers was recently organized in Marrakech, with some results: positive articles in the specialized press, a TV program on Morocco, etc.

According to Mrs. Fantini, the real takeoff of the French market can be expected around the Easter holidays (third week in April) but, she feels, the market will not reach its cruising level before the fall.

We should also say that Morocco was not listed in brochures; however, according to Mr. Lahbabi, chairman of the National Federation of Travel Agencies, this is now being remedied through separately printed leaflets. This evaluation by travel agencies, which in fact find themselves "on the front line," is confirmed by sources in the hotel industry. Mr. Bouamrani, chairman of the Hotel Industry Federation, emphasized that there are in fact no cancellations, but that results are only just trickling in.

Occupancy rates increased on the average by 10 to 15 points, but that is not much when you start from zero. And that does not solve cash-flow problems. The C.I.H. [Real Estate and Hotel Bank] played the game and agreed to review the cases submitted (on an individual basis).

The Throne Holiday weekend somewhat softened the impact, no more. This is why several agencies and many hotels told us that they are preparing for the Aid weekend.

We should point out, however, that the way the Throne Holiday weekend was organized in several hotels resulted in many disgruntled or disappointed clients. Hotels that had retained only a minimal staff because of the crisis were surprised by an affluence of guests. And while they are willing to acknowledge that the quality of the service suffered, they are also prone to criticize the behavior of our domestic "new tourists."

#### Considerable Damage

Now that business for a large part of the year is already set, we can make a first assessment of the damage.

In the modern organized sector (travel agencies, transportation, hotels), 1991 losses are estimated at 50 to 70 percent of 1990 sales. Actually, all will depend on how the markets will react during the second half-year, especially from October on.

Thus, Mr. Othman Alami estimates that a "bombproof" strategy is required to save the second half-year.

Actually, judging from what professionals told us, such a strategy does not exist yet, or if it does it is quite unobtrusive. Many professionals are doubtful when asked about the future.

In fact, they expected that the 1991 crisis, which was certainly linked to circumstances, would be a shock and would draw attention to the structural problems of tourism.

Today, the war is over, the (structural) problems remain. A first-rate tourism operator thus mentioned the case of Marrakech: "The few tourists in town cannot even leave their hotels for fear of being 'assailed' by real and phony guides, professional beggars, and the idle fauna that traditionally pesters tourists."

This example is certainly somewhat exaggerated, but it merely serves to show that the period of crisis was not turned to good account, either to improve the situation or to reflect on it.

What was needed was to draw the lessons of the crisis. That did not happen. It does not mean that it is too late.

## TUNISIA

### Censure of LTDH President Marzouki Criticized

91AA03284 Tunis REALITES in French  
4 Apr 91 pp 14-15

[Article by Saloua Charfi: "The Members of the League, and Freedom of Speech," under the rubric "Political Realities"; first paragraph is REALITIES introduction]

[Text] The article by the president of the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights [LTDH], Moncef Marzouki, which appeared in the columns of REALITES and in which he took a position with respect to the events in the Gulf, has earned him the criticism of those of his comrades who are Ba'athists or Ba'athist sympathizers.

The virulent criticism would have been classified as no more than petty polemics if the malcontents had not concluded their writings with urgent appeals for the "removal" of Marzouki from his "throne" as LTDH president.

In short, Marzouki is criticized for acknowledging that we lost the war, that the defeat was foreseeable, and that while honest citizens have the right to make mistakes—because they may have been deceived or because their mistakes did not cause the loss of thousands of human lives—a head of state does not have the right to make mistakes.

Marzouki did not spread false reports likely to disturb public order. He invented nothing; the facts are there to attest to that.

Moreover, his position—which is his own personal position, it should be explained—does not contradict the official position of the League and in no way runs counter to the League's internal regulations.

The fact is that Marzouki's "crime" is that he dared—precisely when pressures are still exacerbated—to speak the raw truth bluntly to the world. He did not spare our poor war-weary nerves; he did not choose his words carefully. He could, for example, have said that Saddam "won" in defeat. Would phrasing it that way have saved his skin?

Is it not futile, however, to continue to make inferences based on the content of the article? People are free to think and speak, and the problem therefore does not arise with respect to the content.

It would be wiser to place the incident in its organizational and deontological context. Moreover, when members of the League are questioned on this subject they refuse to express an opinion on the content of the article and instead rebel against the practice of putting the League's internal problems on display in the columns of the press. Besides, the matter has not yet been brought officially to the League's attention.

In the opinion of some League members, this mistake was compounded by a serious attack on a fundamental right.

"It is a serious blow struck at freedom of speech," one member declared. "What is inadmissible in this matter," he said, "is the demand that someone be punished because he expressed an idea that displeases some people. This attack on freedom of speech is all the more serious because it emanates from members of the League and of so-called democratic or progressive political parties!"

### Crime and Punishment

The members refuse to see the League transformed into a clique. This organization cannot be other than an area of tolerance, they say.

They did not fail to point out, in this connection, that those who are today criticizing Marzouki for expressing his opinion on this problem were not deprived of the right to express their own opinions during all the time the events in the Gulf were taking place. "Worse still," a member of the LTDH Executive Committee informs us, "while Iraqis were falling by the hundreds under the bombs and the League was intensifying its appeals for peace, Midani Ben Salah was writing in the newspapers that the war had not yet begun and it was therefore too early to appeal for peace. Still others did not hesitate to demand that chemical weapons be used—an antihuman rights statement if there ever was one—and yet no one demanded that those who made it be excluded from the League!"

### And What About Discipline!

Those who today support Moncef Marzouki do not deny that he has sometimes put them in an embarrassing position because of his tendency to express an opinion without taking into account the advisability of doing so.

This example of his outspokenness is therefore not the first such incident, but the others took place in secret and were settled internally within the various sections of the League. This time, however, he chose to ensconce himself in the columns of the press—and that is the problem. That is why League members when interviewed were unwilling to give the matter a personal dimension. It is above all a question of discipline and of respect for the rules of the organization. "The president was chosen by the Executive Committee," one member emphasized, "and that is the proper venue for demanding the dismissal or punishment of the president. Those who make this demand by indirection in the press are undoubtedly attempting to influence the rank and file and win them over to their side, for they surely realize that theirs is a minority opinion. It amounts to a diversion of authority and is unworthy of human rights activists."

It is an ill wind that blows no good, however. This incident has made it possible once again to expose the problems that have beset the League for some years.

"It will enable us to reexamine the role of the League and its very structure," a member of the Executive Committee confided to us. "We will surely face opposition from those who view the League merely as a political party or as an annex to their own party, but the majority have sound judgment and with their help we can undertake a veritable revolution that will restore to the League its prestige and credibility."

Indeed, a review of the incidents that have abounded in the history of the League will entitle one to wonder about its effectiveness. Has this organization fulfilled its mission appropriately? Yes, without any doubt. During the "anxious years" the League accomplished a gigantic task in defending the oppressed, in sensitizing society to human rights values, and in inducing those political parties that are the most impervious to these principles to incorporate—even if only as slogans—the concepts of freedom and human rights.

Where the League has stumbled, however, is in the quality of leadership it has provided for its own members.

When one realizes that in 1985 some League members who were Arab nationalists opposed the membership application of Serge Adda because he is a Jew; that other League members are advocating that the principles of human rights be reexamined from the standpoint of Islam or the Arab heritage; that on 8 March of this year a female member of the League opposed the publication of a statement that commemorated the occasion and urged retention of the gains made by women, proposing instead that "our references" be consulted with a view to finding a day that could replace "the Western 8 March"; and that today these same individuals are calling for their own colleagues to be muzzled, one cannot help but be disturbed by such flagrant contradictions.

The fact is that the League's problem arises from this excessive politicization, which unfortunately characterizes many of our nonpolitical organizations. It is a legacy of the lean years—a legacy of which we have been unable to rid ourselves. The League functions like a political party and has difficulty managing its 400 sections, which are scattered throughout the national territory and "encompass" many currents of opinion that are as conflictual as they are divergent. The League cannot, however, be regarded as a mass organization, nor can it be the "fifth wheel on the cart" of any particular political party. It should, when necessary, adopt positions that do not conform to current public opinion.

Unfortunately, there is an outcry every time the League does act in this manner. Politicians—at least some of them—refuse to assimilate this fundamental aspect. They are prepared only to uphold those values that are useful to them in the immediate future. This is why the campaigns in support of "political" freedoms or in opposition to torture are accepted readily, but questions of a social nature such as women's liberation, adoption, and religious freedom unleash passions and encounter serious resistance even within the League itself.

The League will be unable indefinitely to follow this policy of "complaisance" that leads from consensus to compromise and would ultimately threaten its very existence.

### Students Deny Official Version of UGTE Role

91A40326B Tunis REALITES in French 4 Apr 91 p 9

[Article by S.C.: "University Arms Cache Affair"; first two paragraphs are REALITES introduction]

[Text] On the evening of Monday 25 March, television viewers learned to their great surprise of a new installment in the ongoing saga of "fundamentalist violence." This time, the commentator informed us, the news was the dismantling of weapons caches discovered in the prayer halls at the university housing complex and in the UGTE [Tunisian General Student Union] offices at the Faculty of Sciences.

One after another, images of fuses, cans, and Molotov cocktails filed across the screen while in the background we heard the text of the Interior Ministry communique announcing an investigation has been launched....

It is an important event, because we are no longer talking about misdeeds committed by a clandestine or simply tolerated organization. This time we are talking about the UGTE, a legally recognized student syndicate that often presents itself as a serious and peaceful interlocutor.

How could these students have resorted to such tactics?

To learn more, we spoke with members of the UGTE executive bureau, whose version is considerably different from the official story.

Despite the gravity of the accusations against them, the three students seemed to us to be calm and confident: "It didn't surprise us," said one of them. "The Interior Ministry twice already has threatened to dissolve the organization. Also, people have been pointing out to us for days now that the authorities take a dim view of political activity at the university. So there was need to find a good pretext to get rid of us."

The students also maintain that they first heard the news on television, like everyone else. "Why didn't the police come search here at our official headquarters downtown?" they ask. "We don't even have offices at the Faculty of Sciences."

The executive bureau also sent an emissary to the dean to inquire about the legal status of those premises: "He told us it was an office reserved for student representatives to the Scientific Council." But it should be pointed out that the Islamists have been running that office since the most recent elections. So it is directly under their control.

"The prayer halls don't belong exclusively to us," they say. "They fall under the jurisdiction of the administration, which has never found anything suspicious there." The UGTE categorically denies the accusations and states the organization is committed to operating legally and peacefully. "We want nothing to do with violence," they say.

Questioned about any possible connection between this incident and the recent upheavals in the Ennahdha movement, they say it is not their concern. "We don't interfere in the internal affairs of political movements, and we are not obliged to take a position on everything that happens in the country."

But suppose that tomorrow the members of the UGTE inform on their comrades, as happened with the Ennahdha "troika." "There is no chance that will happen. That kind of thing only happens in undisciplined, nonhomogeneous movements; moreover, our comrades cannot inform on us, since we are innocent."

The leaders do not seem upset about the possible dissolution of the organization: "The UGTE has existed in the past without legal recognition. Its legitimacy has come from the students, which means we could easily do without legal recognition. Besides, we are always being harassed, with or without recognition."

While awaiting the reaction of the authorities, the UGTE has published a communique in which it denies all responsibility in the affair. The organization also plans to send a registered letter to [Tunisian Radio and] Television and hopes the latter will respect the provisions of the press code regarding right of reply. In addition, the organization plans to ask for an interview with the tutelary ministry and demand an investigation. "If necessary, we will sue for libel," they say.

Perhaps the UGTE, which is currently all stirred up about the "harassment" it receives, should begin by asking itself why it is such a frequent target of journalistic sensationalism.

Is it not true that the violence at the university and in the streets is often the work of Islamist students, members of the MTI [Islamic Tendency Movement] or UGTE, who eventually "graduate" into leadership positions in the Hezb Ennahdha? In the end, things come full circle.

UGTE had to struggle for only a few years before it was given legal recognition—unlike the provisional university committees, which had to struggle for two decades under the old regime to gain control of the UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students].

It will be difficult to forget the tantrums of the "spoiled child" during the past academic year. The picket lines and violence showed us the movement's power over the university. And now it tries to tell us it had nothing to do with the strikes unleashed by the MTI!

The whole problem with this Islamist union is the injection of religion into what purports to be an occupational organization.

Apart from these few general observations, based on well-known facts, it is not up to us to pronounce on the veracity of the accusations. That is entirely up to the courts.



## BANGLADESH

### Former Ministers Fail in Elections

91AS0754A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 2 Mar 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] Sixty-one former Ministers out of 79, including former Prime Minister Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, who had contested the national elections on February 27, could not come out successful, reports BSS.

Two former Presidents one former First Lady, one Vice-President, one former Speaker, one former Prime Minister, one former Deputy Prime Minister, two former Leaders of the Jatiya Sangsad and 18 former Ministers were elected.

Of the 18 elected former Ministers, eight are from Jatiya Party [JP] ousted from power on December 6—eight from BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] and the remaining two from the Awami League [AL]. Of the defeated 61 former Ministers, 26 are from JP, eight from BNP, five from AL.

Besides, eight former JP ministers were in the race as independents and another, former JP Minister as Islami Oikya Front. Others are from Jamaat, Baksal, NDP [National Democratic Party], Muslim League, Janata Dal, Oikya Front, etc.

BNP chairperson and former First Lady Begum Khaleda Zia won all the five seats that she had contested.

Deposed President H.M. Ershad, who contested from five seats of Rangpur district, have won all.

Mr. Ershad, now under detention in a Gulshan residence along with his wife since his fall in December 6, is awaiting trial in an arms case and several charges of corruption. He and his wife Begum Raushan Ershad did not cast their votes.

Former President Mohammadullah, who was the head of state during Awami League regime, has been elected with a BNP ticket from Laxmipur while former Vice-President Moudud Ahmed, who is awaiting trial in several charges of corruption, has been elected with JP ticket from his own constituency (Noakhali-5).

Former Speaker Mirza Golam Hafiz has been elected from Panchagarh-1 as BNP candidate.

Former Prime Minister of the ousted Ershad government and Acting Chief of Jatiya Party Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury lost his seat-Chandpur-4 to BNP candidate M. Abdullah. Another Prime Minister of the same government Kazi Zafar Ahmed won his seat (Comilla-12).

Former Deputy Prime Minister of the Ziaur Rahman Government, Dr. A.Q.M. Badruddoza Chowdhury, has been elected beating Awami League candidate and former inspector General of Police A.R. Khondakar from (Munshiganj-1).

Former DPM [Deputy Prime Minister] of Ershad regime M.A. Matin who filed his Nomination paper as an independent, withdrew his candidature and another DPM of JP government Shah Moazzem Hossain also withdrew his candidature.

Former Leader of the Opposition in the Jatiya Sangsad and Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina, who had contested from three seats (two in Dhaka and one in Gopalganj), has been elected from her own constituency (Gopalganj-3). She lost her Dhaka seats to BNP candidates Major (Retd) Abdul Mannan and Sadek Hossain Khoka.

Another former Leader of Opposition in the Jatiya Sangsad A.S.M. Abdur Rob lost his two seats (Dhaka-10 and Laximpur-1) that he had contested.

Former Home Minister of the JP government Major General (Retd) Mahmudul Hasan has been elected defeating former Home Minister of the Awami League government M.A. Mannan and former Deputy Foreign Minister Wajed Ali Khan Panni. Mr. Panni, who was a Deputy Minister of the JP government, had contested in the polls as an independent candidate.

Former Minister of the JP government Dr. T.I.M. Fazle Rabbi Chowdhury has come out successful with JP ticket beating Dr. R.A. Ghani of BNP.

Former Ministers Abdul Alim and Jamaat's Acting Chief Abbas Ali Khan lost in Joypurhat-1 to BNP's Golma Rabbani. Mr. Alim, who was a Minister of the Zia Government, contested in the polls as a candidate of Jatiya Oikya front. Mr. Khan was a Minister of Malek government during the Liberation War in 1971.

Awami League's Raushan Ali has been elected from Jessore-3 beating former JP Minister Khaledur Rahman Titu and former BNP Minister Tariqul Islam.

Former Minister of the AL government Asaduzzaman has won his seat (Magura-2) beating former Minister of JP government Nitai Roy Chowdhury and former Minister of BNP government Major General (reted) Majedul Huq.

Former Minister of Jute Abdur Rahman Biswas of BNP has been elected defeating former Minister of JP government Motiur Rahman from Bagherganj Sadar.

Janata Dal leader K.M. Obaidur Rahman, who was a Minister of three consecutive governments—Mujib, Mushtaque and Zia, has lost to Awami League General Secretary Sajeda Chowdhury from Faridpur-2.

Former Minister of the BNP government Chowdhury Kamal Ibne Yousuf won from Faridpur-3 but lost to AL's Mosharraf Hossain in Faridpur-1.

Former Minister of Ershad government and leader of the National Democratic Party Salahuddin Qader Chowdhury lost to Jamaat's Enamul Huq from Cox's Bazar. Repolling will be held in some centres in Chittagong 7 in which he is contesting.

Former Foreign Minister of AL government Abdus Samad Azad has been elected from Sunamganj-3 beating former State Minister for Finance of the JP government Faruq Rashid Chowdhury.

The former Ministers elected are:

Reazuddin Ahmed Bhola Mian-JP (Lalamonirhat-3),  
Tajul Islam Chowdhury-JP (Hurigram-2),  
Advocate Fazle Rabbi-JP (Gaibandha-5),  
Sardar Amjad Hossain-JP (Rajshahi-3),  
ASM Mostafizur Rahman-BNP (Bagerhat-2),  
Anwar Hossain Manju-JP (Pirojpur-2),  
Barrister A Salam Talukder-BNP (Jamalpur-4),  
Col (Retd) Akbar Hossain-BNP (Comilla-8),  
L.K. Siddiqui-BNP (Chittagong-2) and  
Col (reted) Oli Ahmed-BNP (Chittagong-13).

The former Ministers defeated are:

Lt Col (reted) Zafar Imam-JP (Feni-1),  
Rezwanul Huq Chowdhury-JP (Thakurgaon-1),  
Col (reted) A. Momin-JP (Bogra-1),  
Mozaffar Hossain-JP (Bogra-2),  
A.B.M. Shahjahan-JP (Bogra-6),  
Mamdudur Rahman Chowdhury-JP (Bogra-4),  
Nurunnabi Chand-JP (Rajshahi-5),  
Abdul Momin Talukdar-BKSAL (Sirajganj-5),  
Major (reted) Manjoor Qader-JP (Pabna-1),  
Korban Ali-JP (Kushtia-1),  
Barrister Amirul Islam-Ind (Kushtia-3),  
Nazimuddin AL-Azad-Ind (Jessore-4),  
Mufti Moualana Wakkas-IOJ (Jessore-5),  
Sheikh Abdul Aziz-AL (Bagerhat),  
Moulana AKM Yousuf-Jamaat (Khulna),  
S.M. Amjad Hossain-BML (Khulna),  
H.M.A. Gaffar-JP (Khulna),  
Mansoor Ali-JP (Satkhira-4), and  
Naziur Rahman-JP (Bhola-2 and 4).

ABM Ruhul Amin Howlader-JP (Bakerganj-6),  
Prof. A. Salam-Ind (Sherpur-2),  
Justice T.H. Khan-BNP (Mymensingh-1),  
Nurul Amin Khan Pathan-JP (Mymensingh-3),  
Abdul Momin-AL (Netrokona),  
Mujibul Huq Chunnu-JP (Kisoreganj-4),  
Golam Sarwar Milon-JP (Maniganj-4),  
Dr. Kamal Hossain-AL (Dhaka-11),  
Chowdhury Tanvir Ahmed Siddiqui-BNP (Gazipur-1),  
Mainuddin Bhuiyan-Ind (Narsingdi),  
A.S.M. Solaiman-Zaker (Narayanganj-3),  
M. A. Sattar-JP (Naayanganj-4),  
Abul Khair Chowdhury-JP (Madaripur),  
Abdul Mannan Sikder-BNP (Madaripur-2),  
T.M. Giasuddin-Ind (Shariatpur),  
Major (reted) Iqbal Hossain-JP (Sunamganj-4),  
M.A. Haq-BNP (Sylhet-2),

Saifur Rahman-BNP (Moulvibazar-3 and 4),  
Dewan Farid Gazi-AL (Habiganj-1),  
Zakaria Chowdhury-BNP (Habiganj),  
Humayun Kabir-JP (Brahmanbaria-3),  
Abdur Rahid Engineer-Ind (Comilla),  
Kazia Shah Mofazzal Hossain Kaikobad-Ind (Comilla),  
A.F.M. Fakrul Islam Munshi-Ind (Comilla),  
A.K.M. Maidul Islam-Ind (Kurigram) and  
Shawfiqul Ghani Swapan-Ind (Nilphamari).

### Hasina Meets Press on Election Results

91AS0747A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 1 Mar 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] Awami League Chief and the leader of the Eight-Party Alliance Sheikh Hasina on Thursday thanked the people for voting in favour of her party and Alliance and reiterated her pledge to continue the struggle for establishing parliamentary democracy in the country. "We are committed to uphold democratic values and we shall sincerely fight for the cause of the people," she asserted.

Addressing a crowded Press conference, attended by a good number of foreign journalists, to give her post-election reaction at Bangabandhu Bhaban, Sheikh Hasina said that her party and Alliance had relentlessly fought to restore the franchise right of the people to materialise the dream of the nation. She added that her party and Alliance ensured the downfall of the autocratic regime to hold a free and fair election under a neutral caretaker government. She expressed her satisfaction that the rights of the people to vote freely had been established through mass movement.

The Awami League Chief said that her party, Alliance and the people did not expect such results in the election. She was happy that people voted for her party and Alliance. But the forces against parliamentary democracy and people's rule had tried to influence the people's verdict with huge black money amassed during the autocratic regimes in the last 15 years, she alleged. She observed that there was a move to foil the expectation of the nation in establishing accountable government through parliamentary democracy. She urged the people to remain alert against such move and all conspiracies against institutionalisation of democracy.

The Awami League Chief said that she had repeatedly urged all to honour the code of conduct during election campaign and practice democratic tolerance. But she regretted that the Press reports were evident that there had been intimidations and conspiracies against her party and Alliance during the election campaign. Motivated, false propaganda and tirades against her party were made by the opponents during the campaign violating the code of conduct, she alleged.

Asked whether she had conceded defeat in the election, Sheikh Hasina who looked confident and relaxed said that she did not consider the election result as a defeat as people had voted for her party and Alliance. Replying to a question whether the election was rigged she alleged

that there had been reports of some unfair means and casting of false votes in different centres. She mentioned about some incidents in Dhaka City and added that instructions had been sent to her partymen all over the country to send their information to her within five days after which they could give a full report on polls incidents.

Asked whether she had referred to any polls rigging to the international polls observer groups now in the country, the Awami League Chief said that she had discussion with the teams. She added that her party was still receiving information from all over the country and the final election results had not been announced as yet.

Referring to post-election incidents Sheikh Hasina regretted that BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] supporters had started intimidating and harassing the people, workers of her party and Alliance after the election results. She reminded all to practise democratic tolerance and warned that people would not accept fascist activities in politics.

Replying to a question whether she would form any coalition in the Parliament with any other parties the Awami League Chief ruled out any possibility of her party's coalition with the anti-liberation forces and the Autocratic Jatiya Party against which people fought relentlessly. She said that who would form government would be decided when the Parliament was convened.

### Shahabuddin Speaks on Election Outcome

91AS0755A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 2 Mar 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Acting President, Mr Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, said in Dhaka on Friday that it was not possible to form a Cabinet at this moment under Article 58 of the Constitution, reports BSS.

In an address to the nation over radio and television network the Acting President said the formation of Parliament would be completed with the composition of 330 members including 30 women members to be elected in according with the constitution.

He said the first session of the Parliament would be held soon after the election of women members.

The Acting President said he was not sure which Member of Parliament would derive confidence of the majority members under the present party positions. In the 330-seat Houses at least 166 members are required to achieve the majority, hence the formation of Council of Ministers under Article 58 of the Constitution is not possible at the moment, he explained.

But he called upon the members of Parliament, especially the majority party or parties, to keep on watch on the overall situation in the country with particular reference to administration, economic situation and other important problems. He said eight months of the current fiscal year have already gone, therefore, they must be

especially alert on various national problems. At this moment I can keep contact with those persons who would be elected Leader and Deputy Leaders of the House, he pointed out.

Explaining institutional provision regarding his resignation from the office of Acting President he said under Article 51 of the present Constitution Vice-President would submit his resignation to the President and the President could do so to the Vice-President. If the offices of both the President and Vice-President were vacant, the Speaker would act as President under Article 55 of the Constitution, he explained.

In this context he also explained that under the present constitutional provision a Vice-President, whether he would be acting as President or not, could submit his resignation to the Speaker.

The Acting President also appealed to the Parliament-elect to bring necessary amendments to the Constitution so that he could submit his resignation to the Speaker and leave his office. Explaining the relevant constitutional provisions, he said that without such an amendment the Acting President would not be able to leave his office until a new President was elected and joined his office.

Justice Shahabuddin said that right from the very beginning of his tenure he was saying that he would go back to his original post and if there was no constitutional obstacles he would have gone at once.

The Acting President said the foreign observers had expressed the view that elections were completed in a free, fair, neutral and peaceful manner.

Commonwealth observer group, National Democratic Institute of United States, Japanese observer team, and European Parliament member have mentioned the elections as an unprecedented example to follow in the country, he added.

Justice Shahabuddin said all these successes were achieved because of the all out cooperation from the democratic minded people of the country.

He said the Election Commission and the officers and employees involved in the holding of the election earned appreciation from all for their untiring efforts.

Similarly, the Acting President said members of the police, Ansar, BDR [Bangladesh Rifles] and mobile Army units deployed for maintaining law and order performed their duties sincerely. Sincere cooperation from all sections of officers and employees of Armed Forces had helped conduct polling peacefully, he added.

Justice Shahabuddin said the Union Parishads and Pourashavas which had been given collective responsibility under an Ordinance helped maintain peace and order in their respective areas.

The Acting President congratulated all those functionaries who extended cooperation in smooth holding of elections.

He said out of 24,200 polling centres in the country polling had been suspended in only a few centres where repolling would be held very soon.

The Acting President said out of 300 constituencies elections were countermanded in two following deaths of two candidates. The Election Commission, he added, had announced the date for holding elections on March 14 in one constituency and on March 28 in the other.

Justice Shahabuddin said after elections to those two constituencies the elected representatives as Members of Parliament would elect 30 women members.

The Election Commission would conduct that election in accordance with representation of the People (Seat for women members) 1973, he said.

He said after constitution of the 330-member Parliament including 30 women members the first session of the Sangsad would begin. Prior to the commencement of the first session the members would have to take oath from the Speaker of the last Parliament.

The Acting President said that there was apprehension among the people in early January whether the election would at all be held. Therefore, he added, he had firmly announced in his nation-wide address on January 15 that election would be held on February 27 and other than Allah none could stop the polls.

Justice Shahabuddin expressed gratitude to Allah for successful holding of elections.

### More on Election Observers' Comments

#### SAARC Team, British Team

91AS0753A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 2 Mar 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] The resolve and commitment of the people [of] Bangladesh and of the administration to a free and fair election established standards which other SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] countries could emulate, reports BSS.

This observation was made in an interim assessment by the Non-Governmental observer group from four SAARC countries which observed the parliamentary elections, held on February 27.

The 30-member group visited 288 polling centres in 77 constituencies under 19 districts of the four divisions. Besides calling on the Acting President justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, Election Commission, Eight and Seven parties Alliances and principal political party leaders, the group also met representatives of more than 100 non-governmental organisations [NGO] during their visit.

The group would issue a comprehensive report including recommendations shortly.

However, in its interim assessment, the SAARC group said the participation of the people in the electorate process was manifested in the high voter turnout including women and minority groups reflected the Commitment of all elements within the Bangladesh polity to the democratic process. This attributed to the fact that the elections were conducted in an atmosphere free of general intimidation, the group observed.

Regarding concern related to the possession of unauthorised arms, the group said despite such concern no incident of violence was observed by them on the day preceding the election or on the election day. The elections were reportedly suspended in only 34 out of the 24,000 polling centres in the country, it added.

The group said they had received complaints regarding electoral rolls and election expenditure.

#### British Team

The All-Party British parliamentary observers group on Friday said Wednesday's election in Bangladesh was an "exemplary" one—a free exercise of vote by the electorate.

Mr. Peter Shore and other members of the group told newsmen that they visited polling centres in Dhaka and Sylhet and they were satisfied that the event was a fair expression of right of franchise.

The members of the group, who visited a number of constituencies in capital Dhaka and Sylhet as well as some other areas, said the turnout was good and the will of the people to exercise the voting was also remarkable.

They said among other constituencies, they visited Lalbag, Kotwali and Motijheel in the city and some interior areas in Sylhet. In all the members of the group were in 69 polling stations.

The group said they found certain inaccuracies in the voters list in some areas, where people keen to vote were disappointed not to see their names. It said an up-to-date voters list would have been desirable but they were also conscious of the short time that the Interim Government had in organising the elections.

One of the members of the group, who had been in Dhaka in 1986 [to] observe the elections in Dhaka, said there was no comparison between the two elections when viewed from their fairness.

The group said the just-concluded elections would help flourish the democratic processes in Bangladesh and usher in a new era of democratic system.



### Japanese Team

91AS0753B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 2 Mar 91 p 1

[Text] Mr. Hirochi Fukuda, leader of the Japanese parliamentary observer team on Friday expressed the hope that all major parties in Bangladesh would work together so that a tolerant and democratic government could be established reflecting the wishes of the people. Describing the holding of national polls as a first major step towards democratic process, he praised the caretaker Government for conducting the polls in a free, fair and orderly manner.

Addressing a press conference at a local hotel on conclusion of the four-day visit on the day, Mr. Fukuda had words of appreciation of the cooperative attitude demonstrated by election agents representing different contesting parties. Narrating the experiences of visits to various constituencies, the leader of the Japanese election observer group however, pointed out some irregularities. The irregularities were in the voter list as some persons were deprived of the opportunity to vote, he said. During the course of their observation, the team also found two voters trying to vote claiming the identity of the same voter, he said. Mr. Fukuda, however, categorically said, "we do not believe these irregularities seriously affected the outcome of the elections." He was in favour of correction of such irregularities in future so that none was deprived of his voting right.

The NGO [Non-governmental organizations] groups observing the election on its own initiative was another testimony to the enthusiasm for a free and fair election, he said. The team members visited 21 polling centres in seven constituencies in Dhaka, Mymensingh town and Narayanganj and observed the casting of votes as well as counting of ballot papers, he said. Other members of the team were Tessue Inue, Tetsue Kitamura, Makoto Taneda, Takashi Tanihata and Kazuo Kitagawa. The team left Dhaka for Tokyo in the afternoon on the day.

### Constitution on Changeover of Power

91AS0746A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 4 Mar 91 pp 1, 8

[Article by M.I. Farooqui: "What Constitution Says"]

[Text] With the holding of the parliamentary polls in the country the nation is awaiting the next constitutional steps in the direction of transition of power to the elected Members of the Parliament. When will the Parliament be summoned? Who will administer the oath of office to the Members of the Parliament? To whom will the Acting President submit his resignation? Will the present advisers continue to aid and advise even after the Members of the Parliament take oath of office? These questions have occupied the mind of the people.

### Parliament To Meet

According to the constitutional mandate the Parliament shall be summoned to meet within 30 days after the declaration of the official result of the polls at the general election of 300 members of the Parliament and the Election Commission may complete the election of 30 women members to be elected by the 300 members before the Parliament meets. Summoning of the Parliament does not depend upon the election of 30 women members. This position appears to have emerged from Articles 65, 72(2) and 123(3)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic.

### Oath To Administer

The Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the dissolved Parliament are deemed to continue to hold office until their successors enter upon their offices notwithstanding the fact that they had ceased to be the members of the Parliament upon its dissolution. They are in the office by the deeming provision of the Constitution, Articles 67(2) and 74(2)(6) of the Constitution make the point clear. According to the Rules of Procedures (made under Article 75), the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker will administer oath of office to the elected members of the Parliament. The members of the Parliament are required to be administered oath of office under Article 148(2) by the persons specified in the Rules of Procedures, but it may be administered by such other person and at such place as may be designated by that person. The Chief Election Commissioner may administer oath to the members if he is so designated.

### Acting President's Resignation

Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was appointed Vice-President after the vacancy occurred in the office of the Vice-President under the newly inserted Article 55A, he may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President under the amended Article 51A(3) and not under Article 51 (as amended). The President may, however, resign by writing under his hand addressed to the Vice-President under the amended Article 51 (3). If the offices of both the President and Vice-President are vacant, or they are unable to discharge the functions of their respective offices, the Speaker shall act as President until a new President is elected. But the vacancy will not occur unless the Vice-President voluntarily resigns, and Article 52A(3) specifies the President alone to whom the Vice-President may tender his resignation. Unless appropriate amendment to this Article is made, the Vice-President will have no option but to wait till the President is elected within 180 days from December 6, when country's presidency fell vacant.

### Council of Ministers

The Vice-President has been acting as President under Article 55(1). There appears to be no legal impediments for him to form a Council of Ministers under Article 58 to aid and advise him in the exercise of his function as

Acting President. It appears to be a constitution requirement for the President to have aid and advice from the Council of Ministers after the members of the Parliament take oath of office. It is he who will appoint a Prime Minister, one or more Deputy Prime Ministers and other Ministers from among the members of the Parliament to aid and advice him. The present Advisers must quit. The Vice-President may, however, appoint the Ministers of his council from among persons qualified for election but the member will not be more than one-fifth of the total number of elected representatives forming Council of Ministers.

If the Parliament does not amend the Constitution to introduce parliamentary form of government (which will necessarily require referendum, even if the theory of basic structures not amenable to amendment is discarded) the Election Commission must hold the elections to the offices of President and Vice-President within 180 days (ending on June 3, 1991) under Article 123. The election process under the Constitution will then come to an end.

Justice Shahabuddin's exercise as head of the care-taker government is not that of 90 days on holding of parliamentary polls. He took reign of the administration as an Acting President with all the constitutional authority to restore the constitutional government.

### Political Groups, Others on Elections

#### Jamaat Approval

91AS0744A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 5 Mar 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh expressed its satisfaction over proper holding of elections in near peaceful atmosphere under the caretaker government and conducted by a neutral election commission, reports BSS.

The Central Working Committee of Jamaat at a meeting held on Tuesday with its acting Amir Abbas Ali Khan in the chair was of the opinion that the just concluded elections had proved that the election commission could perform its duty in a neutral manner without direct or indirect obstructions if it was held under a caretaker government.

The members of the law enforcing agencies could also discharge their responsibilities free from the pressure of undesirable quarters the Jamaat meeting observed.

It was also of the view that the people having bitter experience of elections under the autocratic government would not agree for any national polls under a party government. Therefore, the Jamaat meeting felt that elections should be conducted by a caretaker government.

It was also pointed out in the meeting that had there been no big flaws in voter list, the chance of casting false vote would have been diminished and the elections would

have been much fairer. Despite these flaws the Jamaat has accepted the verdict of the people and congratulated the people for elections Jamaat candidates, a Jamaat Press release said.

#### Human Rights Council

91AS0744B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 5 Mar 91 p 8

[Excerpt] Defects and irregularities in the voters' list were identified as the greatest obstacle in the recently held national polls. Otherwise, the polls were held in free, fair and peaceful manner, revealed a survey conducted by Coordinating Council for Human rights in Bangladesh (CCHRB).

Several killings and incidents of violence took place mainly before and after the elections, the survey said. But such incidents could not influence the election in any way, CCHRB viewed.

The voters' list especially in the cities are very deficient, it said. A big percentage of eligible people were not in the voters list as has been revealed from CCHRB's door to door investigation and enquiries. Many people who left an area and registered in a new place remained on the previous voters' list leaving scope of certain percentage of false voting, CCHRB said.

But the fact is that all political parties accepted the existing voters' lists and defects did not harm any candidate or party unequally. CCHRB had words of appreciation for physical arrangements and security measures taken by the Government in the capital city and elsewhere in the country.

Any attempt at false balloting, rigging and malpractices were foiled successfully. It congratulated the government and Election Commission for conducting free and fair polls. [passage omitted]

#### Liberty International

91AS0744C Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 5 Mar 91 p 8

[Text] The Liberty International (LI), a Bangladesh based International human rights organisation in its initial reaction, expressed the view that actual conduct of elections on February 27, was, with insignificant exception, generally free, orderly and fair, says a Press release.

The President of Liberty International, advocate M.A. Mutaleb said, "our observer groups dispersed across the districts of Tangail, Mymensingh, Netrakona, Sherpur, Kishoreganj and Jamalpur visiting polling sites in various urban and rural areas heard no significant complaint about casting or counting of ballots. Instead, the groups observed that the people displayed a remarkable and exemplary degree of patience, tenacity and integrity to make the election a success."

Expressing satisfaction at the neutrality and independence shown by the officials and law enforcing agencies,

the Liberty International noted "discharge of their duties without fear or favour as hopeful improvements in the election process."

Names of large numbers of voters were not found in voters list in many centres and many voters were not allowed to cast their votes due to minor mistakes [spelling mistakes of their names] father's names or wrong recording of age, one such example was Jalasatra polling centre of Tangail district where many garo aboriginals could not cast their votes, Advocate Mutaleb added.

Liberty International, of course, had concluded that what minor irregularities were there, perhaps, had not affected the final outcome of the elections.

### Commonwealth Monitors

91AS0744D Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 1 Mar 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Commonwealth Observers Group to monitor the polling said in Dhaka Thursday that Wednesday's parliamentary elections have a "triumph" for the Bangladesh people, reports BSS.

Chairman of the group DATO [as published] Pathmanaban told newsmen that the electoral process and the polling in the elections had demonstrated that the people of Bangladesh were committed to democratic process.

The group which came here before the elections travelled extensively to see the polls arrangements and visited some 300 polling centres in over 60 constituencies Wednesday.

"We were impressed by the efficiency and dedication of the election officials at all levels, as well as the cooperation among the party agents who worked together in ways that augurs well for the future," Mr. Pathmanaban said.

He praised the Acting President, administration and the Election Commission for the job they had done for a free and fair election but said the achievement was a triumph for people of Bangladesh.

The voters turnout and significantly the large participation by the women voters had been success of those involved [in] the elections, he said.

The Chairman of the Group said repolling in a handful of 24,000 polling centres, given the size of the task and legacy of the past, was nothing to suggest that polling was not smooth.

He said the Group would submit a report to the Commonwealth Secretary General over its findings.

Replying to a question, Mr. Pathmanaban said certain deficiency in the electoral polls was something needed to be corrected but added that it was not a problem for the participating political parties since they accepted it.

The Chairman who is from Malaysia, told another questioner that the polls were as good and smooth as held in his country.

### Chittagong Candidate Accused of Terror Tactics

91AS0749A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 4 Mar 91 p 8

[Text] Chittagong, Mar. 3—National Democratic Party (NDP) Raozan chapter Election Conducting Committee Chairman A.M.M. Abu Bakar Chowdhury today alleged that Awami League candidate for Chittagong-6 (Raozan) constituency resorted to widespread terrorism in the constituency sensing his defeat in February 27 Jatiya Sangsad elections, reports BSS.

Election was suspended in seven out of a total of 71 polling centres of the constituency following clashes between Awami League and NDP workers. Both parties blamed each other for the clash.

Addressing a Press conference at a local hotel, Mr. Chowdhury also alleged that Awami League candidate Abdullah Al-Harun hired several dozen terrorists and mastans and engaged them for terrorising voters in those centres where he apprehended his defeat. The presiding officers of seven centres were compelled to suspend election in their centres because of armed terrorism created by Mr. Harun's hoodlums, he claimed.

Mr. Chowdhury called upon the concerned authorities to take adequate security measures including posting of army personnel at the seven centres on the re-polling day.

Alhaj Jafar Ahmed Chowdhury, Awami League candidate for Chittagong-13 constituency today demanded an inquiry into alleged rigging and re-election in the constituency.

Addressing a Press conference at Chittagong Press Club this afternoon Jafar Ahmed Chowdhury said that militant workers in connivance with local administration and members of law enforcing agencies forced out all polling agents from 32 centres out of total 61.

On the night receding the election law enforcing men arrested his chief polling agent Wahiduzzaman and several other polling agents and workers from their homes without any formal charges, he claimed.

Jafar Ahmed Chowdhury also claimed that even after the announcement of unofficial results, BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] workers resorted to terrorism in the name of celebrating victory.

Bangladesh Sammyabadi Dal General Secretary and candidate for Chittagong-1 constituency, Mr. Dilip Barua, today congratulated the interim government for holding a free, fair and peaceful election on February 27.

In a statement here he said, the fair and peaceful Parliamentary elections on February 27 heralded a new chapter in the political arena of the country for smooth transition to democracy.

### Chittagong Jatiyo Party Leader Arrested

91AS0748A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 4 Mar 91 p 1

[Text] Chittagong, Mar. 3—The Doublemooring Police on Saturday midnight arrested the former Deputy Mayor of Chittagong Municipal Corporation and Joint Secretary of City Unit Jatiyo [JP] Party Alhaj Dastagir Chowdhury from his residence at Kadamtali of Chittagong City.

Dastagir Chowdhury, Jatiyo Party candidate for Chittagong Nine (Kotawali) constituency was taken to custody by the police under Special Power Act. He had to stay in captivity of Doublemooring Thana as he could not be remanded to jail custody being the day holiday. [sentence as published]

The Doublemooring Police could not give any specific reason for the arrest of this Jatiyo Party leader. However, a competent source said that he was taken into police custody for the safety of public life. Al-Haj Dastagir Chowdhury who is a defeated candidate in the just concluded parliament election announced to observe one-day token hunger strike in front of Chittagong Press Club on Sunday to press home the release of Jatiyo Party Chairman deposed President Hossain Mohammad Ershad from internment. Earlier, the district police arrested Shamsul Alam Master, General Secretary of Chittagong South District Jatiyo Party from his Patiya Upazila headquarter residence. Shamsul Alam Master is also defeated JP candidate in the parliament election from Patiya Constituence.

### Former Vice President Ordered Released

91AS0745A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 5 Mar 91 p 1

[Text] The single judge Bench of the High Court Division comprising Mr. Justice Bimalendu Bikash Roy Chowdhury on Monday delivered the judgment on the writ petition of former Vice-President, Mr. Moudud Amhed, directing the respondents to release the detenu, if he is not found guilty in any other cases, reports BSS.

The judge found the order of detention Mr. Moudud as illegal and without any lawful authority.

Earlier, a two-judge Bench of the High Court Division had heard the detention case and delivered a split judgment on February 11.

Mr. Justice M. Ismailuddin Sarker had found that the order of detention legal and lawful while Mr. Justice M. Badruzzaman differed with him.

The Judges referred the matter to the Acting Chief Justice who allocated it to a single-judge Bench to hear the matter afresh.

Barrister Rafiqul Huq, appeared for Mr. Moudud Ahmed and submitted that the grounds of arrest shown by the Government were irrelevant and vague.

Mr. Aminul Huq, Attorney-General, argued for the State and said that Moudud Ahmed was arrested on a specific charge showing reason and his involvement in prejudicial activities. He referred to the Press interview of Mr Moudud from his hideout with the Morning Sun.

Mr. Moudud Ahmed was arrested under the Special Powers Act, 1974 from his hideout at Baridhara on December 20 after the fall of Ershad regime and was put under house arrest at his Gulshan residence for sometime. He was shifted to Dhaka Central Jail on December 31.

## INDIA

### 'Moderate Growth' in Economy Perceived

91AS0725C Bangalore DECCAN HERALD in English 13 Mar 91 p 6

[Text] Bangalore, 12 March—Following are the details of the economic survey:

The year 1990-91 is marked by a moderate overall growth in the economy with a marginal fall in agricultural production compared to the previous year. Industrial production is expected to register an increase of 4 to 5 percent. However, the tempo of development activities in the infrastructural sectors and poverty-alleviation programmes has been maintained at a fairly high level. After witnessing severe resource constraints during the Seventh Plan there is a perceptible improvement in the resources position of the State. The plan investment in the State is anticipated to be maintained at the envisaged level, if not exceeded marginally.

As per the State income estimates, the average growth in the State's economy was 5 percent per annum during the Seventh Plan period compared to 5.6 percent for the country as a whole. However, the growth rate during 1989-90, last year of the Seventh Plan, is anticipated to be only 3.6 percent as against 4.9 percent expected earlier. The trends in the growth of States' economy also reveal that there were greater fluctuations in the growth over the years due to vagaries of monsoon. This is because of low irrigation facilities and excessive dependence on hydel sources of power in the State. Unfortunately, the frequency of droughts or unfavourable monsoons seems to have increased in the State in recent years.

### Erratic monsoon

During the current year, the monsoon has been erratic and the rainfall was ill-distributed, affecting agricultural



production adversely. The food-grain production during the current year is anticipated to fall by more than 10 percent over the level of 1989-90. This has neutralised the growth in other sectors. The overall growth rate during the current year is, therefore, anticipated to be only moderate at 1.7 percent as per the tentative estimates of State income. There was a sizeable shortfall in public investment and mid-year cuts in the plan outlays for three consecutive years from 1987-88 to 1989-90. The maximum cuts have occurred in the outlays for the core sectors of irrigation and power. This has adversely affected the creation of capacities in these crucial sectors. Perhaps this is also partly responsible for the poor performance of the State's economy during the last two years.

### Food production

Foodgrain production, which has not shown any improvement during the 1980s compared to earlier levels is expected to decline to about 64 lakh tonnes from 71 lakh tonnes during 1989-90. Pulses, oilseeds and tobacco production during the current year is anticipated to be marginally higher compared to last year, but are below the targets. Coffee production is anticipated to register a marked increase of about 52 percent in the current year over last year. The production of sugarcane is expected to fall marginally. There was a substantial increase in the irrigation potential created in the State and also the fertiliser consumption has nearly doubled during the last one decade or so. But the yield rates and production do not seem to have improved commensurately.

In horticulture, forestry and fisheries, no significant growth appears to be likely during the current year. In fact, a marginal decline is anticipated in the additional area brought under forestry and fish production. However, production of milk, eggs and wool in the State is estimated to go up significantly.

### Industrial output

Industrial production in the State has improved during the Seventh Plan period with the annual average growth rate provisionally placed at 6.6 percent compared to 3.6 percent during the Sixth Plan period. But still, the growth of industrial production in the State during the Seventh Plan period was lower than that of all India level (7.5 percent p.a. [per annum?]). While the growth in the organised sector of the industry in Karnataka had been very impressive in recent years, the growth in the unorganised component seems to have slackened.

The current year's growth in industrial production is anticipated to be only moderate, say at 4-5 percent. Production during the first eight months of the current year had registered a marked increase in respect of silk fabrics, sandalwood oil and fertilisers. Production has also gone up very significantly in saleable steel, sugar and iron ore as compared to the corresponding period last

year. In contrast, a significant decline in production is noticed in respect of motorcycles, aluminum and soap.

The small-scale sector has progressed well in recent years. The number of small-scale units has almost doubled within about five years. The number of SSI [small-scale integrated?] units by the end of 1989-90 was 1.06 lakh with an investment of Rs. 970 crore and providing employment to about 7.5 lakh persons. During the current year, 5,420 SSI units have been registered during the first eight months.

### New factories

There appears to be a big spurt in registration of new industrial units. As many as 403 units have been registered during the first eight months, compared to 235 during the same period last year. As many as 578 joint stock companies were registered in the first eight months and the authorised capital involved is Rs. 117 crore.

A New Industrial Policy 1990 was announced effective from 1 October 1990 to subserve the objectives of the Eighth Five Year Plan. The policy aims at achieving an annual growth of about 7-8 percent in industrial output and generation of more than 10 lakh jobs during the Eighth Plan period. The other notable features of the policy are major concessions for new industries, incentive packages to employment-oriented rural industries, dispersal of industries to backward areas, etc.

### Irrigation potential

During the current year, a total of 77,000 hectares of irrigation potential is anticipated to be created. One major irrigation project, viz. Bhadra and one medium irrigation project, Upper Mulamari are expected to be completed this year. There is a considerable timelag in utilising the irrigation potential created at huge costs under major and medium projects due to delays in command area development. Particularly during the last three years of the Seventh Plan, there was a setback to the CAD [expansion not given] programme when the achievement fell far short of the original targets. During the current year, a marked improvement is anticipated in all the components of the programme like construction of field channels, field drains, land levelling and warabandi.

During the current year, an installed capacity of power generation of 327 mw [as published] is anticipated to be added to the State's power grid. The power generation, however, is anticipated to be marginally lower at 10,957 MU's [as published] compared to 11,113 MU's last year. Forest clearance and environment clearance for the Kaiga Nuclear Power Project have been received and necessary infrastructural facilities provided by the State Government. The work on the project is progressing satisfactorily.

The State Government feels that private investment in the power sector needs to be encouraged and, accordingly, applications have been invited from private parties for setting up power generation projects.

#### Banking system

Karnataka has a well-developed banking system. In addition to the public sector banks, there are 16 private sector banks and 13 Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) operating throughout the State. Government's policy is to have one RRB for each district, the total number of banks, including the RRB branches stood at 4,268 by March 1990.

Under the newly introduced "Service Area Approach" credit planning is extended to village level. All the villages in the State have been allotted to 3,100 branch managers to take up detailed surveys for preparing service area plans. During the current year, about 34 new bank branches are anticipated to be set up.

Deposits and advances have been growing at a significant rate. The total deposits of commercial banks and RRBs are expected to reach a level of Rs. 9,217 crore by the end of the current year, which marks a growth of more than 9 percent over the previous year. Similarly, total advances are expected to reach a level of Rs. 8,796 crore by March 1991, an increase of nearly 22 percent.

The price situation in the country during the current year has been quite alarming. Inflation rate crossed the double digit figure, and price increases were steeper in respect of agricultural and other common consumption goods. All-India Wholesale Price Index (1981-82=100) (WPI) which stood at 169.7 for March 1990 has gone up to 185.6 by December 1990, an increase of 9.4 percent in nine months compared to 6.2 percent during the corresponding period last year.

The price trends in Karnataka are, more or less, the same as at the all-India level. As per the WPI for agricultural commodities in Karnataka (1952-53=100), the rise in the prices of agricultural commodities has been much higher during the current year compared to last year. However, the prices of cereals in Karnataka have registered only a moderate increase of 3.7 percent compared to 14.1 percent in the country. This is because the prices of jowar and bajra have actually declined and the increase in the prices of rice has been very moderate. The prices of pulses have gone up by 13.9 percent during the first nine months of the current year. The increase in oilseeds prices in the State at 17.6 percent is significantly lower compared to that of all-India between March and December 1990.

Consumer prices have been increasing at a higher rate than wholesale prices in the country.

In Karnataka, inflation as measured in terms of CPI [consumer price index] during the first nine months of the current year has been lower at 11.4 percent compared

to 13 percent in the country. Similarly, the other consumer price indices available also indicate that the increase in the consumer prices in Karnataka, particularly in respect of food articles, has been marginally lower compared to the country as a whole.

#### Employment

As per the Survey on Employment and Unemployment (1987-88), the total unemployment is estimated to be 5.6 lakh in the State by the end of March 1991, 3.85 lakh of backlog and 1.75 lakh of additions to labour force. The number of registrants on the Live Register of Employment Exchanges has grown to 12.8 lakh by November 1990 registering a 2.5 percent increase over the level of March 1990.

The employment in the organised sector during the current year has registered a very marginal growth of 1.1 percent during the first six months and the growth of employment in the organised sector continued to be rather sluggish and tardy, as is witnessed at the all-India level also. Karnataka's share in the total employment in the organised sector of the country continued to be the same of about 5 percent during the decade 1980-1990.

#### Editorial Urges Karnataka To Better Utilize Assets

91AS0725E Bangalore DECCAN HERALD in English  
13 Mar 91 p 8

[Text] The Eighth Plan in Karnataka has begun on a poor note. The State's economy is expected to grow by a mere 1.7 percent in 1990-91 and the rise in real per capita annual income (at 1980-81 prices) is a token Rs.[rupees]2. The State's 1990-91 Economic Survey attributes this poor performance to the erratic behaviour of the monsoon last year. Food production in 1990-91 is expected to decline by over 10 percent. The excuse that vagaries of the weather are responsible for low agricultural output year after year is, however, beginning to wear thin. In only four of the past 10 years has food production crossed 7 million tonnes, a level that was reached as far back as the late 1970s. With the area under high yielding varieties having risen by a third and fertiliser consumption more than doubled in the past decade, stagnancy in production suggests that extension services have not been up to the mark. In addition, as the Survey points out, lack of maintenance has reduced the irrigation capacity of tanks by 30 percent. The Survey also rightly points out that inadequate attention to command area development has meant a poor utilisation of the potential created in major irrigation schemes, in which over Rs. 1,500 crore has been invested in the past decade.

Industrial production in the State is expected to grow by only 4 to 5 percent in 1990-91, down from the 6 percent growth in last year. Here it is not the performance of organised industry that has faltered but that of small-scale industry. The latter has a large share in Karnataka's

aggregate industrial output and unless adequate organisational support is provided there is little likelihood of industrial growth accelerating. In large industry, going by the trends in the first half of 1990-91, the prospects of higher investment appear dim. The number of letters of intent and industrial licences issued or units in Karnataka continue to be at the low level of recent years. There has also been a decline in the number of units assisted and the financial aid provided by the Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corporation. The Seventh Plan was a relatively disappointing one for the State as the average growth of 5 percent was lower than the 5.6 percent growth of the national economy. If the Eighth Plan is to be different, the State has to pay as much attention to better utilisation of existing assets as to creation of new assets.

### **Karnataka State Budget Commended as Pragmatic**

91AS0725D Bangalore DECCAN HERALD in English  
13 Mar 91 p 6

[Article by V.N. Subba Rao]

[Text] Bangalore, 12 March—When Karnataka was expecting only an interim budget from Chief Minister Bangarappa, it has got a full and proper budget. When it expected a hard budget, it has been given a soft one. After all, elections are round the corner.

The Opposition has pilloried the budget. Former Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde has, with characteristic disdain, remarked that the most outstanding feature of the budget is its featurelessness. He has also taunted that only boozers and gamblers would benefit from it. Hardly the kind of comment one expected from a man in whose regime liquor "seconds" ruled the roost and every street corner was blessed with either a wine shop or a pub.

Much as politics would inevitably intervene in one's analysis of the budget, it isn't certainly as worthless as the Opposition would make it out to be. In fact, it is much more pragmatic and realistic than one would have expected.

It is not just that it hasn't resorted to heavy taxation. There was no way Mr. Bangarappa could have spread his tax net wider. Karnataka already enjoys the notoriety of being perhaps the highest taxed State in the country, and the Chief Minister's scope was extremely limited. And the deficit is also within reasonable and manageable limits. This is in striking contrast to the huge deficits left uncovered by the Finance Ministers of most other States.

This situation, of course, presupposes that there can be nothing spectacular in the budget. The previous year's budget presented by Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy had to grapple with a situation where the coffers had gone almost empty. In the statement on the financial situation made by him soon after the Congress(I) came back to power, he had spoken of a situation "which was far from comfortable and was indeed daunting." His budget

sought to set right some of the aberrations, mostly in the excise sector, but Mr. Bangarappa's budget has another story to tell.

**Dip in Excise Revenue:** The Excise Department has just failed to lay the golden eggs so fondly expected of it. Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy's optimistic projections have failed to click. Mr. Bangarappa now admits to a whopping Rs.[rupees]86-crore dip in the anticipated excise revenue of Rs. 555 crore, with both the IML [expansion not given] and arrack components accounting for the fall. The situation can be interpreted in two ways: one, that Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy had overshot his mark while making the projections and two, that the Bangarappa Government just did not have the gumption to go for the kill. The truth, however, is hard to find.

However, Mr. Bangarappa's decision to effect a steep decrease in the export duty on IML from Rs. 20 to Rs. 2 per bulk litre is sure to draw a lot of flak. While he has pointed out that the actual realisation from the previous Government's increase in the duty from Rs. 1 to Rs. 20 per bulk litre had fallen far short of the anticipated yield of Rs. 38 crore to justify the decrease, he has also needled the Opposition by saying that he "takes note of the anxiety expressed by the members of the Opposition about the rate of export duty." If this implies that he was going by what the Opposition wanted him to do, then they won't certainly take it lying down. In fact, they have already cried foul in their reaction to the budget.

Anyway, Mr. Bangarappa cannot escape another Opposition onslaught on him for "capitulating" to the excise lobby and the Opposition is right when it takes with a pinch of salt his claim that, in the matter of "seconds," the enforcement machinery of the excise machinery would be substantially strengthened. One knows enough about the excise machinery to be taken in by this promise.

One would indeed be surprised that Mr. Bangarappa hasn't gone for any substantial enhancement in the allotment for the irrigation and power projects, but his constraints are obvious. There have been marginal increases in the allocation, but they might well be absorbed by the escalation in prices of inputs before the year is out. The realities of the Krishna and Cauvery tribunals have been given the go-by, but Mr. Bangarappa has also made a reasonable promise that additional allocations for Cauvery basin projects would be made after the exact devolution of Central funds is known.

**Happy Feature:** It is just as well that Mr. Bangarappa hasn't gone overtly populist as his Janata predecessors did. One happy feature of the budget is that it doesn't smack too much of doles, though there are many obtruse references to pamper the village folk. But to the extent that some of these projects are distinctly aimed at the poor, there should be no cribbing on that account.

While the Government's claim of distributing nearly one lakh house sites during the year would automatically

rouse one's scepticism, there is no doubt that Mr. Bangarappa's fiat to the urban development authorities to reserve sites for weaker sections like Group D employees, coolies, auto-rickshaw drivers, railway porters, bus drivers and conductors is indeed innovative and is sure to be well taken. The substantial increase in the plan outlay under the water supply, housing and urban development head from Rs. 14.89 crore to Rs. 142.28 crore for 1991-92 is also reassuring, but how about the resources?

A notable feature of the budget is Mr. Bangarappa's proposal to constitute a Chief Minister's Bangalore Development Fund under the aegis of the Bangalore Metropolitan Region Development Authority [BMRDA] and his confidence that as much as Rs. 100 crore can be mobilised for the fund in a short period. This is an excellent idea which breaks fresh ground since the phenomenally growing Bangalore has of late become nobody's baby and is showing every sign of decay on the lines of its senior counterparts.

But unless the BMRDA, which is today virtually a moribund body, is brought to shape, this new scheme might well remain a paper dream. It is also good that the BDA [expansion not given] is not being given the responsibility; it has gone to seed. It is also heartening that Mr. Bangarappa has kept the hopes of the fourth stage of the Cauvery drinking water scheme for Bangalore alive.

A refreshing thing about the budget is Mr. Bangarappa's pragmatism vis-à-vis huge public sector investments in the key areas of public transport clearly hinted at offloading the Government's shares in many sick industrial units to more realistic levels and permitting the private sector to operate transport services in some sectors. He also wants more private investment in tourism. He might as well have extended the same logic to the housing sector also. Apologists of the public sector might holler and they cannot, of course, be faulted on ideological grounds, but a pragmatic choice would certainly be in favour of a result-oriented private sector as against an ineffective public sector fattening on its own sins of omission and commission.

Mid-Day Meal: Mr. Bangarappa's proposal to reintroduce the mid-day meal scheme for rural school children is also welcome and the token provision of Rs. 20 crore for the scheme, pending approval by the Planning Commission when funds could be more substantially reallocated, is a testament of his seriousness in pushing the scheme through from the next academic year.

But the grandiose free medical check-up scheme twice a year for every citizen remains as ludicrous as it was when it was first mooted in the Governor's address and looks even more so, considering that even the token allocation for it is a peanut-like Rs. 1 crore.

Close on the heels of the Planning Commission blessing the Hyderabad-Karnataka Development Board with a Rs. 50-crore allocation, it is a good move on the part of Mr. Bangarappa to have decided to constitute a Malnad

Development Board as well with a token provision of Rs. 10 crore. But what he should not forget is that a similar board could not deliver the goods when it was set up some years ago.

Kannada & Culture: One welcomes the extra solicitude shown by Mr. Bangarappa for Kannada and Culture and the series of measures he has announced in this sector. But will he ensure that the boards he has sought to establish in the names of D.R. Bendre, Kuvempu and Puthina do not become dens of politics and groupism as most of the academies have become?

On the taxation side, Mr. Bangarappa has stuck his neck out by withdrawing the sales tax on raw silk and silk yarn, since it might, while preventing the diversion of silk trade outside the State, also line the pockets of some rich silk interest. But one wishes he had shown the same pragmatism in regard to the stiff sales tax on some other items which has also resulted in diversion of business to other States. In Visit India Year, he would have done well to bring down the crippling taxes on luxury hotels, which has almost finished them.

## IRAN

### First F-4 Training Session Completed

91AS0767A Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian  
13 Mar 91 p 4

[Text] Hamadan, CENTRAL NEWS UNIT: The first training session for F-4 fighter pilots ended in ceremonies in the presence of General Sattari, the commander of the Air Force of the Islamic Republic, at the Martyr Nuzheh air base in Hamadan.

According to this report, this training session, which was held for the first time at the Hamadan base, involved 9 pilots taking a 52-day course in science and technology needed to fly the F-4 bomber.

According to this report, in the continuation of these ceremonies, the official in charge of the training regiment of the base presented a report on this training session and said: During this session, the students have undergone a variety of needed ground training as well as heavy bombing training.

In these ceremonies, the commander of the Air Force expressed his delight in the establishment of the F-4 training course and said: Such courses, in addition to their military dimension, have an important cultural dimension, because before the victory of the revolution, our student pilots were sent abroad, especially to the United States. In addition to military dependence, this also caused the spread of decadent Western culture.



### Commentary on Rising Prices

91AS0767B Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian  
14 Mar 91 p 2

[Text] Despite the clear instructions of the president dated 25/8/69 [16 November 1990] concerning the prohibition against increasing the prices of general goods and services, the unbridled increase in prices continues, and in recent days prices have reached a critical point.

The increase in prices under the circumstances, with the buying power of wage earners having decreased considerably and their take-home pay seeming inconsequential in light of the cost of their minimum daily necessities, compromises the hopes and promises of an improvement in economic conditions.

The increase in the price of shoes in the factories affiliated with the government, the increase in passport taxes by Tehran City Hall, the announcement of the new telephone rates, the increase in the price of window glass by one hundred percent, and so on, are some of the increases that have occurred following the recent instructions of the president. Each case can itself affect the price of dozens of other items and create a continuous chain-reaction. But, unfortunately, the related officials remain indifferent, in clear violation of the president's instruction.

This all happens in conjunction with the temporary increase in cash flow in the hands of wage earners at the start of the new year, which is sufficient economic and psychological motivation for higher prices of goods, and, unfortunately, the official announcement of the unbridled increase in prices escalates this trend and motivation.

An understanding between the people and the officials is impossible unless the people are informed of the efforts of the officials to increase production and profits, and unless they fully acknowledge the harsh and difficult situation which the people face due to high prices and inflation. This understanding can pave the way for economic growth, but, unfortunately, the uncontrolled increase in prices works against this understanding. In order to counter this danger, price controls and precise observation of the president's instructions are necessary.

## PAKISTAN

### Commentaries Call for New Foreign Policy

#### Call for New Alliances

91AS0739A Karachi DAWN in English 9 Mar 91 p 12

[Article by Ghani Eirabie: "Outline of a New Foreign Policy"]

[Text] Our 40-year-old foreign policy, anchored primarily on friendship with the United States, has begun to

crumble and the national interest calls for its replacement by a triadic structure resting on accords with Beijing-Moscow, Iran-Saudi Arabia and Australia, Indonesia. In the fifties, Pakistan was as anxious to secure US arms against possible Indian aggression as the USA was to mobilise Pakistan against Communist expansionism; and in the eighties, the national interest of Pakistan coincided with America's in rolling back Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

By the same token, India gravitated towards the Soviet Union and benefited immensely from Soviet arms supplies and Soviet investments in India's infrastructure; and when the USSR and China fell out and Beijing got a measure of the threat posed by India's growing power, it edged away from Delhi and made friends with Pakistan, which warmly embraced China as a counterpoise to India, much the same way as it welcomed America as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Islamabad repaid the twin favour in 1971 by helping bring the erstwhile foes, China and the USA, closer together which shifted the global balance of power away from the USSR.

However, economic and scientific progress over four decades soon began to make its impact—eroding both the Indo-Soviet and Pakistan-American alliances. Pakistan's scientific quest for nuclear energy started clouding relations with the USA; and India's industrial development, including defence production, reached a degree of sophistication where only America's high technology could meet its requirements. Also, India's rapidly growing middle class attained a level of prosperity that American entrepreneurs found too tempting to resist: India's exploding military expansion was recognised by the United States as qualifying India for the role of regional gendarme by the Shah of Iran.

India's increasing purchases of dual-purpose technology from the United States, topped by Cray supercomputers, have driven Indo-American trade to seven billion dollars a year, slashing Soviet earnings from India and forcing Moscow to cut back on its lavish assistance to India.

At the same time, the USSR has improved its relations with China by accommodating Beijing on three critical issues: vacation of Afghanistan, withdrawal from Kampuchea and pull back from the Sino-Soviet border. With both countries assigning higher priority to economic growth than to ideology, their mutual suspicion is likely to decrease still further; and both sharing concern at the American bid to monopolise global resources and political clout, the USSR and China are likely to find common cause in resisting US hegemony. Beijing's improved ties with Moscow could benefit Islamabad too.

On its part, Islamabad need make a determined bid to remove the irritants souring Pakistan-Soviet relations, more specifically the continuing Afghan stalemate. It must affectionately but firmly prod the Pakistan-based Mujahideen to iron out their differences with the Iran-based Afghans and seek a political accommodation with the Soviet Union. A Pakistani rapprochement with

Moscow and still closer ties with Beijing constitute a pivotal point in the restructuring of the nation's foreign policy.

This is not to suggest, by any means, that Pakistan should deliberately seek a rupture with the United States which would not be in the national interest, but only to underline the point that the passage of time has caused distinct divergences in their respective perceptions of world affairs.

First, there is the USA's policy decision to recognise India as a regional power; second, the US Congressional refusal to tolerate Pakistan's nuclear potential; and third, the Western inclination to view so-called Islamic fundamentalism as a greater menace than Soviet Communism.

The campaign to recognise India's primacy, launched by US scholar Selig Harrison and carried forward by Congressman Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for Asian and Pacific Affairs and Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, culminated in directive of state policy by President Reagan ordering liberal release of dual purpose technology to India to enable it to grow into the USA's military partner in the region. The new policy also expressed itself in the White House approval of India's invasion of Sri Lanka and the Maldives and the Congressional denial of AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] to Pakistan is deference to New Delhi sensitivities. America's nuclear policy is so discriminatory that US scientist Leonard Spector has noted that even though India, and South Africa are way ahead of Pakistan in nuclear capability, punitive action has been taken only against Pakistan. The bias is further confirmed by the fact that instead of reviving the 1987 Senate formula of Senators Inouye and Kasten, treating India and Pakistan at par in a regional context, the Indo-Israeli lobby has acted to bar aid to Pakistan alone. And the explanation offered by an American publication turns on the fear that Pakistan might pass on the suspected nuclear bomb to a Muslim country which might use it against Israel or that it might fall into hands of "Islamic fundamentalists." Pakistanis for their part have contributed not a little to the dubious impression by dubbing the conflict triggered by Saddam's occupation of Muslim Kuwait as a Holy War between Islam and 'Kufr.'

However, the Western charge of fundamentalist inclinations against Pakistan has helped drive Islamabad closer to the Ummah, more specifically Iran and Saudi Arabia. Ever since its emergence as a Muslim state in 1947, Pakistan has played a major role in promoting the Palestinian cause and in establishing and training the defence forces of the Gulf states and helping boost their economic growth. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman has traditionally recruited its troops from Makran—Gwadar once was a part of the Sultanate—and Saudi Arabia for years has retained a full Pakistan Army division on its soil, whereas the UAE's [United Arab Emirates] Air Force was built up and long headed by a

PAF [Pakistan Air Force] officer. Hundreds of thousands of Pakistani workers have contributed to the economic development of the Gulf states; and the two to three billion dollars they remitted home every year have brought a measure of prosperity to Pakistan at grassroots level.

Whatever new order emerges in the Gulf, two features will be common to all: the war-ravaged states will need to rehabilitate their economies and seek greater self-reliance in national defence. They will require trained workers to rebuild the country economically and military events to revamp the armed forces. Pakistan can play a major role in both fields because of its past association and the present level of friendship.

The growing friendship is illustrated by three events over the last fortnight: one, Saudi Arabia's promise to supply Pakistan with oil free of cost to the tune of \$100 million; two, Qatar's plan to run a gas pipeline under sea all the way to Karachi; and three, Iran's commitment to lay an oil pipeline to Pakistan, build a 120,000 barrel-a-day oil refinery in Karachi, establish a rail link between Zahidan and Kirman, and place a \$50 million revolving fund at Pakistan's disposal to supply Pakistan-made arms and ammunition to Iran. Additionally, Chairman of the Majlis, Mehdi Karubi, in his address to the National Assembly, visualised a vital role for Pakistan in any future scenario for the Gulf. For our part, we could contribute to Ummah unity by promoting an accord between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and the Gulf security, by militarising the Mekran coast with missile sites and air-strips for Orion-style surveillance aircraft and protecting the Arabian Sea trade route to the Gulf with Ossa-type patrol-bouts, equipped with Exocet missiles.

Pakistan's relations with the Ummah as also the USSR, could be further cemented by Pakistan offering an outlet to the sea to the landlocked republics of Muslim Central Asia. They are rich in natural resources and have fairly well-developed economies and they are keen to establish joint industrial ventures with Pakistan. And the region's 50 million Muslims will appreciate our providing them transit facilities across our land through a new Pakistani port—preferably on the Mekran coast, possibly at Khor Kalamat—to overseas markets, especially the Gulf. This can also give us an economic clout for a role in the region, based on an inner triangle of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The third leg of the larger foreign policy triad is provided by Australia and Indonesia, besides Malaysia and Japan—based once again on commonality of national interest. All of them are deeply interested in the freedom of commerce and navigation across the Indian Ocean; their survival rests on unhindered import of oil from the Gulf or export of their produce or manufactures to the Gulf—and beyond, through the Suez, to Europe.

But they find their economic and security lifelines across the Indian Ocean threatened by the accelerated expansion of the Indian navy—eight to 10 times since independence. Seeing no legitimate purpose behind India's

acquisition of aircraft-carriers, blue-water warships and nuclear submarines, they suspect that the massive armada is designed to convert the Indian Ocean into an Indian lake. Their suspicion is reinforced by India militarising its Nicobar and Andaman island chains and laying claim to strategically-located islands like the Mauritius, Seychelles and the Maldives. Additionally, Malaysia and Indonesia fear encroachment by India on sea-bed minerals within their territorial waters—even a direct challenge to their sovereignty and territorial integrity in view of Indian voivonaries like K.M. Pannikar recall wistfully the ancient Indian Empire in the far east centred on Malaysia and Indonesia. Gravely alarmed, the Australian Government and Parliament have started reviewing their security presumptions and their Foreign Minister has voiced concern at India amassing naval forces beyond reasonable national security requirements and the Government has taken the fateful decision of moving half the Australian naval fleet from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean; and promised protection to Indonesia and Malaysia. Equally significantly, the Australian Foreign Minister last year paid a visit to Islamabad and held discussions on matters of mutual concern with Pakistan policymakers.

Building on this common fear of Indian expansionism, Pakistan would be well advised to foster closer relations with Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia, besides Japan. In addition, Pakistan should take the initiative to promote an Indian Ocean Users Association to underwrite freedom of commerce and navigation.

To conclude; recognising the gravity of the internal challenge flowing from the economic crisis and the external challenge resulting from the power vacuum in the Gulf, Pakistan needs to move fast to replace the foreign policy anchored almost exclusively on United States with a triad of alliances, however informal, embracing Beijing-Moscow, Iran-Saudi Arabia and Australia-Indonesia.

### Aid Causing 'Subservience'

91AS0739B Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 4 Mar 91 p 9

[Article by S.H. Shahid: "Pakistan and the Aid Syndrome"]

[Text] The Gulf debate is in full swing all over the country. The rear guard action by standard bearers of so-called pragmatism and rational thought, are now out in numbers. The upsurge against imperialist designs is being dismissed as a mere emotional reaction, or as an uneducated response, going against our own national interests, and so on.

Once again, the people of Pakistan, its workers, doctors, professionals, journalists and other sections of the general public and intelligentsia, are being dubbed as unthinking, ignorant, immature and irrational. Ironical, is it not, that until yesterday, the very same persons were

considered mature, knowledgeable, and sane, when they helped to return the present government in office with a massive mandate.

Taking an independent view of the happenings in the Gulf and decrying mass murder by US forces, with Saudi Arabia in tow, is being considered a betrayal of time honoured allies and traditional friends.

PTV [Pakistan Television] has been at pains to parade hitherto unknown experts who are unabashedly propagating our continued subservience of thought and action in exchange for aid from USA and Saudi Arabia.

Before one accepts these lightweight arguments, there is a need to pause and ponder. American and Saudi aid have never been, and never will be granted minus the self interest of the donors. This is not a dole or a favour as some would like us to believe. There is always a quid pro quo. Time and again we have seen US aid cut off for this reason. The latest example is our resistance to US views about our nuclear programme.

Saudi aid too, has strings attached. Saudi Arabia aided Iraq to fight its proxy war against Iran recently, a war which was supposed to weaken both Iran and Iraq so that neither could pose a threat to Saudi Arabia in future. In this war, we were asked to remain neutral. We paid the price for our friendship with Saudi Arabia in not squarely condemning the aggressor, which was Iraq. Saudi Arabia stopped aid to Afghan mujahideen, or reduced it significantly, once Russian withdrawal eliminated a threat to the Gulf region.

We are also told that Saudi Arabia has sided with us in our cause over Kashmir. We too have reciprocated in full measure in all international forums, at times even sacrificing principles. Pakistan went to the extent of positioning its forces not only behind the holy land and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but as declared by the late General Zia, to protest and sustain the House of Saud, in the bargain we were dubbed as mercenaries.

Today, Saudi Arabia demands that we support the American and British aims in the Middle East, which include the complete destruction of Iraq, the death of thousands of human beings, and fellow Muslims perpetuation of status quo in the sheikhdoms, death of Arab nationalism, and future hegemony of Israel in the region, under the aegis of old and new imperialists. Do we think that to do all this and be a party to it will be in our national interests? Should we barter away our independence of choice and foreign policy option and agree to Saudi demands against our better judgment? Should we not, as a good friend, beware Saudi Arabia of the dangers and pitfalls of the road she is traversing?

Yet another argument that is much bandied about is the fear of the expatriate worker returning from Saudi Arabia if we do not unequivocally support US/Saudi policy in the Gulf. It is also said that Saudi Arabia had done us a great favour in accepting our work force in the first place. I know of no instance when the Saudi government, or

the basis of friendship, awarded us any major government contract, discarding better terms offered by others.

As regards companies and individuals, they too employed Pakistanis on competitive terms. In fact, Pakistanis drew lesser salaries than Lebanese, Egyptians, Koreans and Turks, who in turn got lesser salaries, perks and privileges than Westerners. Both Koreans and Turks struck work by laying down tools in protest against this discrimination; Pakistanis who got even lesser pays never protested.

The fact of the matter is that Saudi Arabia needed a workforce for her development programmes, and Pakistan provided it on a competitive basis. So did other nations. No country (including Egypt when she signed the Camp David Accord) hesitated to pursue its own foreign policy simply because her workforce was employed in Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia never sent its Egyptian workers back.

The situation on the ground will be well understood if we backtrack to 1974-75. David Holden in his balanced and authentic book "The House of Saud" writes: "The two Durham economists calculated that in 1975 total employment was 1,799,900 of which 102,6500 [as published] were Saudis and 77,3400 non-nationalists.... But with 53,0700 Saudis engaged in agriculture, fisheries (together with 54,900 foreigners), Saudis accounted for only 40 percent of people working on the so-called "modern sector," which included government services, civil, military, national guard and other security services."

These figures amply show that most of what we see in modern Saudi Arabia has been achieved by the expertise and hard work of expatriates, including architects, engineers, doctors, bankers, administrators, managers, contractors, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers from Pakistan. They were paid for this, no doubt, but they were not on dole; they were receiving wages for their hard work. It will be a great injustice and insult to these Pakistanis if it is believed that they were there as a political favour to Pakistan.

Pakistanis were simply there because they were the best work force at that price, and they will continue to be there in future for the same reason. Saudis are hard headed businessmen and drive a hard bargain, at least where Third World nationals are concerned. The following true story may give a correct perspective to Saudi thinking.

An aged Pakistani sought employment in Saudi Arabia, stating his qualifications and experience, and ending his application with the pious hope of dying there and being buried in the holy land. The application was rejected with these comments: "We need people to work here, not people who want to get buried."

Our political pundits also tell us to remain subservient to American wishes, otherwise our very existence will be in jeopardy from India. These sages forget that when we

were being dismembered, neither USA nor Saudi Arabia physically intervened. Any hope that this will happen in the future, is only wishful thinking. India took advantage of our internal strife, which was the cause of our dismemberment. This may happen again if we continue along the same lines, of dependence upon dubious friends and their conditional aid.

No doubt, we are in a mess economically. This is primarily due to our dependence on aid, its waste and misuse. Our moral fibre has eroded. We are getting deeper and deeper in the morass. The Gulf War has just aggravated the situation, putting us in a tighter corner. But we can emerge from it through our own resourcefulness and the national will to survive, if we exercise it.

We did this after the loss of East Pakistan, when our markets disappeared and foreign exchange resources dwindled. We can do it without selling ourselves short to anybody, and without taking a confrontational posture. All the government needs to do is to truly take the public into confidence and embark upon a real self reliance programme. Tell the people what sacrifices are necessary and they will do it, for Pakistan. Those in power only need to set a practical example.

The ordinary Pakistani will give up a lot from his meagre lot—but will those who have been the sole beneficiaries of all the aid received by Pakistan in the last four decades? They are the ones who cannot live without aid. They are the ones who are the protagonists of the status quo at any cost.

### Old Alliances No Longer Applicable

91AS0739C Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
14 Mar 91 p 7

[Article by Inayatullah: "New Realities and Our Foreign Policy"]

[Text] Pakistan today needs a new geo-strategic vision. This vision has to be firmly anchored in the new realities. But what are these new realities? The first of these is the emergence, (or reemergence if one takes into view the brief period of American supremacy after the World II [as published] when it was the sole nuclear power) of USA as the primary world power preeminent and predominant. The recent utterances of President Bush exude a sharp sense of rejuvenation, of exultation, of celebration. "Thank God," he said in his post-war news conference "we have kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."

Earlier while declaring the suspension of operations he described the victory as a time for pride—let us be proud of what we have accomplished." On January 20 a few days after the war started in his State of the Union address, to the Congress, he repeatedly used the words "We American...." He described the war as "a defining moment." Still earlier in August 1990 he was already talking of "a new world order." As things stand the victory in the war has made Uncle Samia Colossus who



sits astride the oceans and continents, holding in one hand the levers of oil economy—its pricing and supplies; and in the other willing henchmen in the United Nations with Arab sheikhs, monarchs and presidents tied to his coat-tails and hankering for protection and patronage.

The second major factor is the fading away of USSR as a countering superpower. The way the Russians were kept in tandem at the United Nations and their attempts to carve a place in the Gulf region by a belated peace-initiative spurned and brushed aside, has established to the hilt their secondary and subsidiary role. At best they are a one-dimensional (military) power blocked in their domestic troubles which makes them all the more vulnerable and increasingly dependent on the goodwill and support of the stronger economies.

The third element of the emerging realities is the destruction of Iraq as a military power—the only country in the region which could defy or threaten Israel thus clearing the way for the (strengthened) dominant Zionist state to hold its sway unchallenged in the area. As outlined by Kissinger in his recent writings the world may soon enough witness another round of Camp David agreements. And to ease Arab and international pressures, steps may be taken to settle the Palestinian issue by providing autonomy in part of the occupied territories without conceding an independent Palestinian state.

The fourth development is the enhanced stature of Iran as a result of its principled and neutral stand in the Gulf war. It endorsed the UN condemnation of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait and was equally concerned about the presence of Western armed forces in the area. It voiced its anguish at the excessive use of the lethal war machine against Iraq and sought to mobilise support for a ceasefire to save Iraq from total destruction. How Iran relates itself to developments in the region and how the Iran-USA relationship develops will be watched by the world with great interest. A maturing Iran may find it expedient not to opt for a confrontationist stance vis-a-vis USA. Iran needs time to consolidate its strength after the prolonged armed conflict with Iraq. It will remain, for various reasons a force to be reckoned with, in the area. It has vital interests in the region and especially in Iraq where the large Shia population will be a crucial factor in the future political set up.

The fifth phenomenon is the beginning of a definite change of direction on the part of India. How the Indians blew hot and cold during the Gulf war, how they ran with the hare and hunted with the hound (lip sympathy for the old friend, Iraq on the one hand and providing fuel facilities to the American aircraft and abstaining instead of voting against US-sponsored Resolutions in the Security Council on the other). It is an indication of things to come. There is enough evidence of a tacit understanding between USA and India for a larger regional role for the latter. Indian adventures in Sri Lanka and Maldives did not draw any adverse American reaction. In the matter of Kashmir the Americans have displayed little hesitation in disowning the UN Resolutions for a plebiscite

and have instead advised that the issue may well be settled within the framework of the Simla Agreement. Already the IMF has agreed to provide the much-needed funds to India and another super-computer technology transfer from USA is in hand. India may not let go its connection with USSR for reasons material and diplomatic but certainly the old warmth will give way to a more business like relationship.

A reassessment of Pakistan's foreign policy will have to rest on a serious recognition of the changes and the shifting scenario indicated above. The old assumptions will have to be reviewed and a new strategy devised to preserve and promote our national interests in the context of the changing world order.

The aid cut-off and the ensuing attrition of the American connection is bound to force Pakistan to search for new sources of strength and security. Below is a tentative outline of approach.

—A well-worked and mature handling of US-Pakistan relationship. Whatever our feelings, it will be impolitic to deliberately weaken our links with the most powerful country in the world. Pakistan has much to gain from the USA and a lot to lose if there is estrangement instead of a normal relationship—a relationship predicted on a dispassionate understanding of each other's vital concerns and interests.

—Normalisation of relations with USSR. An initiative on our part for good relations will be appreciated. An immediate objective, in our relationship with this large neighbour of ours should be to secure a viable settlement of the Afghan issue. Our goals should be (A) an expeditious repatriation of Afghan refugees and (B) through elections under UN auspices an Afghanistan which is not unfriendly to us.

—Intimate relations with Iran are crucial for our standing and security. We should institute measures for a continuing dialogue with it and mobilise active cooperation in various fields for our mutual benefit.

—China is a major power and is a permanent member of the Security Council. Prime Minister's recent visit was well-timed and according to Press reports quite productive. The much-needed nurturing of China-Pakistan friendship will require constant care.

—An integral element in our economic strategy should be to relate ourselves to the opportunities offered by Japan's international assistance programmes and the emerging contours of a new Europe. Special cells should be set up in the Ministries of Economic and Foreign Affairs to secure information, watch developments and design initiatives.

—While generally working for strengthening the role of United Nations in settling disputes and actively involving itself in peace-keeping pursuits, we should launch special efforts to mobilise world opinion on our (and UNs) case for Kashmir. American action for

Kuwait rested on UN Resolutions and their prompt and effective implementation. We should in the current context make full use of the opportunity to raise and highlight the Kashmir issue as an unimplemented UN commitment. Already voices (even in USA and UK) for a fair deal to the Kashmiris are being heard. We may also add our voice to the need for settling the Palestinian case as stated in the relevant UN Resolutions.

—We must keep up our friendly relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and should not be found wanting in making the best of the opportunities to have a share in the reconstruction plans and projects. Our stand in the Gulf war should help us in securing the much-needed economic benefits.

The world is already in the grip of a new order. Only a clear and dynamic Pakistan can forge a rightful place for itself. The times call for reappraisal and renewal. The first priority for our new government besides a credible defence against India is to put its own house in order and consolidate its strength. For this to be realised, untiring efforts need to be made to achieve national consensus on all vital issues. It is equally necessary to build institutions and scrupulously adhere to time-tested democratic traditions. Half of the battle has already been won. We are at long a democracy. A strong Pakistan also has to have an egalitarian and progressive ethos. Even the best of foreign policies will fail if the country is itself retrogressive, divided, unstable and locked in contradictions. Surely Pakistan today holds promise of better times to come. A new dynamic foreign policy and a new Foreign Minister (no denigration of the present capable incumbent intended) sensitive to popular aspirations and cognizant of the new realities, is the need of the hour.

#### Call for a National Security Council

91AS0739D Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
1 Mar 91 pp 1, 5

[Article by Ghani Eirabie: "Need for a National Security Council"]

[Text] Islamabad—The Gulf war has been frightening enough, the shape of peace imposed by the victors could be even more horrifying. The arrogance displayed by President Bush in ignoring the UN Security Council, especially the pleas of the Soviet Union and Congressman Solarz's apparent endorsement of a possible Israeli bid to assassinate Saddam Hussein, send creeps down the spine. The spectre of a new World Order, the Anglo-Saxons threaten to impose on us, has become a nightmare.

Pakistan has more to worry than most countries—for several cogent reasons. One, there has recently been an estrangement between Pakistan and the United States over the nuclear issue, resulting in the loss of American political support and economic and military assistance. Two, India has moved closer to the USA and refused to withdraw its troops from the Pakistan border on grounds

of ongoing ferment in Kashmir. Three, the continuing stalemate on Afghanistan blocks a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Four, the politico-ethnic conflict in Sindh and sectarian strife in parts of the Punjab and NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] continue to plague the nation. And five, the country's deteriorating economy has been further aggravated by the damaging fall-out from the Gulf war.

Cumulatively, the five factors have confronted Pakistan with the gravest challenge it has faced in the 44 years of its existence. And regrettably enough, precisely when the challenge needed to be met with the combined will of the nation, the country has been gripped by wild rumours of a rift in the nation's high command. Newspaper reports contend that the country is ruled by a "troika," the President, the Prime Minister and the Army Chief of Staff, who frequently pull in opposite directions for instance on the Gulf war. Worse, reports of a split at the top have spilled into the world stream of news and tarnished Pakistan's image abroad. Whether the reports are true or not matters little, for in such cases, perception is as important as reality—and just as damaging.

The gravity of the situation demands: firstly, that the policy-making process at the top should be institutionalised; and secondly, that it should guarantee input by all relevant agencies, civil and military, political and professional. So far, Pakistan has been plagued by ad hocism in all spheres of life, including finance, defence and foreign affairs; and ever so often, critical decisions have been made by the government without access to expert position papers setting out the options.

While the armed forces have long redressed the situation for themselves by instituting an elaborate system of basing their professional decisions on scientific studies of each subject in all its bearings and with all its options, the civil side, by and large, has not matched the effort. The Secretary's note on the Ministry file is all that there is by way of a position paper. Our armed forces deeply impressed the Americans in 1981-82 with full back up studies of precisely what they wanted by way of fighter aircraft, army weapons and naval vessels. And since defence is closely related to foreign alignments, the National Defence College has also made credible studies of relevant foreign policy issues. One only hopes our Foreign Office too is constantly reviewing various foreign policy options, through even more extensive studies.

The intention mere is not to applaud one and denigrate the other, but to pool at one place all that is available and utilise it in the best national interest. Nor is it the intention to induct the armed forces into a constitutional role as perhaps in Turkey. All that is sought to be done is to upgrade the defence sub-committee of the Cabinet and streamline its working, and provide it a professional backup. The National Security Council visualised here has nothing to do with what the late President Ziaul Haq had in mind.

What is proposed now is an 11-member panel, consisting of the President and the Prime Minister; Ministers for Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Communications and Interior; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force. No more than two other officials should be around and they should always meet in camera. The National Security Council should be in a position to finalise decisions on all major issues of national significance, relating to defence, finance, foreign and home policies. And to reflect full conformity to the system of parliamentary democracy, the Council's operational cell should be located in the Prime Minister's Secretariat.

In the last analysis, the operational usefulness of the National Security Council will depend on the quality of talent manning the cell. Drawn from the services (civil and military), the high-calibre experts should be engaged in analysing studies of policy options submitted by research scholars from within and without and consolidating their recommendations for decision by the Council. This is one item on which no expenditure should be spared, for the quality of their studies and conclusions could make or mar the nation's future.

To conclude: with all sensitive decisions taken collectively by the nation's top leadership, all talk of a troika—and a divided one at that—should be eliminated. And a positive perception, at home and abroad, is critically important to our national survival at a time when the end of the Gulf war will be followed either by a free-for-all or a high-handed imposition of a self-serving "New World Order" by the victors, in a world that, at least for the time being, is bereft of the counter-balancing clout of the other superpower.

### JI Said Acting Opportunistically

91AS0740D Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 3 Mar 91 p 11

[Article by I. A. Rehman: "Jama'at Cuts Its Sails To Suit the Winds"]

[Text] Most people of Pakistan have been surprised by the extremely tough line Jamaat-i-Islami [JI] has adopted against the U.S. operations in the Gulf and its other policies, by its criticism of Saudi Arabia's reliance on Western help, and by its strident calls for a change in Islamabad's external policy. Those who have studied Jamaat's policies for some time believe a change in the substance and style of Jamaat's politics, as well as its rhetoric, is evident. They think the party has entered the phase of populist politics and that it has replaced the earlier language of academic argument with the street idiom.

The Jamaat's capacity to cut its sails to suit the winds is known. It began as a movement to help the Muslims purge their lives of objectionable characteristics and thus create a puritan society which would act as the nucleus of a reformed world. It did not own for itself a directly

political role, at least on the open agenda. After independence it changed course and conceded that social reform could follow, instead of preceding, acquisition of influence over the custodians of power or capture of power itself. This could be done by joining the political process, including participation in elections, and through alignment with other democratic parties. Association with dictatorial forces was generally shunned with the advent of Yahya Khan, and particularly Ziaul Haq, the Jamaat legitimised collaboration with anti-democratic forces if this enabled it to gain access to levers of power and thus use the state machinery for its own advancement. However, throughout this period the party has tried to emphasise its commitment to enforcement of an Islamic system. While it has tried to make political capital out of its image among the masses as a fundamentalist party, it has not hesitated to pragmatically reinterpret Islamic values, traditions and practices to suit the sensibility of its middle class followers. What does its present shift imply?

According to the party chief, who has been talking to various groups of people for several weeks, the Jamaat has always been anti-American. If it now appears to be more anti-American than before the reason could be a clash it sees developing between the rising Islamic forces at the international level and the U.S. designs to maintain a world order subservient to it. Washington is said to be afraid of Islamists acquiring state power in a number of countries with mass support. It favours democracy and elections in countries where people enamoured of Western political models can win elections (as in Pakistan) but will not risk elections where such elements face defeat (as in Egypt). The Islamic forces are on the winning path from Morocco to Afghanistan. Hence the conflict with the United States has sharpened. In this global conflict the Jamaat and its associates abroad are quite hopeful of victory. This assessment should not be dismissed lightly. After all, who could have predicted the collapse of the socialist camp five years ago! At least in the Middle East—North Africa region, the Jamaat views a clash for supremacy between the United States and Islamic resurgence and believes it has a vanguard role in the latter.

The Jamaat dismisses its alignment with the United States on the Afghan issue.

True, the Jamaat supported Gen. Zia's policy in Afghanistan, it says, and that gave the impression of a Jamaat-U.S. axis. But Jamaat and its friends in Afghanistan started fighting the Kabul regime in 1970, much before the Americans came on the scene. Besides, Gen. Zia was capable of wriggling out of the American embrace once the utility of this connection had been exhausted. As regards the attitude towards Saudi Arabia, the Jamaat had regard for it because it had provided refuge (though not freedom to work) to leaders of Ikhwanul Mushmeen who had fled Egypt. However, a break came in 1979 when Jamaat, at the prompting of Ikhwan, persuaded Gen. Zia to recognise the Iranian revolution despite

Riyadh's pressures, and then the Saudis started favouring other religious groups in Pakistan, it is said.

The Jamaat think that all Arab countries are ripe for socio-political change and therefore far-sighted Islamic internationalists should value their links with the people rather than the rulers. The party is now mentioning its association with Ikhwanul Muslimeen more openly than before and hopes that other Islamic organisations in several countries will be absorbed in their alliance, especially Afghanistan.

The Jamaat does not believe moves for a political settlement in Afghanistan will get anywhere. It remains committed to a military solution and is confident that the factions led by Hikmatyar, with the help of allies within the Kabul defence forces, will overthrow the Najibullah regime. They claim to have assured the Soviets that they will not interfere with their republics beyond sending literature and that an Afghanistan ruled by their friends will have relations with Moscow, partly because of geography and partly because it would never link up with the Americans.

By changes in Pakistan's foreign policy Jamaat means severance of ties with the United States and adoption of a nationalist-cum-pan-Islamic policy. It agrees that such a change will necessitate radical changes in economic policies. Such changes are not to be feared because Pakistan and other similarly placed countries have been exploited by the West which takes away from these countries more than it gives. Once this unequal and exploitative relationship ends, the way to a healthier economy will be clear.

As regards relations with India, Jamaat considers Kashmir and the condition of Indian Muslims two issues that must be amicably settled before the sub-continental neighbours could establish cordial relations. The party attaches considerable importance to the assurances reportedly given by Mr. Chandra Shekhar to Mr. Nawaz Sharif to the effect that he will do "something" to normalise relations and to settle Kashmir issue. Qazi Hussain Ahmad emphatically denies any substantial change in the party's domestic priorities. Only it is talking in the language understood by the masses instead of academic discourses. It will not allow disruption of Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI], which is an alliance it claims to have created, and because it can influence Mr. Nawaz Sharif in a way it could not influence Benazir Bhutto. The Shariat Bill will soon be adopted as there are no material differences among the various sects on the enforcement of Islamic laws. The Jamaat has basic differences with Awami National Party—on Afghanistan and relations with India—and it does not accept the latter's anti-Americanism as genuine. In sum, Jamaat will support the Nawaz Sharif government but will not accept any office in it and will also criticise it wherever necessary especially siding with public sentiment. That is, Jamaat will not forego the possibilities offered by being in the ruling alliance and also gather the fruits of playing an opposition role.

Many of the Jamaat's claims, especially to over-righteousness and consistency, can easily be challenged. In the external field, the Jamaat has for long shared the U.S. view of the world not only because it considered the other camp an unwelcome alternative but primarily because it stands for capitalism and privileges of the propertied classes with a bit of philanthropy thrown in. Also for many, many years it was a proud bearer of the Saudi flag. True, the Ikhwan leaders were not happy with the Saudi rulers and one of them used to call Saudi Arabia the graveyard of commitment or that Maulana Maudoodi sometimes referred to 'mujavirs' (parasitical custodians of shrines) and his books on politics and against monarchy were banned in Saudi Arabia. But by now the Jamaat has accumulated a sizeable body of texts and can find observations here and there to justify any position it wishes to adopt to benefit from an available opportunity. Moreover, the party is apparently convinced that the days of Muslim monarchies are over therefore sees advantage in an early switchover to potential successors. That such a switch will not be without a cost is perhaps not fully realised. After all no political party, especially if it claims to follow divine, injunctions, can emerge unscathed from the exercise of demolishing idols it has worshipped for long years. And Jamaat may have been carried away by the gains recorded by its associates in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Egypt to smell victory a little prematurely.

On the domestic front the Jamaat's claim to have always championed democracy is patently laughable. There have been occasions when it has sided with democratic forces, as in the sixties, when it has failed to find accommodation with the rulers, but it has moved more than half the way to join hands with any ruler who has sought its hand. Collaboration with General Zia could perhaps be rationalised because he had outfitted dictatorship in the garb of Islamisation but Jamaat also had no qualms about seeking allotment of National Assembly's 'evacuee' seats from the distribution agency opened by Rao Farman Ali under the tutelage of Yahya Khan. (Or was Yahya Khan as firmly committed to the establishment of Islamic order as the Jamaat?)

Maybe, Qazi Hussain Ahmad knows Mr. Nawaz Sharif better than anyone else but the assumption that Mr. Nawaz Sharif will be an absolutely pliable tool seems more of wishful thinking than anything else. The IJI chief is not worried by the firing Jamaat does while nothing by his side, and by jumping into the forefront of the new anti-American mobs it has done him a service—it has diverted mass anger away from the government. To believe that Jamaat can make Mr. Nawaz Sharif do whatever it wishes is giving him more than due credit as the mover of things and less than due credit as the defender of his community's interests (unless Jamaat is relying on closer understanding with the paramount sources of power). While both Mr. Nawaz Sharif and the services lobby should welcome Jamaat's support and they will shower all courtesies on it, they are unlikely to let it dictate in areas of their vital interests. The Jamaat's



expectations of the Prime Minister may soon receive a jolt when it becomes clear that he cannot revise the foreign policy assumption.

As for the change in the Jamaat's style of politics, the process has been going on since Qazi Hussain Ahmad took over the command. Not that he does not like pulling strings from a remote control tower, in the manner of his predecessors, but he prefers to go where action is. He enjoys leading processions, speaking at outdoor rallies, and jostling with volatile crowds. If earlier on Jamaat tried to garner depressed souls in poorer localities now it expends charity at relief camps for the already sensitised activists (like Afghan and Kashmir militants). One should not ignore the demands of survival in leadership. The Afghan factor may not be decisive when the Jamaat elect its amir for a new term soon and Qazi Hussain Ahmad should be keen like any professional politicians to show something to be able to retain his position.

However, regardless of the merits or otherwise of the new Jamaat thesis its political rivals should not minimise its challenge in the coming months. The party will be out in the streets and at every possible forum, including street-corner theatre, to put its name at any demonstration of public sentiment. And those who wish to stop the Jamaat engines of conservation will do well to look at their own disarray instead of banking on holes in its brief.

### **Violence, Alienation in Sindh Seen Increasing**

#### **Interior Said Under 'Dacoits Rule'**

91AS0737A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 2 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Hassan Mujtaba: "Interior Sindh Under Dacoits' Rule"]

[Text] Hyderabad—More than 14 persons have been kidnapped from various parts of Sindh interior between late Tuesday night and Thursday. Sindh is nowadays again under the grip of rising tide of kidnappings and other activities of dacoits as the number of persons kidnapped during the last three days in Sindh interior reached 31.

Whereabouts of five kidnapes from Shia community have so far not been known. These TNFJ [Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiaq Jafria—Movement for the Enforcement of the Shitte Faith] men were kidnapped from super highway while returning after welcoming the Irani Majlis speaker Mehdi Ali Karoubi at Karachi, it may be recalled.

Political and social circles at Sindh see the ongoing rising tide of kidnappings as a "would be" charge sheet against Sindh chief minister Jam Sadiq Ali if there is any to be prepared in Islamabad on the present Sindh situation.

A gang of dacoits led by one of the most dangerous outlaws of Sindh, Mohib Shidi attacked a village at old Saeedabad, some 45 kms from Hyderabad and fired

hundreds of klashnikov [as published] rounds. They kidnapped 30 villagers initially, among whom they freed all except four. These were identified as Muherum Memon, Yar Muhammad Memon, Ghafoor Umrani and Ayoob Bilal. One villager was seriously injured when he offered resistance to the dacoits. The ring leader of these kidnappers Mohib Shidi is known to be patronised by a sitting Senator.

In wake of dying dacoit Ali Sher Khaskheli's disclosure of their links with police, and increasing lawlessness in the district, the Sindh government has ordered transfer of SSP [Senior Superintendent of Police] Muhammad Akber Khan. Muhammad Ramzan Channa is to charge as SSP of this district.

Meanwhile, four persons have been reported to be kidnapped near Sita road district Dadu. A Hindu trader of town Seth Munawar Lal was kidnapped from Dori on Tuesday night.

Another gang of dacoits blockaded Indus Highway during Tuesday night near Sehwan. After looting valuables from the passengers, they took away a Doctor Alomani and his young nephew. The kidnapped doctor was travelling in a car along with his family including minor children.

The dacoits kidnapped local businessman Madad Ali Khawaja from Mirpur Mathelo.

A considerable number of police officials have either been suspended or taken into custody on the charges of collaborating with dacoits in Hyderabad division, it is reported.

On the other hand, dacoits have released Sajjad Zaheer, the son of comrade Jam Saqi and another student of Sindh university Khalid Junejo.

According to some sources, dacoits who had been fellow prisoners of political persons at Sukkur jail during Zia's regime approached the kidnappers and secured the release of these two.

However, the dacoits have refused to release QIP [Qaumi Inqilabi Party] leader Mir Thebo saying: "we have to settle old scores with Thebos."

Meanwhile, the spokesman of Communist Party of Pakistan and DSF [expansion not given] have said that they would continue their protest movement till the release of all political workers from the clutches of dacoits.

A large number of girls, boys, peasants and labourers are reported on hunger strike in various parts of Sindh against the kidnappings of political workers.

The militant leader of Jeay Sindh Progressive Wing Dr Kadir Magsi in his message from jail has termed the kidnapping of political persons as a conspiracy hatched by the government to crush awareness among the people of Sindh.

### Agitation Threatened Over Census

91AS0737A Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 2 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by Shabir Bhutto: "Sindh's Threaten Agitation If Census Not Resumed"]

[Text] Sukkur—Protests against the authorities decision to stop the process of census in Sindh have appeared from nearly all the political and social organisations based in the province.

Syed Ghulam Shah, chairman of Jeay Sindh Mahaz [JSM] and Jayed Memon, a leader of Jeay Sindh Mahaz protesting over the decision said that if the process of census in Sindh was not resumed, then an agitation would be launched.

He pointed out that in the past, all the censuses had never represented the true figures of population in Sindh.

Elaborating on the subject, he said that the past population counting in Sindh had partly been conducted in the desert of Thar, hilly areas of Mohal Kohistan and the forests and plains lying within the area of Indus Kutch. He added that in these areas about 70 percent of the population had not been counted. Now as the true figures of the houses including the family members had been recorded, the vested interests had started raising hue and cry and compelling the bureaucracy to stop the whole business of census.

The JSM leaders warned that Sindh would never tolerate this unjust, unfair, unconstitutional and illegal decision. And the bureaucrats would have to accept the real figures of the Sindh's population.

Doctor Habibur Rahman Bhutto, convener of Awami Tehrik, Sindh, said that regrettably the bureaucracy has not learnt the lesson from the tragedy of the east Pakistan. The bureaucracy did not recognise the majority of Bengal and through "one unit" they tried to show the west Pakistan equal to the east and thus deprive the Bengalis of their rights proportional to their population. The result was that which was regretted by everybody. He warned that the overlords now should open their eyes and not try to repeat the tragic history.

Imdad Awan, Siddique Khar, Farooq Pirzada, advocates, of People's Lawyers Forum, speaking on the legal aspect of the suspension of census in Sindh, said that the government was legally bound to conduct the census, in normal conditions. If the census was not resumed, then lawyers would go to courts to seek justice.

### Hindus Being Kidnapped for Ransom Money

91AS0737C Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 2 Mar 91 p 5

[Text] All Sindh Hindu Community's representatives drawn from 51 *panchayets*, held its meeting in Khairpur and discussed the dreaded situation in Sindh created by

the frequent kidnappings of Hindus in the province which have spread the wave of insecurity among the Hindu families.

Prof. Anand Ram and Moohan Lal, later briefing the newsmen said that Hindus were being victimised for the last three months. Every day scores of families receive telephonic messages for paying money to the dacoits. Time and again the helpless members of Hindu minority were kidnapped and released only on payment of ransom. He lamented that the government had never come to their rescue and all the abductees had no option but to pay ransom to save their lives. They, in this respect, said that one Sundur Das, who was captivated by the bandits one week ago, was still in custody of outlaws, but the government agencies did not turn up to rescue him.

They further said that if this wave of kidnapping was designed to force them to leave their native soil, then the conspirators were seriously mistaken as Hindus would never leave the land which had been their cradle since the birth of civilisation. They added that systematically brutalising a weak and helpless minority was against the eternal messages of celestial religions.

They appealed President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Sindh government and chief minister to come to the help of Hindu community and protect their lives, honour and property.

### Chief Minister Conducting 'Witch Hunts'

91AS0737D Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
(Supplement) in English 1 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by G.N. Mughal: "Jamming of Sindh"]

[Text] With the election to the ten vacant senate seats from Sindh just around the corner, the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly] from the province have once again become subject to a political witch-hunt. It seems as if a campaign to arrest the opposition MPAs and to raid their houses has been initiated by the Sindh government once again, but just as in the past, chief minister, Jam Sadiq, is denying the arrest of PDA MPAs by the police or other agencies.

This latest campaign of harassment and victimisation of opposition MPAs points once more to the policy of systematic persecution that the present chief minister has followed from the day he took office. As the elected representatives approach another election with fear of being harassed for their political affiliation, the province breathes in an atmosphere stripped of democratic freedoms and any semblance of a democratic spirit.

Political observers have even gone to the extent of comparing Sindh under Jam Sadiq with Nazi Germany as the whole province has become a police state. The biggest target of this 'neo-nazism' are the elected representatives who are being treated as the most disrespectful and disgraceful members of society. A more horrifying aspect of this crusade against political opponents is that while the opposition

MPAs and MNAs [members of National Assembly] are frequently arrested and confined in police lock-ups like criminals, all responsible executives publicly deny such happenings, not only in press conferences but also on the floor of the Sindh assembly. There is a complete refusal on the part of the government to own up to any such actions taken against its opponents.

The first obvious victim of Jam's policy of political persecution was former provincial minister and PDA MPA, Manzoor Wasan. He was arrested from his Karachi residence by a police contingent without a warrant. For one month, Jam Sadiq denied the MPAs arrest and said that the government was ignorant of his whereabouts. In the meantime, Manzoor Wasan was being reportedly transferred from one police lock-up in the province to another. At one point, he was reportedly detained at a police lock-up in the far-flung desert area in Khairpur district where a press party from the district discovered him in police detention. He was interviewed and photographed and it was reported in the local press but the Sindh government still refused to accept that Manzoor Wasan was in police custody.

After over one month of his arrest, the provincial government admitted that Wasan was in police custody and contended that he was arrested on the charges of possessing an unlicensed weapon. However, after a few days, it was declared that he was actually involved in the killing of MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] workers at the time of Altaf Hussain's return to Karachi from his trip abroad. Since then he has been challaned in a terrorist court. Asif Zardari MNA, Syed Qaim Ali Shah and former MNA Shah Nawaz Junejo have also been challaned in the same case.

Grandson of former Sindh chief minister Pir Ilahi Bux and a PDA MPA, Pir Mazharul Haq, is another obvious case of political victimisation. He was kept in jail throughout the period of October elections which he was contesting. He was granted bail by different courts on four different occasions but was rearrested on fresh charges each time. It was reported that at least once during this period he was hung upside down while in police custody in Dadu.

He was in a police lock-up even on the day of provincial elections which he won. On getting the results, a large number of his supporters from Dadu encircled the police lock-up where he was being detained. It was only after the administration started getting jittery about causing a law and order situation that it released him.

#### Chief Minister Seen as 'Hatchetman'

91AS0737E Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
(Supplement) in English 1 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by I.A. Rehman: "How Not to Rule Sindh"]

[Text] Many years ago one of the kings of Lahore's underworld was detained during a campaign to break the power of 'goondas' and other anti-social elements. The

public was fully aware of his dark record—he had been suspected of several murders, he ran gambling dens, traded in narcotics, and extorted 'Jagga tax' from shopkeepers and residents over a large area. He was also reputed to enjoy the power to get troublesome police officials, or those who declined to receive honoraria from him, transferred out of his jurisdiction. When he challenged his detention, several city dignitaries appeared in his defence. They testified that he was a God-fearing man, that he never spoke harshly to anyone, that he paid stipends to orphans and provided dowry for poor girls, and that no thief dared break into a house in his domain. What was said by the honourable defence witnesses was not untrue but while they did a good turn to a benefactor they could not rehabilitate the object of their praise in the eyes of the people for the simple reason that highwaymen are not absolved of their crimes if they distribute a small part of their loot among beggars on the way.

Many politicians while in power dismiss with contempt this public standard. They believe they can get away with anything, including blue murder, if they can buy the loyalty of some respectable looking persons. Several figures in Pakistan's history became effective practitioners of this theory of rule. Its limits are these days being extended by the Chief Minister of Sindh. Only the other day he was complimented for curbing lawlessness (for continuing his reign of terror, according to most other people) in the province. Mr. Nawaz Sharif perhaps knows all about the chief minister's third degree methods but he has chosen to volunteer as a defence witness presumably because of shared interest. However, as happened in the story given above, public perception of Sindh having become a police state cannot be altered by any witness.

The Sindh chief minister scornfully brushes aside the adverse comments on his style of governance appearing in the press and condescendingly declares that he has no quarrel with journalists. They are also needed as defence witnesses. Even if they cannot be persuaded to depose in his favour at least they should remain silent. Like the journalists who were questioned by the police for suspicion of involvement in dangerous anti-state activities only because their cars had been noticed parked outside the opposition leader's house. The day the story appeared in newspapers the Chief Minister walked into the Press Club to shed tears on the shoulders of the aggrieved newsmen and to deny any knowledge of the witch-hunt. The victims were disarmed and silenced.

Unfortunately for the chief minister such denials are subject to the law of diminishing returns. There is no value left in his denial of plans to manipulate the forthcoming Senate elections. The PDA has made very serious allegations that its members are being arrested and are otherwise being harassed with a view to force them to change their party affiliations or to prevent them

from participating in the senate election. The chief minister vehemently repels the charge of victimising political opponents. But there are two reasons that his protests sound less than convincing.

First, the people are familiar with countless cases in the country's history in which criminal proceedings were employed to blackmail, browbeat and punish political opponents. Incidents of politicians being kept in unrecorded and unauthorised detention or simply sent on camel rides in the desert also are known.

Second, the memory of the events of 1 December 1990 when the Sindh Assembly elected some senators is still fresh in public mind. That day several opposition MPAs were detained while on their way to the Assembly hall (and released after the polling was over). Two MPAs were allegedly prevented from casting their votes by a simple refusal to administer them the required oath. It could be argued that recourse to last-minute preventive action is not favoured now because it arouses suspicion and that the provincial administration thinks actions taken well in advance of election could be explained as routine proceedings.

It is possible that the Sindh government has sufficient evidence to proceed against PDA MPAs and activists. It has every right to prosecute them but only in accordance with the due process of law. There have been extremely distressing reports that many detainees have been denied inviolable legal safeguards. Strong allegations have been made that quite a few suspects, including women, have been detained without their arrest being promptly recorded, have been denied access to family and counsel, and have been tortured during investigations.

These reports have become much too frequent to be ignored and if the federal authority does not stay the provincial government's hand, or at least does not order a public probe, it will stand indicted for abetment in gross violations of fundamental rights.

What adds weight to complaints that administrative machinery is being used to crush PPP activists is the fact that this party's liquidation is the political necessity of the ruling alliance. No IJI settlement with MQM is possible until IJI and its allies can demonstrate that they represent the entire population of indigenous Sindhis. Also the Sindh Chief Minister has a personal motive in wiping out the PPP. He has become chief minister solely because he was able to win over, through persuasion or coercion, some former PPP supporters. He could not have manoeuvred a majority in the provincial assembly with only IJI and MQM following. His need to enlarge his own group is obvious.

Nobody will deny the Sindh ruling coalition's right to increase its power base and to reduce the opposition's influence provided this is done through political means and administrative authority is not abused. What is happening now invites strong suspicions that unfair means are being used. This after making allowances for

the possibility that some of the PPP legislators or activists may be giving up the party after a voluntary change of heart or some others may be doing so to escape retribution for what they did while in power.

It has been said that the PPP's record in government is so bad and that it persecuted its opponents so callously that it is receiving what it gave others and therefore it has no claims to public sympathy. Assuming for the sake of argument that the charge-sheet against the PPP is correct all that it implies is that it should lose political support and perhaps a little of public sympathy but that does not give anyone a right to abuse executive authority to settle old scores. Besides, there can be no justification for denying the PPP its political rights and its followers the protection of law.

The essential fact that the Sindh and the federal authorities must not ignore is that the battle between PPP AND Jam Sadiq Ali is not a private affair, it affects the credentials of the national political order and it affects the country's political system. We know from our own history that whenever a government has tried to eliminate its political opposition it has ended up by destroying its own political support. It is in the ruling alliance's own fundamental interest to allow the opposition all necessary freedoms to play its due role. Otherwise it will find that its own supporters will be freed of all political constraints and discipline and government will lost the protection of a party apparatus.

It can also be shown that liquidation of PPP through administrative means will disrupt Pakistan's evolution into a democratic state. Of course, PPP can die a natural death and there are indications that it is not keen to avoid such a fate. That will not harm the democratic process because the vacuum will be filled by other parties, old or new. But attempts to forcibly annihilate a party which still has the largest vote bank in the country will gravely undermine the democratic process. The effort could fail and even if it succeeded it would give rise to individual and collective grievances that could condemn Pakistan to the vicious politics of vendetta. In such a climate there will be no possibility for democracy to survive.

Finally, the old theory that a powerful centre could deprive the Sindhi people of their political and cultural aspirations by finding allies from within the Sindhi elite is no longer valid. Any Sindhi leader who is considered by the masses, rightly or wrongly, as the hatchetman of the central authority is bound to accelerate the people's alienation from the state. That the political crisis of Sindh has been aggravated over the recent months is confirmed by the failure of the government to handle the census issue, a failure sufficient to warrant its replacement. Sindh cannot be pacified by despots wearing velvet gloves and capable of double talk, it needs politicians of compassion whose hands are clean and firm and who have truthful tongues.



### Violent Incidents Reviewed

91AS0737F Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
(Supplement) in English 1 Mar 91 pp 1 sb  
[Article by Hasan Mujtaba: "Kill, Kidnap and Plunder"]

[Text] On taking over Jam Sadiq promised to clean up Sindh within 100 days. Instead, in this short tenure, political persecution and a plummeting law and order situation have made Sindh look like a state under martial law.

6 November 1990:

Clerk of an advocate kidnapped from Hirabad Hyderabad.

8 November 1990:

Five kidnapped within 24 hours in Sukkur Division.

Seventh temple burnt in Hyderabad:

One more killed. Death toll of Sukkur violence rises to five.

9 November 1990:

Son of Police official among 13 kidnapped near Oderolal (Hyderabad District).

A Kathiawari trader kidnapped in broad day light from Hyderabad city.

11 November 1990:

Dacoits kill a woman, kidnap three in Sukkur Division. Temple burnt at Thari Mirwah (Khairpur Mir district). Terrorist groups attack Sindhis at Mehrabpur, 11 injured.

3 kidnapped near Bhiria road (Nawabshah District).

Dacoits set 13 houses on fire near Kashmore.

Notorious robber Imoo Khoso and his gang kidnapped 6 villagers.

13 November 1990:

Dacoits raid Halani town (Nawabshah district), kidnap three.

14 November 1990:

Two persons killed, three teachers kidnapped at Khairo Dero (Dadu).

18 November 1990:

Five more kidnapped near Piaro Goth (district Dadu). Dacoits attack police van at Tando Jam killing a constable.

Exchange of fire between rangers and inhabitants of Pucca Qilla.

19 November 1990:

Six persons kidnapped from Naushehro Feroz district. Dacoits kidnap eight near Sobho Dero (Khairpur Mirs). Armed men loot thousands of rupees from the house of a Hindu in Larkana.

20 November 1990:

Dacoits launch rocket attacks on village Siddique Arain at Tando Allahyar.

21 November 1990:

Dacoits attack Mehran Sugar Mills' Colony with rockets, panic. Spread Set tractors and commodities on fire. Ask for one million rupees as 'protection money' within a week.

23 November 1990:

Police implicate a reporter of a Sindhi daily in a false case on reporting dacoits activities at Tando Allah Yar. Dacoits go on rampage at Kazi Ahmed-Nawab Shah link-road. Attack the car of Deputy Commissioner, his guard injured.

One kidnapped from Mirpur Khas.

Dacoits' bid to loot Khyber Mail.

25 November 1990:

Dacoits free 3 kidnapped landlords on 'credit.'

26 November 1990:

Two killed, seven kidnapped in and around Sukkur.

Dacoits kill two real brothers at Khai Village (Dadu), attack police van.

Dacoits raid village Pinial Gaho.

27 November 1990:

Women passengers looted aboard Bahauddin Zakria Express near Sukkur.

28 November 1990:

Imoo Khoso, one of the most dangerous dacoits of Sindh, leading his gang, kidnap at least 40 passengers including Shia delegates from a Blue line coach near Moro. Freed 10 leaving message for the SP to have an encounter with him at Dari Feros.

29 November 1990:

Dacoits kill one, kidnap another at Larkana, 15 persons kidnapped within a month in the district.

30 November 1990:

Dacoits kidnapped 10 passengers near Tando Allahyar, 67 persons killed, 31 injured and 121 kidnapped within fortnight in the province.

Dacoits shoot a young kidnapped doctor Nisar Unar to death. The slain doctor had enraged the kidnappers by saying to them: 'Sindhis are looted by terrorists in cities, and by the dacoits in rural areas.'

2 December 1990:

Gang of Imoo Koso kidnapped eight persons near Hajo Dahri (Nawab Shah).

A trader kidnapped near Tando Allahyar.

Dacoits kidnapped three women at Kotdeji.

3 December 1990:

Dacoits destroy transformers on the lands of PPP MNA Abdul Sattar Bachani at Tando Allahyar, cut down 50 trees in his gardens.

4 December 1990:

Armed highway men block national highway, loot and kidnap seven passengers near Moro.

Two persons kidnapped at new Saeedabad (Hyderabad District). Kidnappers demand ransom worth Rs. 900,000.

5 December 1990:

PPP's [Pakistan People's Party] city President Mirza Ashique Hussain and his 15 other partymen arrested on the charge of murder of MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] Councillor Salim Qureshi.

Arrests of PPP men and other Sindhis are aimed to cover up the within MQM Sindhi nationalists.

6 December 1990:

Dacoits raid a village near Sehwan, kidnap eight. Later on, freed four. 'We'll blow your village up with dynamite if you lodge an FIR [first information report],' dacoits threat.

7 December 1990:

One killed in dacoits firing near Radhan village (Dadu). Dacoits clash with each other, kill their two accomplices and kidnap two villagers near Moro.

8 December 1990:

Notorious dacoit Sultan Jatoi kills three persons at Sehwan.

11 December 1990:

Four persons kidnapped at Larkana.

Dacoits attack a Larkana-Hyderabad bound passenger bus. Kidnap 21 passengers. The mother of an abductee dies of heart failure.

12 December 1990:

Dacoits attack the village of PPP leader Latif Mangrio at Tando Allahyar.

The son of a trader killed in dacoits' bid of looting his shopping in Sukkur city.

13 December 1990:

Two buses boarding the workers of Al-Noor Sugar Mills hijacked by robbers near Moro. (Kidnapped later freed all the workers except five).

14 December 1990:

Urban robbers loot gold worth Rs. 1.6 million in broad daylight from a shop at Sarafa Bazar Hyderabad.

Two clerks of SP [Superintendent of Police] Naushero Feroze kidnapped.

15 December 1990:

Agricultural farm of former SP attacked.

Over 50 influentials held on charges of patronising the dacoits. 3,000 more to be held through operation clean-up. MQM activists allegedly kill two Sindhi students, injure five others at Mirpur Khas.

Parma company looted in Hyderabad city, looted amount worth Rs. 86,000.

18 December 1990:

A youth kidnapped near Bakrani (Larkana).

19 December 1990:

Senator Aijaz Jatoi's Pajero looted in Latifabad suburbs.

Two more kidnapped near Sakran.

11 kidnapped in Larkana Division.

20 December 1990:

Dacoits kidnap five near Saeedabad.

Encroachers resorted to intense firing on municipal staff in Hyderabad.

Three more kidnapped from Larkana.

23 December 1990:

Dacoits attack a village Jaffar Machho at Sukkur. Set 6 houses to torch.

Three wagon passengers kidnapped.

24 December 1990:

Dacoits kidnapped seven persons near Bhan Saeedabad (Dadu).

A minor child killed in dacoits' attack on a village near Tando Allahyar.

A woman killed, five kidnapped at Bhindo (Hyderabad).

25 December 1990:

DSP [Deputy Superintendent of Police] Tando Allahyar killed in attack launched by various gangs of dacoits near Tando Jam. DIG [Deputy Inspector General], DC [Deputy Commissioner] narrowly escaped while the body guard of the former gets killed on the spot.

Dacoits attack Matiari Police Station. Firing lasts one and a half hour. Police flee from police station.

Two including a lecturer kidnapped at Larkana.

Strike against the kidnapping of a medical store owner continues at Larkana.

28 December 1990:

Dacoits attack an ambulance carrying a dead body to Mirpur Khas, kill four including two women near Tando Jam.

Canal assistance protesting against kidnapping of their colleague arrested from Tando Jam.

Five kidnapped from Sukkur division.

Bus looted near Jamshoro.

29 December 1990:

Dacoits reduce 25 houses of scheduled castes to ashes near Tando Allahyar.

30 December 1990:

Strike against kidnapping continues on its second consecutive day at Pano Akil.

Abductee returned after payment of Rs. 175,000 as ransom to the dacoits at Dokri.

Two others kidnapped at Kandiaro (Nawabshah).

31 December 1990:

DIG Hyderabad Range Police Salim Akhtar Siddiqui having claimed the killing of seven dacoits in police encounters near Hala, at Hyderabad press club, could not substantiate his claim.

Dacoits attack a village near Oderolal (Hyderabad), leave a message asking a local landlord for Rs. 1 million as ransom.

Kidnappers at Kandiaro were disguised in police uniforms.

1 January 1991:

Police fail to issue details of killing of seven dacoits in encounters at Hala to the press.

2 January 1991:

Sindhi students attacked by APMISO [All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization] activists at Dadu college. Six Sindhi students seriously injured. Police refuse to register the case.

Dacoits kidnap six persons after looting village Gaheja. Ninety eight arrested in police swoop against dacoits and their patrons in Sukkur Division.

Sindh Government spokesman claims 'only' 28 persons were kidnapped, 31 were murdered, 106 robberies committed and loot worth rupees 20,000,000 was made during the month of December 1990.

Dacoits burn 20 houses at a village near Piaro Goth (Dadu) Police 'encounters' with the dacoits in Sindh become suspect because of great contradictions between the 'locals' and 'police' versions.

58 percent crimes rise in Sindh in the year 1990.

Strike against kidnappings of lecturers and teachers at Larkana.

Two kidnapped from Malir Karachi.

Three bus-passengers kidnapped from Shaikh Bhirkio (Hyderabad).

3 January 1991:

Divisional Commissioner terminates 30 of his clerks who protested against kidnapping of one of their colleagues.

Dacoits loot Allama Iqbal Express.

Three persons including a police inspector kidnapped near Tando Ghulam Ali (Badin).

Four Kidnapped at Sehwan.

Dacoits cut fruit trees of a local landlord leaving for him a message to pay Rs. 200,000 as 'protection money.'

4 January 1991:

17 gangs of dacoits camp in Saeedabad forests (Hyderabad).

5 January 1991:

Dacoits kidnap six bus-passenger near Chamber.

Kidnapped coach passengers including 11 Shia delegates freed after paying huge ransom to their captors.

Teachers decide to court arrest protesting the kidnapping of their SDO [Subdivisional Officer] Muhammad Saleh Sahito.

6 January 1991:

Six passengers kidnapped their Hyderabad.

12 January 1991:

Eight armed men kill three, including a woman, at Tando Allahyar.

Two more killed at Tando Allahyar in dacoits' operations.

15 January 1991:

Two Hindu youths kidnapped from Radhan.

Two lecturers kidnapped near Kandiaro.

14 January 1991:

Nine road banditries in and around Garhi Mori (Khairpur), the native village of Sindhi M.N.A. from Narowal Syed Ghous Ali Shah, within four days.

Dacoits attack 3 villages within a night in Tando Allahyar.

18 January 1991:

One of the notorious robbers, Mohib Shidi, kidnaps 70 Bus-passengers near Matiari on national Highway (Hyderabad). On resistance a truck driver seriously injured. Karachi-Peshawar highway blocked for three hours. Mohib frees all passengers except 6, police rush to the scene.

Three kidnapped near Badah (Larkana), over a dozen kidnapped within a week.

A student and a trader among four kidnapped within a night in Larkana.

Dacoits kill a police-cop and kidnap two near Kandiaro (Nawabshah).

19 January 1991:

Enquiry against police official accused of gang rape at Mirpur Bathoo (Thatta) ordered.

20 January 1991:

Five kidnapped near Mirpur Khas.

An abductee and police-cop killed in an encounter at Sakrand.

21 January 1991:

Three kidnapped in different cases of dacoits' operations near Nawabshah. In an incident, dacoits kidnap grand father and his grand son. While mother of an abductee dies of heart attack.

23 January 1991:

Dacoits demand Rs. 700,000 as ransom from Jalalani village (Thatta).

27 January 1991:

45 member gang of dacoits attack a village near Dadu. One killed.

29 January 1991:

One kidnapped in Moro.

Police kill three in an encounter at Kotri.

39 Sindhi ASIs Police sacked.

Rangers raid a village near Nasirabad (Larkana), kill two villagers, round up many including children.

2 February 1991:

Gangs of dacoits at war with each other. Fighting with mortar and rocket launchers. Eight dacoits killed at Gamb forests (Khairpur). Villagers abandon ten villages in fear. Police positioned outside the forests.

Dacoits kidnap 40 bus-passengers on national highway near Hala (Hyderabad).

House of Chinese experts looted at Latifabad. Urban robbers take away valuables worth Rs. 10 million. Police find no clue yet.

Three more kidnapped near Nasan (Hyderabad).

8 February 1991:

Police operations near Larkana. 3 villages ablaze. Police and rangers arrest 11 women and an old man about 78 years of age.

Rangers raid a village near Chamber (Larkana), arrest six. One kidnapped from Johi (Dadu).

Dacoits kidnap six including four Hindus near Ghotki (Sukkur).

One more Hindu kidnapped from Raharki (Sukkur).

9 February 1991:

37 including peasant leader comrade Mandhal Shar arrested in a raid on village Khrohi (Sukkur) by the rangers.

Dead body of kidnapped found at Machhyon (Khairpur)

10 February 1991:

15 killed, Ethnic riots erupt in Sukkur. Case registered against nine office bearers of MQM.

15 February 1991:

Khairpur police arrest 25 persons including women and an infant from village Balhriji (Larkana).

Dacoits kill a Hindu rice mills owner at Gaji Khuawar (Larkana).

One more kidnapped from Kazi Ahmed.

Dacoits kidnap a cabinman from Wahab Shah railway station (Hyderabad).

Due to the delay in payment of ransom by the landlords, dacoits raid village Bhurgari (Hyd:) and cut down 60 fruit trees.

18 February 1991:

Six kidnapped from village Allah Dino Bhagat.

Three kidnapped in Moro. Two from Kamber (Larkana).

Former PPP MNA [member of National Assembly] Mian Mitho arrested.

Dacoits kidnap nine political leaders and workers including QIP's [Qaumi Inqilabi Party] Mir Thebo, Sajad Zaheer, the son of CPP [Communist Party of Pakistan] Secretary General comrade Jam Saqi, DSF's Hafiz Dayo, JSSF's [expansion not given] Khalid Junejo and others from Mehar (Dadu).

Dacoits kill a woman and two others on Indus Highway (Dadu).

A landlord and his farmer kidnapped from Tando Allahyar.

Eight armed men kidnap a person near Sakran.

Two were kidnapped at Tando Jam.

Six armed men kidnapped one near Ghotki (Sukkur).

Newphew of PPP MNA Haji Abdullah Halepoto and another local PPP leader kidnapped near village Sanjar Chang.

Police raids the residence of PDA MPAs in many parts of Sindh. MPAs Hakim Baluch, Hanif Soljar, Lal Bux Bhutto and Haji Khan Chachar arrested.

Police arrested over one hundred villagers from Dito Kalro (Tando Allahyar). Arrestees were kept at an alleged torture camp set up within a sugar mill.

Police raided at village Sobho Khan (Hyd:) arrested a large number of rural people.

23 February 1991:

Teachers go on strike against the kidnapping of their colleagues.

24 February 1991:

Dacoits kidnapped an additional Sessions Judge near Hala. Encounter with police took place which resulted in the death of two Notorious dacoits Ali Sher Khaskheli, Hassan Ali and kidnapped ADJ Aslam Memon.

### Crisis Deepening

91AS0737G Karachi DAWN in English 28 Feb 91 p 13

[Article by Sultan Ahmed: "The Deepening Crisis in Sindh." Words in italics as published.]

[Text] While the political divide in Sindh becomes deeper and the tragic breach between the two major ethnic groups persists, democracy in the province is getting to be more and more farcical. The provincial government's near-all-out war against the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] opposition is no longer a provincial issue. Normally, the Speaker of the Sindh Assembly, Mr. Abdul Raziq Khan, should have taken positive initiatives to protect the interests of the beleaguered opposition members.

As he did not, the Speaker of the National Assembly [NA], Mr. Gohar Ayub had to intervene, calling himself "a father figure," and obtain a commitment from the Prime Minister that the PPP members of the Sindh Assembly would be permitted to vote in the Senate elections on 14 March.

And realising the gravity of the situation Mr. Gohar Ayub also adjourned the NA session on Tuesday after the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] announced an indefinite boycott of the session as a protest against the excesses committed against it in Sindh. He thought it was more prudent to enable the government to persuade the opposition to return to the assembly than carry on the business of the Assembly as if nothing had happened despite the PDA boycott.

The issue is far larger than permitting the PPP MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly] vote in the election of 10 Senators from Sindh—they will now be. The real issue is whether they will be permitted to function like normal legislators, until those among them who are facing cases are properly tried and duly convicted.

The issue is not only the arrest of 14 MPAs, or more or less, but also the government not admitting that they had been arrested after the arrest, or arresting them without a warrant and then maintaining they had not been arrested. The official position becomes absurd when the government maintains that it did not know who had arrested some of them if they had been arrested, and it becomes ludicrous when the government contends the PPP itself had detained them to make them vote in the manner it directs.



But since some of the MPAs vanished before the election of Jam Sadiq Ali as Chief Minister, and the same happened before the recent Senate by-elections, the people take it for granted the government had arrested or detained the missing MPAs.

A notable new trend in the PPP is Ms. Benazir Bhutto or the PPP Parliamentary Board not directing who should be elected by its members, but ascertaining the preference of the MPAs and even holding a straw poll, as was done recently in the case of the Senator to be elected from Karachi. When the party chiefs are ready to go along with the voting members there is no need for them to lock up their members. But they do want to protect their MPAs from being detained or coerced in any other manner by the Chief Minister to force them vote in the manner he directs.

It is this fear which has resulted in 31 petitions from Sindh PPP MPAs being filed with the Chief Election Commissioner seeking protective custody until the Senate elections on 14 March.

When Jam Sadiq Ali met the Press at a stormy session he maintained that not a single MPA had been arrested. But on Monday the Advocate General, Sindh, confirmed that five MPAs, including former chief minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah had been arrested in "substantive cases." On what basis has the former chief minister been arrested? On the basis of the confessions of one Zahid Saeed who said in court that confession was extorted under duress.

What is even more galling for the PPP is that the charges on which the PPP MPAs have been arrested are of the same kind as those which the MQM leaders and workers had faced before they were withdrawn. Clearly what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander in Sindh politics.

As a result of this strategy of Jam Sadiq to eliminate the PPP, about 14 PPP MPAs from Sindh have sought refuge in the Jal Magsi area of Balochistan where they were taken by Mr. Nadir Magsi. And the Sindh government was prompt in asking the Balochistan government to hand them over to it, and the Balochistan government rejected that request.

Earlier when Mr. Mansoor Wassan, former PPP minister was arrested, the government denied for very long that he was. Ultimately, after many cases had been filed against him, his arrest was admitted. Meanwhile the Sindh government kept on insisting that if Mr. Wassan had been arrested, it did not know who had done it.

But the legal position is that regardless of who arrests or detains an MPA or any other citizen of Sindh, the government has to know who had arrested him and why and get him released if he is unlawfully arrested or unauthorisedly detained. Protecting the life and property of every citizen is the obligation of the Sindh government, and not only of the persons it chooses.

In his intense dislike for the PPP Jam Sadiq told the Press on Friday that the PPP was a terrorist party and a party of *Badmash*. He would have sounded credible if he had not been with the PPP for over 20 years, and had not been its provincial minister in the 1970s and Political Adviser with cabinet rank in the second PPP government. That is not the kind of language permissible for a Chief Minister to use against the principal opposition party in the country and in Sindh.

Earlier, his adviser on Home Affairs, Mr. Irfan Marwat, had also spoken in almost the same strain about the PPP is not so harshly. While Mr. Marwat was not a PPP member, he was provincial minister in two PPP cabinets in Sindh. If the PPP was such a wicked party, how could those who had been ministers in its government today turn around and claim they had just discovered what a bad, bad party it was and is? All this trivialises our politics, and even more the democratic process.

Meanwhile, Sindh continues to be a disturbed province with killings, dacoities and kidnappings although the kidnapping and dacoities in Karachi appear to have come down now. Following the death of 14 persons in Sukkur last week in what the Sindh government denied was an ethnic outrage or one which has been given an ethnic colour, five persons including three students, a Jamaat-i-Islami leader and a driver were killed in Karachi this week. The Naib Amir of the Jamaat, Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad, says the city is under the "worst kind of terrorism" following those deaths which are the result of the shoot-out between the Jamaat-i-Tulaba and the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organizations.

Strong disapproval of the anti-democratic process in Sindh has been voiced by the leader of the Awami National Party, Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Bilour, as well.

The cumulative hostility of the Sindh government towards the PPP has resulted in the opposition in the National Assembly coming up with three demands for a return to the NA: 1. Immediate release of all Sindh MPAs. 2. Postponement of disqualification cases against PDA members. 3. Assurance that all members of the Sindh Assembly will be free to vote in the Senate elections.

But outside the NA, Begum Bhutto has been calling for the dismissal of Jam Sadiq Ali as Chief Minister. She has also been denouncing the speedy trial or anti-terrorist courts for trying PPP leaders as "kangaroo courts."

Clearly the situation in Sindh can only be aggravated by more conflicts and ugly political tussles. If Sindh cannot be ruled well by the PPP to the exclusion of the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], it cannot be ruled by MQM or an MQM dominated coalition to the exclusion of the PPP. It is folly to try to exterminate the PPP.

Former British Prime Minister Disareli said "No government can be long secure without a formidable opposition." And in ancient Greece Herachitus said: "2 Opposition brings concord [as published]. Out of the discord

comes the fairest harmony." But that is not what the Sindh government thinks today. NA Speaker Gohar Ayub clearly acknowledges the need for an effective opposition to make the parliamentary system a success and to keep the government on the right track. The Prime Minister is interested in keeping the opposition within the Assembly, particularly after the offer of cooperation from Ms. Bhutto to overcome the crisis the country is facing. But he is not evidently ready to exert too much.

President Ghulam Ishaq, too, should be interested in normalising the situation in Sindh. Jam Sadiq Ali was his choice as interim-Chief Minister from where he worked his way up. And Mr. Irfan Marwat is his son-in-law, and that seems the reason why Jam Sadiq chose him as high powerful Adviser on Home Affairs. Although the appointment was not made following any indication from the President, Jam Sadiq must have presumed that this would strengthen his bond with the President. If Mr. Marwat fails to control the lawlessness in Sindh, Jam Sadiq could readily argue that was not his own failure but that of Mr. Marwat to whom total authority was given.

Sindh needs far more than smart arguments. The major problem of the province is unemployment. The government, federal or provincial, can offer few jobs because of the economy measures it is forced to take. Employment on a large scale has to come through industrial investment. However liberal the investment policy or extensive the de-regulation, large industrial investment cannot take place in Sindh without law and order. If an increasing number of police inspectors and constables get killed, if a sub-inspector and a constable are kidnapped at Gadap one day and a major Zamindar of Umerkot is kidnapped the next day, and passengers of buses on the highway in Sindh, are robbed wholesale industrial investment cannot come.

The MQM and the PPP ought to realise that salvation lies in promotion the kind of harmony in the province that brings forth large scale investment, increases the jobs and reduces poverty and unemployment. Otherwise increasing unemployment will spur large crimes and worse conflicts. There is not much time for the parties to lose, and so the focus of the federal and Sindh governments should shift from stifling or smothering the opposition to solving the major problems of Pakistan's most troubled province today.

### Urges Communal Understanding

91AS0737H Karachi DAWN in English 4 Mar 91 p 9

[Article by Mohammad Waseem: "What's Happening in Sindh"]

[Text] In Pakistan the year 1991 may turn out to be the year of Sindh. It is possible that Jam Sadiq Ali bows out of office under unenviable circumstances before the end of the year. One can also speculate that it is the politics of Sindh which may have a deterministic influence over

the shape of things in the country rather than otherwise, as has been the case in the past.

The crucial factor is the gulf of perceptions among the leading politicians of Karachi and Islamabad. In Karachi, it is widely perceived to be an ethnic issue par excellence. But in Islamabad it is generally understood to be a federal issue. The former tends to focus on the dichotomy of Sindhis vs Mohajirs politically represented by the PPP [Pakistan people's Party] and MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] respectively. The latter are inclined to concentrate on what are considered the pro- and anti-establishment forces, represented by the IJI [Islamic Jamhori Ittehad] and PPP. Both agree that the PPP is a villain of the piece.

The Sindh problem is both an ethnic and a federal question. Most of the Sindh political elite had gravitated towards the PPP under President Zia's rule. The introduction of parliamentary politics in Sindh under Junejo seemed to put a dent in the PPP's stronghold in the province. But the 1988 and 1990 elections pointed to the PPP's continuing hold over the Sindhi-speaking people. In a rival process of crystallisation of Mohajir interests, the MQM emerged as their representative party, to the exclusion of all others in the field. The Sindhi-Mohajir dichotomy which had been operative in the politics of Sindh for four decades now acquired political and ideological dimensions of dire proportions.

The political divide between the two communities is now complete, at least in terms of seats in the National and Sindh assemblies. A brief period of detente between the two during the first ten months of 1989 broke down on the eve of the no-confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto's government. It was followed by what can be considered the rule of the representatives of Sindhi-speaking community, almost to the exclusion of Mohajirs. In an event of change in the PPP government in Karachi, the MQM could not take a claim as a rival contender for power as opposed to the pattern of Islamabad where the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] leaders Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi had become prime minister.

The question was could a Mohajir become the chief minister of a province where Sindhis and not Mohajirs were the majority community. Presumably a straight MQM government in Sindh was never considered a possibility by the powers that be. The only other way was to install a Sindhi politician willing to oblige and capable of destroying the PPP's constituency among Sindhis. That is where Jam Sadiq Ali came in.

Jam Sadiq Ali, the caretaker and the current Chief Minister of Sindh, is a person who has been assigned a critical role which he has taken up as a challenge. He operates in a political situation which is characterised by the presence of four major forces: the permanent establishment which is not cognisant of the role of the PPP in Sindh or the country at large, the parliamentary framework of politics which brought forth Nawaz

Sharif's IJI government in Islamabad and Jam's own government in Sindh through the October 1990 elections; the MQM of Altaf Hussain which currently represents the ultimate position in anti-PPP politics; and the PPP itself.

Jam Sadiq Ali is obliged to fall back on the former three factors in his efforts to undermine the political relevance of the last factor. In fact, more than that, this is his calling. If he does not perform what he is supposed to, that is deliver Sindh, he will be obliged to forget all about being the chief executive of the province. In other words, he has to serve three masters who operate in different fields of political dynamics—institutional, constitutional and ethnic—but all of whom demand ouster of the PPP's role from the province of Sindh.

Jam has fully committed himself to the role he was asked to play in this regard. He has operated in the way best known to him, i.e. through pressure politics, by instrumentalising the legal machinery of the state. He has reportedly contained dacoity, sometimes by resorting to such controversial means as staging police encounters. He has been accused of arresting the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly], or recently kidnapping a number of them so as to stop them from voting in the election for Senate to be held on 20 March. He has also been held responsible for giving a free hand to the MQM members of the Sindh cabinet in pursuit of their allegedly narrowly conceived ethnic interests.

The political forces representing the Centre in Islamabad have shown some satisfaction over Jam's performance. After all, he succeeded in establishing a non-PPP government in a province, keeping the PPP MPAs and MNAs [member of National Assembly] far from organising themselves as a stable parliamentary force and humouring the most volatile force of the province represented by the MQM. He is generally acknowledged by the IJI leaders to be a man who is fully capable of handling the Sindhi feudals because he is himself one of them. In their words, distinction between fair and foul is not to be maintained if the "job" is to be done.

But then the situation in Islamabad is different. The IJI government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has to weigh the Jam style politics against what it has to pay for it in terms of its own credibility. It is faced with the constant pressure from its need to maintain a modicum of democracy in the country, buttressed by rule of law and accommodation of a legitimate role for the opposition. The IJI government has tried to keep its distance from Jam Sadiq Ali in operational terms. It grossly fears that Jam would become a liability for it at some point in future. It would then be obliged to consider parting of ways with him. One is reminded of Bhutto's decision to dump Khar in 1974 in Punjab under similar circumstances.

Within Sindh, the last few months of Jam Sadiq Ali's chief ministership have brought forth unforeseen results

For example, the government's twin policy of alienating the public representatives of Sindh and appeasing certain nationalist elements of Jiye Sindh variety has led to hardening of ethnic identity among the Sindhi-speaking people of that province. The long-term outcome of this policy cannot be other than revitalizing ethnic nationalism in that community.

In a parallel process, the MQM leadership has failed to fulfil the general demands of its Mohajir constituency in terms of search for jobs, improvement in supply of services, keeping law and order, and generating a sense of security for the future. The basic question of formulating a broad framework for agreement between the two leading communities of Sindh was never addressed. The MQM-dominated cabinet in Karachi has yet to outgrow the narrow vision of asserting itself at the expense of Sindhis and feeling happy about it. Indeed, public disenchantment with the MQM leadership has already begun. Apparently, the latter has considered no option other than stressing its commitment to Mohajir nationalism still further.

The latest outcome of the widening gulf between the Sindhi and Mohajir communities was the exercise in multiplying their numbers on the files during the recent preliminary census of houses. The enumerators on both sides are understood to have inflated the number of their respective communities beyond all reasonable limits. At the centre of the whole exercise remains the question of political domination of Sindh in future, which would depend on the number of public representatives and in turn on the number of voters, and no less the quota system based on it.

It is amazing to see that the present state system of Pakistan has been relatively insensitive to these negative developments. There is an immediate need to search for a solution of the ethnic problem beyond the state itself and out in the society. Unless the two communities come to an understanding with each other, directly and permanently, and also substantially circumscribe their respective positions, no hope of peace and prosperity can be entertained. No one person or even a collection of individuals can do that 'job'.

### Economic Causes Seen

91AS07371 Karachi DAWN in English 10 Mar 91 p. 11

[Article by M.B. Naqvi: "Sindh: Left To Stumble"]

[Text] Symptoms are galore: major crimes in the interior of Sindh have not substantially declined, although ethnic killings have not taken place since about August last year in Karachi and Hyderabad, snipers riding in cars still register their presence from time to time. Who can say that the gulf between ethnic Sindhis and immigrants from upcountry or elsewhere has been filled? Various deadly side-shows do occur, though perhaps less frequently.

Tragic violence in colleges has reappeared between student fronts of Jamat-i-Islami (JI) and MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement]. Whether JI-MQM feud now is accidental or is connected with some specific design or an issue like Senate election, a conspiracy to kill the MQM chief, Mr. Altaf Hussain, is ominously being mentioned. Is anything ugly afoot?

Sindh politics is in a strange state. After losing last year's general election, the country's largest party, PPP [Pakistan People's Party], for all intents and purposes, seems to have been paralysed. Other parties appear to be in no better shape. Most notable in Sindh are factions calling themselves Sindhi nationalists, each claiming to be the most uncompromising champion of Sindh's causes. But the rate at which these factions have proliferated suggests the spreading of some malignancy rather than any healthy clarification of politics. But more on it presently.

Other urban parties—JUP [Jamat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan], JI, JUI [Jamat-i-Ulema-i-Islam], TNFJ [Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiaq—Movement for the Enforcement of Shiite Faith] and a clutch of left-wing groups and factions—also seem to be caught in a time warp; they all try to seize upon fleeting issues like Gulf crises and soon fall into silence and lethargy.

None has registered any real growth. It does look as if the maximum achievement by any of those parties, factions or groups comprises a mention in newspapers. Politics appears to have lost vitality by losing its link with people's actual problems and aspirations.

Why does no one seem to be going anywhere? It is possible that the Sindh Chief Minister, Jam Sadiq Ali's special political and administrative talents have distracted many leaders one way or the other. But the fact remains that the leaderships of these parties, groups, and factions has no answer to the special brew of Jam Saheb's politics. No doubt, the PPP's top leadership is enmeshed in criminal cases that preempt its attention to larger questions. But what about the rest of the party; not everyone is caught in the coils of court cases. Nobody seems to be conscious of the tragic fact that the party may be dying by inches for lack of political oxygen. For a party that is not involved with the people at the grass-roots in some activity concerning the people's actually-felt problems goes the way the Muslim League went. After extended inactivity, all organisms die; political parties no less.

In the PPP's case, it would be a sad loss. It had appeared after almost two decades' political vacuum. It appeared to be alive to the problems that the people actually faced. It more or less energised them for a while and carried the country's politics a stage further. In times of adversity—and they were longish intervals of them—thousands of its workers willingly underwent persecution or otherwise stoically suffered oppression. In purely human terms, it would be a tragic loss if all that fine human material were not to go to waste. But it would—if the party refuses to

throw up new leaders from its lower ranks, who can fill the leadership vacuum temporarily or for the longer term.

The rise of a phenomenon like Jam Sadiq Ali needs to be explained by those who profess to be political leaders, especially in the PPP, from the ranks of which he had arisen. One's sad judgement is that the PPP is not expected to rise to the given challenge that faces it, while the nature of this challenge arises from the stage of political development. Why are all the parties—and one is only concerned with Sindh here, though it also applies to most others—so listless and out of joint? It can quite well be argued that most of them become alive when there is an election to be contested. Some have linked the recent clashes in Karachi and elsewhere with the upcoming Senate elections. But this kind of fitful liveliness during elections and remaining dormant most other times leads to grave political debility, leading to total irrelevance.

Much of it applies to the other so-called rural—aspirating regional nationalism—and urban parties. Even the otherwise vital MQM cannot be immune to this iron necessity. Its leadership seems to be sure that the machinations of its enemies to divide its rank and file would not succeed and so forth. But simple fact appears to be that, like every other party, it has nothing by way of a programme of action and that the old adage of idle minds being Devil's workshop appears to apply.

The principle holds: divorced from day-to-day political activity at the grassroots through democratic capillary action, political parties inevitably die. There are no exceptions. Newspaper statements, interviews or even headlines cannot keep parties alive. The present state of party life in Sindh can only be called a severe paralysis. Not that there are no problems for the people that can keep parties vigorously functioning and alive. Indeed the problems are intensifying.

Parties' inability to respond to rather obvious challenges can be looked under two heads: (a) the extraordinary intellectual inability of leaders to devise solutions to such problems and programmes of political activity that would promote the causes they believe in and keep their parties alive; (b) the sociological origins of various leaderships need to be looked into for causes of this inability.

A hard look at the society in Sindh would explain why there has been and continues to be such large-scale immigration into the province. The immediate post independence immigration from India happens to fall in a different category and in any case it dried up by the middle of 1950s in any meaningful sense of the term. The continuing immigration (from up country) is due to a strange-demographically-determined labour shortage for sustaining new industries, banks and other paraphernalia of a modern state and the processes of economic development. If there had been no such immigration, the pace of such development, as has taken place, would



have been much slower. It is not that Sindh did not have men and women who could do these jobs or needed them.

Only the Sindhi job seekers were not in the market seeking them at the time they were being created. Sindh's original society was, and largely remains, economically and socially moribund. It comprised a small rich landowning elite at the top, and a large mass of people attached to the land, as *harris*, at the bottom. There was no middle class worth naming. It is only now arising mainly through government's own expansion. Even so it is still tiny. By all credible accounts, the mental horizon of a *hari* did not extend much beyond his immediate rural environs; his identification with his job (rather the landlord) was, and largely is, total. A *hari* is not free to leave the land and cannot conceive the idea of walking out on his landlord and going elsewhere in the wide world to earn a living. The state-spawned ethnic Sindhi lower and middle classes—still quite small though large enough to have become noisy—have, so far, failed to provide a leadership with the necessary spark that can truly reform the society.

This is no place to expand on this intellectual failure of Sindh's small intelligentsia or its economic implications, all of which originate in Sindh's land tenure system. One conclusion remains relevant, though.

So long as present relationship between landowners and actual cultivators persists, there is no way that the large mass of Sindhis attached to the lands of only a small elite would remain outside the economic mainstream—even as consumers with enough money to buy manufactured consumer goods. As for the narrow land-owning elite with large unearned incomes, the very mode through which incomes accrue to them seems mostly to preclude their becoming efficient bourgeoisie. This is where the fundamental disease is to be found that afflicts all parties.

The party leadership in nearly all cases springs from this latter class that sustains itself on unearned incomes. Not unnaturally, none of them has chalked out a programme that begins with the basic reform of the land tenure system—without which no further economic development of a genuine kind can be conceived. Nor can party leaderships go to the grassroots and aspiate actual popular desires or reflect their immediate and longer-term needs in their programmes. Hence the ersatz character of most politics. Parties talk of all manner of things except those that concern the immediate needs and problems of the people. Similarly their rhetoric is passionate about things distant, with little mention of things here and now. No wonder politics is not merely unhealthy but well nigh malignant.

The urban parties, all of them, specialise in the same fine art of being loud and passionate about things unreal and far away. They see no misery around them. They have no specific programmes of reforms or of economic and social progress. They do occasionally condescend to talk

of democracy and even of human rights. But their concept of human rights remains devoid of immediate social and economic content that bears on actual lives of common people. None of them cares about longer-term planning either for their cities or for their province or for the country.

Sindh is afflicted with grave problems of both mass poverty in the countryside, under-development and poverty in cities and above all, of an economic policy mix that has been creating mayhem. Ethnic Sindhis are now afraid of becoming a minority in their own region, if it has not already happened. They are angry and afraid. They recognise the economic backwardness of their countryside without daring actually to suggest a politics that, on the one hand, releases their society's latent energies and, on the other, recognises history's ineluctable facts: a large number of human beings has arrived from no matter where; they are here earning their livelihood on a permanent basis; they cannot, and should not be, asked to go away.

The task of statesmanship is, on the one side, to reform and revitalise Sindh's economy to produce the wherewithal of reducing mass poverty and, on the other, to promote a politics that can reconcile and harmonise different ethnic entities already here to produce a hundred flowers' boom. Let all cultural identities be preserved and promoted—as best as possible. By valuing human beings equally increasing their prosperity and encouraging their cultural self-expression as much as humanly possible, the question of majority and minorities would lose its political or economic significance.

That is the high road to enable the Valley of Mehran, the region where love and amity among men should reign. Pointless strife and foolish gestures like wrong reporting of census figures should be seen for what they are. Let a new leadership in Sindh emerge that can rise above old limitations with a programme of economic development and poly-centric cultural flowering and political tolerance. Let all in Sindh be prosperous, free and cultured, with cities integrated into the countryside.

There is much to do by all ethnic components of this province at the local and national levels: the country's political system is too centralised; its wealth is too unevenly distributed, its external relations are based on excessive enmity with some and undue subservience to others. Provinces do not enjoy enough functions and powers while the Centre is all but a leviathan. No one seems to have heard of the devolution of powers and functions as a necessary principle. Local governments need to be made more vital—as true bastions of democracy. All these tasks are waiting to be done. They are necessary to take Sindh forward—together with all others.

### Nationalism Seen a Problem for Muslims

91AS0740E Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 6 Mar 91 pp 10-11

[Article by Zahid Ahmad Khan: "National Integration: Objectives and Realities"]

[Text] The Gulf war has once again brought into lime-light the urgency of the much needed unity of thought and action, at least, on national and international priorities of the nation, which is already reeling under, among other things, the identity crisis. Our haphazard reaction to the Gulf war showed that some of the basic elements of our national character are jerry-built. Every department of our life is suffering from some serious lacunae. Intellectually and emotionally, we have still not come of age. Provincial autonomy, national language, medium of instruction, to mention only a few, are some of the still unsolved problems.

Perhaps the most serious confusion is on the question of Pakistani nationalism. Whereas, nationalism has contributed a lot to the national integration of non-Muslim world; to us nationalism is tantamount to shirk (polytheism). Most of us are of the view that since we, being staunch Muslims, should not rely too much on such a secular notion as nationalism; because we are an international community, according to the basic teaching of the Holy Quran and Hadith, and hence to keep the integrity of our nation; it is enough that we have our first and foremost obedience to God, Almighty. Everything else would fall in line automatically.

The logical presumption, according to this view, is, that we don't need any mundane kind of physical sign or token to keep ourselves secure on the earth. All this sounds very lofty and noble, but when one looks to the past failures of our nation to keep its boundaries intact vis-a-vis foreign aggression, then one comes to the conclusion that mere insistence on the common religion of our nation can never be the only underpinning by which the integrity of our nation can be solidified. In fact, any effort to make a Muslim country more powerful, with physical means, besides transcendental realities of Islam, can only provide yet another opportunity to God the Almighty.

Then there is another group, which is through and through nationalistic and is always on the look out to advise the Pakistanis to do away with all kinds of metaphysical props to keep the unity of Pakistan unimpaired. Since nationalism, pure and simple, has never been on good terms with Islamic values, this group has not unnecessarily been castigated for ignoring the fundamental importance of Islam for a Muslim country in the modern secular age. Both these groups persist in their extreme stance and have not realised the importance of the middle course, frequently preached by Islam.

No one can deny the importance of nationalism in the modern world. Of all the modern and old ideologies, nationalism has been second only to religion in shaping

the destinies of the nations. All the same, nationalism has been on the wane in the east, particularly in the Muslim countries for the last few centuries. The European conquered one Muslim country after another by concerted actions. Whereas some Muslim traitors contributed not a lesser share in causing the defeat of nearly every local ruler; the foreigners were brewing with one aim, to advance their countries interests at all costs. The 'will' overpowered the sheer force of quantity.

Although the history of nationalism is full of hatred and the two world wars were fought on nationalist grounds, yet if the question of nationalism is solved in the light of Islam, nationalism would impart a lot to the strengthening of the intellectual and spiritual contours of a religious country like ours. It is a natural instinct in man to yearn for is [as published] habitat. Even the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) condoned it when certain of his companions betrayed their love for Makkah while staying in Medina for a longer period. Once, Hazrat Bilal, in the presence of the Prophet in a plaintive verse praised the green palm trees and the surroundings of Makkah. The Prophet did not admonish him for loving Makkah, for it was innate in man's instinct, and since Islam has come to fulfil the natural instincts of man within prescribed bounds, this attenuated type of nationalism has added to the furtherance of Islam and not vice a versa.

In one of his sayings, the Prophet (peace be upon him) categorically stated that "The love of one's country and tribe, or group is not bad in itself. What is ignoble and despicable is that you should love your country or tribe in the wrong way." By the same token, love of one's tribe, clan, caste or creed is not bad per se. Historians like Ibn Khaldun aver that, asbeeyat, prejudice, has played an important role in the progress of Islam. However, if he has put more emphasis on the religious aspects of asbeeyat it does not ipso facto prove that territorial aspirations were less important in the progress of Muslim faith.

Islamic nationalism is opposed to the modern secular nationalism in spirit, whereas in letter it has certain motifs plus its own concepts of making its spiritualised. If Islam had not been a code of life, a dour Muslim community could dispense with living in an alien country, but since it is a complete code of life, it requires specified areas for its realisation. Can anyone imagine that the various liberation movements, launched by the subjugated Muslims all over the globe in the 20th century could have seen the light of the day, if not enthused by the Islamic nationalism. Even the Pakistan movement was motivated by Islamic nationalistic urges.

To sum up, we may conclude that Islamic nationalism is in conformity with the letter and spirit of Islam. Those who deny its legitimacy in Islam, want to implement Islam in a vacuum that will only lead to further confusion.

But again, nationalism, even Islamic, one will be of no avail in a Muslim country, if social civil and economical considerations, prevalent throughout the length and breadth of such a nation, are not taken into account seriously. Was it not a fact that Bengali Muslims were religiously more conservative than those in west Pakistan, yet they could not resist the impellings of economic and political deprivations in East Pakistan. Again is it not a reality that the centrifugal another as 'kafirs'. How can we achieve national solidarity? Such are the stock-in-trade arguments that one come across every day. But the situation is not that despairing. Yes, the traits are different, but the essential motifs are the same. Their heroes are the same; their enemies are the same. They are not as dissimilar in their overall composition as it is being made out. Their religion is Islam. The Pakistanis have more in common than diverse, provided they have the grit and the will to translate these truths into reality.

Another factor that has been responsible for the great civilisations and nations, to flourish on the face of this earth for longer period of time, was the admirable combination of power and intellect in their politics and in their people, which enabled them to carry forward not only their arms but also their ideas in the conquered areas. Not only in theory but also in practice, we find the Greeks and the Romans having these qualities in abundance. The Muslims too, when they struck a different note in their civilisation, carried these traditions of power/intellect with them.

This was a reality in the pristine glory of Islam. We are aware of the fact that in the early days of Islam, all the great and famous generals of Muslims were, authorities par excellent on different Islamic disciplines. Indeed some of the famous schools of thought in Islam are more than 70 percent, based on interpretations of these warriors/intellectuals of early Islam. Hazrat Ali, Hazrat Abdullah Bin Masoud, Hazrat Abdullah Bin Abbas, to name a few are chiefly responsible for the most famous fiqha schools of Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Contrarily our politicians, intellectuals, armed personnel, and professionals are 'type' characters. We have confined them to watertight compartments. Yes, this is an age of professionalism. Yet, 'all round' personalities are needed to keep the nation ever on the path of continued progress.

Sometimes, it is contended that National integration is possible only through regimentation. Instances are cited from the state services, particularly from the armed forces, of race ridden countries where the race problem is negligible. But this is not feasible for the whole nation. You cannot train the whole nation on war footings in peace time. You may project to the common man the imperatives of national integration, but you cannot forcibly thrust it into their minds, unless they themselves realise the importance of it. Have we ever tried to grasp this basic truth of national integration?

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